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COURT OF APPEALS 2/19/92 AMENDED OPINION 
EXHIBIT "1" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., 
and Marlen Vernon Johnson, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Division of Securities and 
Utah Department of Commerce; 
State of Utah, 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
Case No. 900558-CA 
This matter is before the court upon petitioners' Petition 
for Rehearing, filed 13 December 1991 and respondents7 Response 
to the Petition, filed 21 January 1992. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for 
Rehearing is granted. The court shall consider the matter 
without argument on the Petition. 
Dated this 19th day of February 1992 
FOR THE COURT: 
/ ^ / 
Mary T/ Noonan 
Clerft/of the Court 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FEB 191992 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk ci the Court 
Utah Coiifi of Appeals 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. , 
and Marlen Vernon Johnson, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Division of Securities of the 
Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED OPINION1 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900558-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 19, 1992) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: John M. Coombs and Craig F. McCullough, Salt Lake 
City, for Petitioners 
R. Paul Van Dam and David Sonnenrich, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Petitioners Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen Vernon 
Johnson (collectively, the Johnsons) appeal from a final agency 
order of the Division of Securities of the Utah Department of 
Commerce (Division), suspending the Johnsons7 registration for 
one year and placing both on two years probation subsequent to 
their suspension. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On August 10, 1990, following a formal hearing, the 
Securities Advisory Board of the Division of Securities issued an 
order suspending Johnson-Bowles's registration as a broker-dealer 
1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same name issued 
November 29, 1991 (175 Utah Adv. Rep. 29). 
and Mr. Johnson's registration as an agent for one year, and 
placed both on an additional two years probation. 
Prior to January 22, 1989, the Johnsons were involved in the 
practice of selling short2 certain shares of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation (U.S.A. Medical). As of January 22, 1989, the 
Johnsons were short 53,500 shares of U.S.A. Medical. On January 
23, 1989, U.S.A. Medical effected a ten for one forward split3 of 
its securities, thus increasing the Johnsons' short position from 
53,500 to 535,000 shares. Shortly after the split, the price of 
U.S.A. Medical's stock increased ten-fold to approximately one 
dollar per share, roughly the same price per share as before the 
split. 
On February 6, 1989, the Johnsons received notice of a buy-
in4 from Otra Clearing Corporation (Otra) of 150,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical securities, giving the Johnsons until February 15 
to effect delivery. At the same time, the Johnsons began to 
furnish the Division of Securities with information regarding 
alleged problems with U.S.A. Medical and its securities. On 
February 15, the Johnsons informed Otra in writing that they 
would not honor the buy-in notice, claiming that they considered 
U.S.A. Medical's common stock to be unregistered securities and, 
as such, refused to "engage or participate in an unlawful 
distribution of unregistered securities," 
On February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles filed a 10b-5 
securities fraud action in federal court, seeking a preliminary 
injunction and declaration that Johnson-Bowles's outstanding 
2. A short sale, a common practice in the securities industry, 
is "a contract for sale of shares of stock which the seller does 
not own, or certificates that are not within his control, so as 
to be available for delivery at the time when under rules of the 
Exchange, delivery must be made." Provost v. United States, 269 
U.S. 443, 450-51, 46 S. Ct. 152, 153 (1926). The goal of the 
broker-dealer is to purchase stocks for delivery at a reduced 
price compared to the outstanding contracts. 
3. The purpose of a stock split is to increase the amount of 
outstanding shares while the amount of capital remains the same. 
It is common for the price of the stock after a split to be 
divided by the factor of the split. For example, in a ten-to-one 
split, the price of each stock after the split would be one-tenth 
of the price before the split. 
4. A buy-in occurs when party "A" fails to deliver stock it owes 
to party "B" within a given period of time. Party "B" may then 
initiate a buy-in by purchasing the stock from another source and 
charging "A" the difference between the actual purchase price and 
what "A" had agreed to spli frw 
contracts and obligations to certain brokerage firms and clearing 
corporations to whom Johnson-Bowles owed shares of U.S.A. Medical 
were void for illegality. On February 17, the court granted the 
temporary restraining order as to Midwest Clearing Corporation, a 
corporation upon which many broker-dealers rely for their own 
securities clearing activities and apparently the entity that 
concerned Johnson-Bowles the most, thus preventing Midwest from 
effecting any buy-ins against the Johnsons for ten days. 
On March 1, 1989, following a hearing on the Johnsons' 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the federal district court 
made numerous findings of fact, including the following: 
2. The Court finds that the stock of 
U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully issued, has 
never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is 
continuing to be traded illegally. 
3. The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been 
and continues to be traded as part of a 
fraudulent scheme and device to manipulate 
and artificially inflate the price of that 
stock in violation of the securities laws. 
4. The Court finds, however, that the 
plaintiff, Johnson-Bowles, knew or should 
have known about the alleged irregularities 
as to non-registration, non-exempt status and 
illegal trading in the stock after it became 
a market maker, and it is charged with 
knowledge of these irregularities. 
5. The Court finds that the relative 
burden between Johnson-Bowles and other 
parties as well as damage to the public 
interest has not been shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence and that there 
is a failure of burden of proof to establish 
those elements. 
The court then entered an order denying the Johnsons' motion. 
On the same date, the Utah State Division of Securities 
issued an order denying the availability of all transactional 
exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1989) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 
which order was made permanent on March 27, 1989. In addition, 
on March 6, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for 
i-on Havq. which order laosed after the SEC did not renew it. 
Also on March 1, the Johnsons received notice from Otra that 
it had effected its buy-in of 150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical 
stock and that, pursuant to buy-in procedures, the Johnsons were 
responsible for the purchase price of that stock. On March 21, 
the Johnsons notified the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), of the notice from Otra. The letter from the 
Johnsons to the NASD stated in relevant part: 
On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. (M.S.T.), 
Otra Clearing called, buying in 150,000 
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corp. The buy-in 
price was $.70 based on guaranteed delivery 
of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson, seller) and the 
buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares (R.A. 
Johnson, seller). 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s 
position that these buy-ins were illegal. 
First, shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical 
Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never 
lawfully registered and do not qualify for 
any valid exemption under federal or state 
law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, 
would have been and is unlawful under Section 
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77e, and Section 10 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares 
of U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement 
or performance of any and all such open 
trades or contracts would constitute and 
serve to complete illegal trades and 
unenforceable contracts. This would violate 
securities law. 
Sometime after the Division's March 1 order suspending 
exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities, the Johnsons purchased 
a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical securities from six 
Utah residents and one New York resident. The Johnsons stated 
that they purchased the U.S.A. Medical securities to satisfy 
outstanding contracts for the delivery of those securities to 
several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. Additionally, 
on March 20, 1990, the Johnsons purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical from another source. Mr. Johnson testified that he made 
this purchase as a possible means to satisfy a pending NASD 
arbitration proceeding between Johnson-Bowles and Otra regarding 
the latter's buy-in. Mr. Johnson further testified that he later 
used the 54,000 shares as securitv for an nni-cfa^^nrf ^^~~—*-<:— 
debt. As a result of the Johnsons' purchase of U.S.A. Medical 
securities, the Utah State Division of Securities determined that 
the Johnsons had engaged in dishonest and unethical conduct 
violative of the Division's March 1, 1989 order and other 
provisions of the law, and initiated an agency action against the 
Johnsons. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 27, 1989, the Division initiated an agency action 
against both Mr. Johnson and Johnson-Bowles, naming each in a 
separate petition containing three counts. Count I alleged 
willful violation or willful noncompliance with agency rules. 
Count II alleged that Johnson and Johnson-Bowles had engaged in 
dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
Count III alleged that Johnson and Johnson-Bowles had, in 
violation of Division rules, recommended to a customer "the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any security without reasonable 
grounds to believe that such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable* inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial 
situation and needs, and any other relevant information known by 
the broker-dealer." The Division subsequently amended its 
petitions, removing Count I and re-alleging Counts II and III of 
the original petitions. 
On May 24, 1989, the Division brought a motion to convert 
the proceedings from informal to formal. Over the Johnsons' 
objection, the said motion was granted on July 14. 
On July 3, 1989, the Johnsons brought a motion pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the 
Division's proceedings against them, arguing that the Division 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to discipline them. The 
Johnsons asserted that they had purchased the stock in order to 
comply with NASD rules, which carry the full force and effect of 
federal law, and therefore necessarily take precedence over state 
law. After a hearing, the motion was denied by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989) 
and applicable Department of Commerce rules, the Johnsons filed 
for agency review of the denial of their 12(b)(1) motion by the 
ALJ, which request was denied by the Division director. 
On September 27, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion to 
dismiss the Division's amended petition for failure to state a 
claim. The Johnsons' motion was granted as to Count II of the 
amended petitions, but denied as to Count I, leaving the 
"dishonest and unethical practices" cause of action intact. 
On November 28, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the Division's amended petitions on several 
grounds. The Division filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Both motions were denied by the ALJ. The Johnsons filed a 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their motion for 
summary judgment, which request was denied. 
On July 16, 1990, a hearing was held on the Division's 
amended petitions. On August 10, 1990, the Securities Advisory 
Board issued an order suspending the Johnsons' registration for 
one year and placing them on an additional two years probation. 
The Division director reviewed and approved the board's order, 
which action was affirmed by the director of the Department of 
Commerce. 
III. ISSUES 
The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) Was the 
Division's March 1, 1989 order suspending exemptions for U.S.A. 
Medical securities valid at the time the Johnsons purchased the 
U.S.A. Medical securities? (2) Did an unconstitutional conflict 
exist between the Division's enforcement of its March 1 order and 
the Johnsons' obligations to complete such transactions under 
NASD rules? (3) Did the March 1 order impermissibly interfere 
with interstate commerce? (4) Did the Division's enforcement of 
its March 1 order violate the Johnsons' due process rights? 
(5) Was there sufficient evidence to support the Division's 
August 10, 1990 order? (6) Did the Division properly apply the 
law to the facts of this case in its August 10 order? (7) Was 
the sanction imposed by the Division unreasonable in light of the 
facts and the Division's past practices? (8) Were procedural 
errors made with regard to the Johnsons' numerous motions? 
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Findings of Fact 
We review an agency's findings of fact under a "substantial 
evidence" test, and will not disturb such findings unless they 
are not "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988)). Substantial evidence is 
something less than the weight of the evidence, but more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence, id. at 68, and is "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion." Id. (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 
110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). The burden lies with 
the Johnsons as the complaining party to "marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findinas are not-. qnnnn>-fo^ u,. 
substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989), our review of 
issues other than findings of fact turned on whether an issue was 
characterized as a conclusion of law or a mixed question of law 
and fact. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State 
Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). However, in Morton, 
the Utah Supreme Court readdressed the standard of review issue 
and concluded that: 
it is not the characterization of an issue as 
a mixed question of fact and law or the 
characterization of the issue as a question 
of general law that is dispositive of the 
determination of the appropriate level of 
judicial review. Rather, what has developed 
as the dispositive factor is whether the 
agency, by virtue of its experience and 
expertise, is in a better position than the 
courts to give effect to the regulatory 
objective to be achieved. 
Id. at 586. The court stated that this type of analysis would 
not significantly impact upon review of agency interpretation and 
application of their own statutes because "[i]n many cases where 
we would summarily grant agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant agency deference on 
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion 
contained in the governing statute.tf id. at 588. Therefore, in 
order for us to determine the appropriate standard of review for 
the various issues raised by the Johnsons, we must first 
determine if the statutes involved grant the type of discretion 
to the Division that the Morton court described. 
Deference to an agency's statutory construction should be 
given "when there is a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the 
statute or implied from the statutory language." Id. at 589. In 
such cases, "we will not disturb the [agency's] application of 
its factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit 
Staffing v. Board of Review. 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989); 
see also Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 172 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. 1991). On the other hand, 
"absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is 
used in reviewing an agency#s interpretation of a statutory 
term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588; see also Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board 
of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App. 1991). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A, Validity of the Division's March 1 Order 
The Johnsons claim that the Division's March 1, 1989 order 
suspending exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities was not valid 
at the time they purchased the U.S.A. Medical securities. They 
assert that since the order was not renewed within ten days, it 
lapsed at that time. The Division responds that the March 1 
order remained in effect and was made permanent at the discretion 
of the executive director on March 27, 1989. 
In order to determine the proper standard of review to apply 
to the validity of the Division's March 1 order, we must first 
examine the statute in question to determine the amount of 
discretion that the legislature granted to the Division in making 
its orders permanent. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1989) grants the executive director 
blanket authority to "deny or revoke any exemption specified in 
Subsection (1)(h) or (1)(j) or in Subsection (2) [of section 61-
1-14] with respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or 
series of transactions . . . ." U.S.A. Medical securities fall 
within section 61-1-14(2), and therefore, the exemptions for such 
securities may be denied or revoked by the executive "director. ~~~~^  
In aiadXtion, section 61-1-14(3) states: "If no hearing is 
requested and none is ordered by the executive director or 
division, the order shall remain in effect until it is modified 
or vacated by the executive director." Id. By its plain 
language, the statute grants broad discretionary powers to the 
executive director to either call for a hearing, modify or leave 
in effect the order that has been entered. Thus, we will not 
disturb the agency's decision unless it "exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board 
of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989); see also Morton, 
814 P.2d at 587; Tasters Ltd.. Inc. v. Department of Employment 
Sec., 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. 1991). 
According to the record, the Johnsons did not request a 
hearing on the March 1, 1989 order within the fifteen day period 
required by the statute, nor at any time thereafter. Further, 
the record indicates that there was no change in the status of 
U.S.A. Medical securities that would have allowed such securities 
to be traded legally. Thus, the executive director had the 
ofrtion of either continuing the order in effect, modifying or 
vacating it. The executive director chose in his discretion to 
continue the order in force. Such a decision was well within the 
agency's statutory authority and discretion, and thus, we 
conclude that it did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness. 
B. Preemption 
In the alternative, the Johnsons argue that the Division's 
order suspending all exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities was 
never valid because it unconstitutionally conflicted with federal 
law, as embodied in the rules of the NASD. The Johnsons contend 
that their obligations as NASD members preempt any state law that 
would interfere with such obligations, and that since the NASD is 
governed by SEC rules, the rules of the NASD carry the full force 
and effect of federal law and necessarily preempt the operation 
of any state laws that may interfere with the operation of NASD 
rules. The Division responds that the Johnsons have not shown 
that there was any conflict between the Division's order and NASD 
rules, and even if such a conflict existed, the Johnsons have 
failed to show that such conflict would have to be resolved in 
favor of the NASD. 
We need not address the Johnsons' argument that the NASD's 
rules carry the full force and effect of federal law because it 
is clear that Congress did not intend the creation and continued 
supervision of the SEC to preempt the states' abilities to 
regulate fraudulent securities schemes. "Consideration under the 
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress 
did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2129 (1981) (citing Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that: 
where Congress has not entirely displaced 
state regulation in a specific area, state 
law is preempted to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a 
conflict arises when . . . state law "stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
full purpose and objectives of Congress." 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 
1472 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State 
Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 
S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983)), cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 
1183 (1991). A state statute will therefore be held to be void 
to the extent to which it conflicts with a federal statute if, 
for example, "compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 
747, 101 S. Ct. at 2129 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-18 
(1963)). Further, the state law will also be found to be void 
where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 321 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 
(1941)). 
That a federal statute should preempt state law in a 
specific area may be evidenced in several ways. For example, 
"[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplant it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947) (citing Pennsylvania 
R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569, 40 S. Ct. 36, 
37 (1919)); see also Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 
148, 156-60, 62 S. Ct. 491, 496-98 (1942). Further evidence of 
preemption may be found if an Act of Congress "touch[es] a field 
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on 
the same subject." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S. Ct. at 1152 
(citing Hines, 321 U.S. at 66, 61 S. Ct. at 404 (1941)). Also, 
evidence of preemption may be found by examining the "object 
sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of the 
obligations imposed by [the law]." Td. (citing Southern R. Co. 
v. Railroad Comm'n. 236 U.S. 439, 35 S. Ct. 304, 305 (1915)). 
Finally, the state policy may simply "produce a result 
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute." Id. 
(citing Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 549, 65 S. Ct. 1373, 1378 
(1945)). 
As to whether state law is preempted in the case at bar, 
Section 78bb(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states in 
pertinent part: 
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or 
any agency or officer performing like 
functions) of any State over any security of 
any person insofar as it does not conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter or the 
rules and regulations thereunder. 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. 1991). The Securities Act of 1933 
contains similar language: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or 
any agency or office performing like 
functions) or any State or Territory of the 
United States, or the District of Columbia, 
over any security of any person. 
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1981). Moreover, "[s]tate securities laws 
operate in conjunction with federal laws; federal laws do not 
supersede state laws." E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d 
978, 980 (Fla. 1989). Thus, section 78bb(a) can only be 
interpreted as an explicit indication by Congress that it 
expressly did not intend to control securities regulation to the 
exclusion of state law. To the contrary, Congress expressly 
granted power to the states to regulate securities. As further 
evidence that Utah's enabling statute, and the Division's order, 
did not in any way compromise the integrity of any federal laws, 
on March 6, 1989, the SEC also issued an order suspending any 
trading of U.S.A. Medical securities. Since both the Division 
and the SEC were acting in concert toward the same goal of 
preventing the fraudulent trading of securities, Utah's 
regulatory scheme in no way conflicted with federal law. 
In summary, it is clear that Congress did not intend the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to displace state law in the same 
area. It is also clear that Congress expressly gave the states 
the authority to regulate securities, especially securities that 
are being traded in a fraudulent manner. North Star Int'l v. 
Arizona Corp". Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Therefore, it is untenable to argue that the SEC would require 
the trading of a particular stock that a state has determined to 
have been traded in a fraudulent manner. Thus, compliance with 
both the federal and state law could not be a physical 
impossibility. The State law is designed to further the same 
objectives that Congress envisioned in creating the SEC. It 
cannot be said that Utah's regulation of a fraudulent security 
does not at the same time fulfill the purposes and objectives of 
federal law. It is therefore apparent that the Division's March 
1 order did not conflict with federal law, but instead helped to 
further the very objectives of Congress in promulgating the 
federal law. Accordingly, if the SEC does not preempt the 
operation of Utah's securities laws, a voluntary, self-regulatory 
organization such as the NASD that is governed by the SEC 
similarly cannot preempt Utah's securities laws. Therefore, we 
conclude that the Johnsons' assertion that the operation of the 
securities laws of the state of Utah are preempted is without 
merit.5 
C. Commerce Clause 
The Johnsons also contend that the Division's order 
suspending all exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities was 
invalid because it impermissibly affected interstate commerce, in 
5. Additionally, the Johnsons raise several procedural attacks 
on the Division and the ALJ that are premised on the argument 
that NASD rules preempt state law. These include: (1) the ALJ's 
denial of the Johnsons' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) the denial of the Johnsons' 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their 12(b)(1) 
motion, (3) the ALJ's denial of the Johnsons' Rule 56 motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (4) the Johnsons' 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their Rule 56 
motion. Having determined that NASD rules do not preempt state 
law. these procedural arguments also fail. 
violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have the power 
to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states . . . . " U.S. Const, art. I, § 8. The Johnsons argue 
that the Division attempted to extend its order to NASD members 
outside of Utah, that the out-of-state NASD members affected by 
the Division's order do not conduct any business in the state of 
Utah, and that, as such, the Division has attempted to give its 
order unlawful extra-territorial effect. We disagree. 
It is clear that Utah may apply its securities laws to 
operations that are conducted within this state, even if those 
laws affect, or are aimed at non-residents. Lintz v. Carey Manor 
Ltd.. 613 F. Supp. 543, 551 (D.C.Va. 1985) (citing Enntex Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Texas, 560 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)). 
With regard to a state statute's effect on interstate commerce, 
the proper inquiry is whether "the statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects 
on interstate commerce are incidental unless the burden imposed 
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits." Enntex Oil, 560 S.W.2d at 497 (citing Pike v. 
Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142-43, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847-48 (1970); 
and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 
S. Ct. 813, 815-16 (I960)); see also North Star Int'l v. Arizona 
Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). Further, "[a] 
state is damaged if its citizens are permitted to engage in 
fraudulent practices even though those injured are outside its 
borders." Enntex Oil, 560 S.W.2d at 497 (citing Rio Grande Oil 
Co. v. State. 539 S.W.2d 917, 921-22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). 
Finally, it is not uncommon for state securities laws to cross 
state boundaries and have some ancillary effect on other states, 
and consequently raise potential issues related to the Commerce 
Clause.6 Such laws are designed to serve two distinct public 
purposes: 
First, the laws protect resident purchasers 
of securities, without regard to the origin 
of the security. Second, the laws protect 
legitimate resident issuers by exposing 
illegitimate resident issuers to liability 
without regard to the markets of the issuer. 
"The states' efforts to advance these 
interests will always overlap when securities 
transactions cross state lines. The states' 
interests can be protected without preventing 
6. Such state securities laws are referred to as Blue Sky laws, 
and have consistently been upheld by both federal and state 
courts. See, e.g., Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.. 699 F. 
Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Media Prods., 
Inc.. 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. App. 1988). 
other states from protecting their own 
interests." 
Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 543, 545 
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (quoting McClard, The Applicability of Local 
Securities Acts to Multi-State Securities Transactions. 20 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 139, 141 (1985)). 
Any interference with interstate commerce by the Division's 
March 1, 1989 order is merely incidental to the local benefit of 
preventing the trading of fraudulent stocks, or the trading of 
otherwise legal stocks in a fraudulent manner. Accordingly, any 
contention that the order as it applies to the Johnsons violates 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is without 
merit. 
D. Due Process Violations 
The Johnsons contend that the Division improperly 
interpreted its March 1, 1989 order as not only suspending 
exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities, but also as prohibiting 
the purchase of such securities. The Johnsons further argue that 
"nothing in the Order, the Utah Uniform Securities Act, or 
[their] industry training and education" put them on notice that 
the mere purchase of U.S.A. Medical securities subsequent to the 
entry of the March 1 order would be interpreted as a violation of 
that order. The Johnsons contend that such a lack of notice 
violated their due process rights. 
However, the Johnsons' argument misses the mark. The 
Division did not sanction the Johnsons for a direct violation of 
the March 1 order. Instead, the Johnsons were sanctioned for 
dishonest and unethical activities in light of the intent, scope, 
and purpose of the Division's order. The Division found that the 
Johnsons' activities "frustrated the Division's appropriate 
efforts to preclude trading in those securities and thus 
partially emasculated the effect of the March 1, 1989 Order." 
The Division found that such activities constituted a "dishonest 
and unethical practice" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-6(1)(g) (1989), thus warranting entry of disciplinary 
sanctions. Accordingly, in order to determine whether there has 
been a due process violation here, we must decide whether the 
statutes, rules, general practices of the securities industry, or 
other facts provided the Johnsons with adequate notice that their 
conduct might be considered dishonest and unethical. See 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 465 (Utah App. 
1991). 
Section 61-1-6(1) (g), under which the Division initiated its 
action against the Johnsons, authorizes the Division to suspend 
or revoke the registration of a broker-dealer if it finds that 
such an order is "in the public interest" and that the broker-
dealer has "engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business." Admittedly, the phrases "in the public 
interest" and "dishonest and unethical practices in the 
securities business" are broadly phrased standards, which may not 
have "a ready and precise meaning to those outside of the 
profession." Heinecke, 810 P. 2d at 465. However, a general 
statutory standard governing professional conduct is acceptable 
for three reasons: "(1) The subject of professional performance 
is too comprehensive to be codified in detail. (2) Members of a 
profession can properly be held to understand its standards of 
performance. (3) Standards of performance will be interpreted by 
members of the same profession in the process of administrative 
adjudication." Id. (quoting Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 
(Utah 1983)). Further, there is not a constitutional violation 
in the use of broad standards governing professional conduct, 
since such standards are not subject to "objections of vagueness 
that apply to penal laws[.]" Vance, 671 P.2d at 128. As we 
stated in Heinecke: 
In contrast to the unfairness in imposing 
criminal liability on a run-of-the-mill 
citizen under a statute which does not 
clearly proscribe the conduct complained of, 
as a result of their training, testing, and 
licensure, members of a profession are 
properly charged with knowledge of what 
conduct is inconsistent with their 
responsibilities as professionals 
notwithstanding some lack of precision or 
comprehensiveness in the statutes and rules 
governing their licensure. 
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 466. 
Under the facts of the present case, it appears somewhat 
disingenuous for the Johnsons to argue that they were not on 
notice that the continued purchase of U.S.A. Medical securities 
subsequent to the March 1 order might be interpreted by the 
Division to be "dishonest and unethical." Beginning with the 
Divisions March 1 order, the Johnsons were put on notice that 
the Division concluded that U.S.A. Medical securities had been 
traded as part of a "device, scheme or artifice," to defraud 
investors. The Division then ordered that the availability of 
any and all transactional exemptions be denied. In light of the 
great efforts and pains that the Johnsons went to in order to 
bring into effect the Division's order, the Johnsons must be 
charged with the knowledge that purchases made subsequent to the 
order might be construed as dishonest and unethical. 
Also on March 1, 1989, in response to Johnson-Bowles's 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the federal district court 
issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order which 
stated in relevant part: 
2. The Court finds that the stock of 
U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully issued, has 
never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is 
continuing to be traded illegally. 
3. The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been 
and continues to be traded as part of a 
fraudulent scheme and device to manipulate 
and artificially inflate the price of that 
stock in violation of the securities laws. 
4. The Court finds, however, that the 
plaintiff, Johnson-Bowles, knew or should 
have known about the alleged irregularities 
as to non-registration, non-exempt status and 
illegal trading in the stock after it became 
a market maker, and it is charged with 
knowledge of these irregularities. 
(Emphasis added). Moreover, there is evidence in the record from 
the federal district court hearing that, prior to the Division's 
proceedings, the Johnsons' legal counsel advised them to not buy 
or sell any shares of U.S.A. Medical securities if there was a 
suspected problem with the security's exemption. 
Additionally, on March 21, 1989, the Johnsons themselves 
issued a letter to the NASD which stated in relevant part: 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company Inc.'s 
position that these buy-ins were illegal. 
First, shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical 
Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never 
lawfully registered and do not qualify for 
any valid exemption under federal or state 
law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, 
would have been and is unlawful under Section 
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 
77e, and Section 10 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares 
of U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement 
or performance of any and all such open 
trades or contracts would constitute and 
serve to complete illegal trades and 
unenforceable contracts. This would violate 
securities law. 
(Emphasis added). This letter plainly exhibits the Johnsons' 
knowledge that, subsequent to the entry of the Division's March 1 
order, any transaction involving U.S.A. Medical securities, 
including the purchase of such securities, might be considered 
dishonest and unethical. 
It is also significant to note that prior to the present 
appeal, the Johnsons argued to any forum willing to listen that 
U.S.A. Medical securities were being traded in a fraudulent 
scheme and that they could not be the subject of any legal 
transaction. For the Johnsons to now argue that they were not on 
notice that their purchases of U.S.A. Medical securities might be 
interpreted as dishonest and unethical is untenable. Therefore, 
we conclude that the Johnsons' due process arguments are without 
merit. 
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The Johnsons contend that the Division's findings of fact 
are unsupported by substantial evidence, and therefore clearly 
erroneous. As noted above, we will not disturb such findings 
unless they are not "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court.11 Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988)). Moreover, 
the Johnsons have the burden of marshaling all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and showing that, despite the supporting 
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See id. 
The majority of the Division's findings are merely a 
summation of a stipulation entered into by the parties. Aside 
from finding of fact fourteen, those few findings that are not 
directly supported by the stipulation are amply supported by 
testimony from the hearing on July 16, 1990. Thus, our 
discussion focuses on the Johnsons' argument with respect to the 
Division's finding of fact fourteen. That paragraph states: 
On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson purchased 54,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities from 
Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, 
Respondent testified that he purchased those 
securities for an entity known as January 
Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy 
a pending NASD arbitration proceeding between 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and 
Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 
1989 buy-in of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. On March 
29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson -
through the January Corporation - sold 54,000 
shares to a firm known as Sorenson, Chiddo & 
May. 
After marshaling the evidence in support of this finding, 
the Johnsons argue that the following testimony is sufficient to 
refute the facts set forth in finding of fact number fourteen, 
and that therefore such finding is clearly erroneous: (1) Mr. 
Johnson testified at the hearing that the 54,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical were purchased during March 1990, to be used, if 
necessary, in an NASD arbitration dispute between themselves and 
Otra; and (2) Mr. Johnson further testified that he later used 
the 54,000 shares as a security interest for an outstanding 
accounting debt, and that such a transfer for security purposes 
only in no way harmed the public. The Johnsons' objection 
centers on the fact that, according to Mr. Johnson's testimony, 
the 54,000 shares were merely transferred as a security interest 
for an outstanding accounting debt, and finding of fact number 
fourteen states that the Johnsons sold the 54,000 shares to an 
accounting firm. However, the Johnsons' objection to finding of 
fact number fourteen, while well-taken in a technical sense, 
misses the relevancy of that finding. The Johnsons are not being 
sanctioned for what they did with the 54,000 shares after 
purchasing them, although that in itself may be sanctionable. As 
discussed above, they are being sanctioned for dishonest and 
unethical conduct in the purchase of those shares, as well as the 
purchase of another 397,900 shares on various dates subsequent to 
the Division's March 1 order, and while that order was in force. 
What the Johnsons subsequently decided to do with the stock is 
inconsequential to the Division's determination that purchasing 
the stock was dishonest and unethical conduct violative of the 
Division's order. Even if we were to eliminate the objected-to 
portion of finding of fact fourteen from consideration, the 
Johnsons could clearly still be sanctioned by the Division for 
dishonest and unethical conduct in the purchase of those 
securities. Therefore, we conclude that whether the shares were 
sold or merely used as a security interest does not affect the 
outcome of the action and is, therefore, irrelevant. 
F. The Division's Application of the Law to the Facts 
Having found that the Division's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence, we next examine the accuracy 
of the Division's application of the law to the facts of this 
case, Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199 (citing Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlainson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); and Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)), which the Johnsons also 
dispute. 
As required by Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), we first examine the 
statute in question to determine the appropriate standard of 
review. Id. at 588-89. Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (1989), 
the executive director of the Division "may issue an order 
denying, suspending, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or 
investment adviser registration if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest" and that "[the defendant has] engaged in 
dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business." 
Id. (emphasis added). We view the words "if he finds that" as 
granting to the Division significant latitude and deference. The 
Division is in a much better position than the legislature or 
this court to supervise the ongoing operation of the securities 
industry and determine what is in the public interest and which 
practices are dishonest and unethical. Therefore, we hold that 
such statutory language "bespeak[s] a legislative intent to 
delegate the interpretation of what constitutes dishonest and 
unethical practices in the securities industry to the Division. 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 (footnote omitted); see also Utah Dep't 
of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 615-16 
(Utah 1983) (agency's determination as to whether something is in 
the public interest is reviewed for reasonableness); Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1316-
17 (Utah 1982) (agency granted discretion to determine what is 
"contrary to equity and good conscience"); Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. 
Department of Employment Sec., 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 
App. 1991) (the words "as determined by the [agency]" indicate a 
grant of' discretion). We further conclude that the statutes in 
question grant to the division the type of deference envisioned 
in Morton, and accordingly we will not disturb the Division's 
decision unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 
439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Division's March 1, 1989 order stated in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in § 61-1-14(3) of 
the Act, that the availability of any and all 
transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-
14(2) of the Act, be and hereby are, 
summarily denied. 
In its findings supporting the March 1, 1989 order, the Division 
found that U.S.A. Medical was not registered with the State of 
Utah, and that it failed to qualify for any transactional 
exemptions. Thus, the Division stated in its August 10, 1990 
order suspending the Johnsons registration: 
The proper scope and operative effect of the 
March 1, 1989 Order entered by the Division 
was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. Medici 
Corporation securities within this state. 
Since those securities were neither 
registered nor exempt from registration and 
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme 
designed to manipulate the price of those 
securities, the just-stated order was duly-
entered to protect the public interest. It 
is specious to argue, as Respondents assert, 
that the order only prohibited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given 
the unlawful issuance of those securities and 
that the subsequent trading of those 
securities was tainted by fraudulent and 
manipulative practices, the proper scope of 
the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly 
interpreted and in a manner consistent with 
the purpose for the issuance of that order. 
Accordingly, the Division held that the Johnsons' actions 
"frustrated the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude 
trading in those securities and thus partially emasculated the 
effect of the March 1, 1989 Order" and clearly "constituted a 
xdishonest or unethical practice' within the meaning of Section 
61-1-6(1)(g) . . . ." Because the Division sanctioned the 
Johnsons for dishonest and unethical conduct in light of the 
intent, scope and purpose of the Division's order, a matter 
clearly within the Division's discretion, we conclude that the 
Division's determination that the Johnsons' actions subsequent to 
the issuance of the March 1 order constituted dishonest and 
unethical activities was reasonable and therefore we will not 
disturb the Division's determination as such. See generally 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 465-66 (Utah 
App. 1991) (the application of broadly phrased ethical standards 
is properly left to the discretion of an agency). 
The Johnsons argue, however, that an act cannot be dishonest 
or unethical unless it is also illegal. However, the scope of 
what constitutes dishonest or unethical conduct is much broader 
than that which is merely illegal. As we stated in Heinecke: 
In contrast to the unfairness in imposing 
criminal liability on a run-of-the-mill 
citizen under a statute which does not 
clearly proscribe the conduct complained of, 
as a result of their training, testing, and 
licensure, members of a profession are 
properly charged with knowledge of what 
conduct is inconsistent with their 
responsibilities as professionals 
notwithstanding some lack of precision or 
comprehensiveness in the statutes and rules 
governing their licensure. 
Id. at 466. Therefore, the Division was within its discretion in 
concluding that the Johnsons' actions were dishonest and 
unethical. The Division's determination is reasonable and 
rational, and as such, we will not disturb this determination. 
G. Sanctions Imposed on the Johnsons by the Division 
In addition, the Johnsons contend that suspending their 
license for one year and placing them on an additional two years 
probation was "arbitrary and ridiculous in comparison to the 
alleged violation." In response, the Division argues that such 
sanctions were reasonable, and that it did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing such sanctions. 
Again, we examine the statute granting the Division the 
authority to impose sanctions under a Morton analysis in order to 
determine the appropriate standard of review. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-6(1) (1989) states in relevant part: 
Upon approval by the executive director 
and a majority of the Securities Advisory 
Board, the executive director may issue an 
order denying, suspending, or revoking any 
agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser 
registration if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that the applicant or 
registrant or, in case of a broker-dealer or 
investment adviser, any partner, officer, or 
director, or any person occupying a similar 
status or performing similar functions, or 
any person directly or indirectly controlling 
the broker-dealer or investment adviser: 
(b) willfully violated or willfully 
failed to comply with any provision 
of this chapter or a predecessor 
act or any rule or order under this 
chapter or a predecessor act; 
(g) engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the 
securities business[.] 
Xd. (emphasis added). As noted above, this statute clearly gives 
the Division broad discretionary powers to either deny, suspend 
or revoke an agent's or broker-dealer's registration. Thus, the 
reasonableness of the sanctions imposed on the Johnsons by the 
Division is similarly a matter of agency discretion, and this 
court will not disturb the agency's decision unless it is clearly 
unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989). 
The Division's sanctions were well within the agency's 
discretion and are appropriate in light of the willful nature of 
the Johnsons' violations. It would be difficult to imagine a 
more willful violation of the intent, scope and purpose of an 
order than that presented in this case. The Johnsons sought 
relief in federal district court, and when such relief was not 
forthcoming, they went to the Division of Securities to seek such 
relief. Having been granted the relief they sought from the 
Division, in the form of the March 1 order suspending all 
exemptions for U.S.A. Medical securities, they immediately turned 
around and began violating the intent, scope and purpose of the 
very order for which in large part they were responsible. As the 
Securities Advisory Board and the Division director stated in the 
Division's August 10, 1990 order: 
entry of a disciplinary sanction in this 
proceeding is in the public interest and 
clearly warranted due to the [Johnsons'] non-
compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which 
was duly entered to regulate the trading of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. The 
record reflects that [the Johnsons'] 
dishonest and unethical conduct was driven by 
a desire to realize monetary gain and/or 
avoid financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] 
willingness to engage in trading the 
securities shifted over time, depending on 
whatever would promote [their] economic 
interests. Adherence to orders duly entered 
by the Division which govern the practices of 
broker-dealers and agents engaged in the 
securities business should not be a matter 
dictated by the potential for monetary gain. 
By reason of the serious nature of [the 
Johnsons'] misconduct, an appropriately 
severe sanction should be entered. 
Further, at the Johnson's request that we take judicial 
notice of past disciplinary practices of the Division, we have 
reviewed these practices with regard to the suspension and 
revocation of registrations, and conclude that the suspension of 
the Johnsons' registration is well within the established 
practices of the Division. Thus, the sanctions imposed on the 
Johnsons by the Division are reasonable in light of the willful 
nature of the violations, and in conformance to past policies and 
practices of the Division. 
H. Conversion of the Proceedings from Informal to Formal 
The Johnsons contend that the Division improperly converted 
the proceedings from informal to formal, thereby prejudicing 
their case. Our review of the Johnsons' argument reveals that 
the Johnsons have failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that "[t]he argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on," Id. 
See also English v. Standard Optical. 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah 
App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App. 
1991); Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 754 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah App.) 
(Jackson, J., concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 
(Utah App. 1987). 
In sole support of this argument, the Johnsons cite Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1989), which provides: 
Any time before a final order is issued 
in any adjudicative proceeding, the presiding 
officer may convert a formal adjudicative 
proceeding to an informal adjudicative 
proceeding, or an informal adjudicative 
proceeding to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is 
in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding 
does not unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
However, this statute does not validate the Johnsons7 argument, 
but rather it supports the action taken by the ALJ. Section 63-
46b-4(3) grants discretion to the presiding officer to convert 
the proceedings from informal to formal if he or she believes the 
conversion to be in the public interest and that such conversion 
would not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.7 The 
Johnsons do not cite any authority or any portion of the record 
that would indicate that the Division abused its discretion in 
taking action under this section to convert the proceedings from 
informal to formal. Therefore, the Johnsons7 appeal of this 
issue is disregarded for failure to comply with the court7s 
briefing rules. 
7. Given the additional procedural safeguards that attend a 
formal proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 to -10 (1989), it 
would be an unusual case indeed where conversion to a formal 
proceeding would prejudice a party sought to be sanctioned by an 
administrative agency. 
We have reviewed the remaining issues raised by the Johnsons 
with regard to their various motions before the Division and find 
them to be without merit, Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 
676 (Utah 1989). 
VII, CONCLUSION 
The Johnsons' claims on appeal are without merit. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Division's final agency order 
suspending the Johnsons' registration for one year and placing 
the Johnsons on two years probation subsequent to their 
suspension. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. J a c k s o n , ^Tudge 
Gregory Orme, J u d g e 
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RUSSON, Judge: 
Petitioners Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen Vernon 
Johnson (collectively, the Johnsons) appeal from a final agency 
order of the Division of Securities of the Utah Department of 
Commerce (Division), suspending the Johnsons' registration for 
one year and placing both on two years probation subsequent to 
their suspension. We affirm. 
I. FACTS 
On August 10, 1990, following a formal hearing, the 
Securities Advisory Board of the Division of Securities issued an 
order suspending Johnson-Bowles's registration as a broker-dealer 
and Mr. Johnson's registration as an agent for one year, and 
placed both on an additional two years probation. 
Prior to January 22, 1989, the Johnsons were involved in the 
practice of selling short1 certain shares of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation (U.S.A. Medical). As of January 22, 1989, the 
Johnsons were short 53,500 shares of U.S.A. Medical. On January 
23, 1991, U.S.A. Medical effected a ten for one forward split2 
of its securities, thus increasing the Johnsons' short position 
from 53,500 to 535,000 shares. Shortly after the split, the 
price of U.S.A. Medical's stock increased ten-fold to 
approximately one dollar per share, roughly the same price per 
share as before the split* 
On February 6, 1989, the Johnsons received notice of a buy-
in3 from Otra Clearing Corporation (Otra) of 150,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical securities at $.10 per share, giving the Johnsons 
until February 15 to effect delivery. At the same time, the 
Johnsons began to furnish the Division of Securities with 
information regarding alleged problems with U.S.A. Medical and 
its securities. On February 15, the Johnsons informed Otra in 
writing that they would not honor the buy-in notice, claiming 
that they considered U.S.A. Medical's common stock to be 
unregistered securities and, as such, refused to "engage or 
participate in an unlawful distribution of unregistered 
securities." 
On February 16, the Johnsons filed a 10b-5 securities fraud 
action in federal court, seeking a preliminary injunction and 
declaration that the Johnsons' outstanding contracts and 
obligations to certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations 
to whom the Johnsons owed shares of U.S.A. Medical were void for 
illegality. On February 17, the court granted the temporary 
1. A short sale is "a contract for sale of shares of stock which 
the seller does not own, or certificates that are not within his 
control so as to be available for delivery at the time when 
under rules of the Exchange, delivery must be made.11 Provost v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 443, 450-51, 46 S. Ct. 152, 153 (1926). 
The goal of the broker-dealer is to purchase stocks for delivery 
at a reduced price compared to the outstanding contracts. 
2. The purpose of a stock split is to increase the amount of 
outstanding shares while the amount of capital remains the same. 
It is common for the price of the stock after a split to be 
divided by the factor of the split. For example, in a ten-to-one 
split, the price of each stock after the split would be one-tenth 
of the price before the split. 
3. A buy-in occurs when party "A" fails to deliver stock it owes 
to party MB" within a given period of time. Party "B" may then 
initiate a buy-in by purchasing the stock from another source and 
charging "A" the difference between the actual purchase price and 
what "A" had agreed to sell for. 
restraining order as to Midwest Clearing Corporation, a 
corporation upon which many broker-dealers rely for their own 
securities clearing activities and apparently the entity that 
concerned the Johnsons the most, thus preventing Midwest from 
effecting any buy-ins against the Johnsons for ten days. 
On March 1, 1989, following a hearing on the Johnsons' 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the federal district court 
made numerous findings of fact, including the following: 
2. The Court finds that the stock of 
U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully issued, has 
never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is 
continuing to be traded illegally. 
3. The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been 
and continues to be traded as part of a 
fraudulent scheme and device to manipulate 
and artificially inflate the price of that 
stock in violation of the securities laws. 
4. The Court finds, however, that the 
plaintiff, Johnson-Bowles, knew or should 
have known about the alleged irregularities 
as to non-registration, non-exempt status and 
illegal trading in the stock after it became 
a market maker, and it is charged with 
knowledge of these irregularities. 
5. The Court finds that the relative 
burden between Johnson-Bowles and other 
parties as well as damage to the public 
interest has not been shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence and that there 
is a failure of burden of proof to establish 
those elements. 
The court then entered an order denying the Johnsons' motion. 
On the same date, the Utah State Division of Securities 
issued a stop trading order, suspending all exemptions under the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act relative to U.S.A. Medical 
securities, which order was made permanent on March 27, 1989. In 
addition, on March 6, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. 
Medical for ten days, which order lapsed after the SEC did not 
renew it. 
Also on March 1, the Johnsons received notice from Otra that 
stock and that, pursuant to buy-in procedures, the Johnsons were 
responsible for the purchase price of that stock. On March 21, 
the Johnsons notified the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), of the notice from Otra in an attempt to initiate 
an NASD arbitration proceeding between themselves and Otra 
regarding a dispute over the legality of the buy-in. The letter 
from the Johnsons to the NASD stated in relevant part: 
On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. (M.S.T.), 
Otra Clearing called, buying in 150,000 
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corp. The buy-in 
price was $.70 based on guaranteed delivery 
of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson, seller) and the 
buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares (R.A. 
Johnson, seller). 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s 
position that these buy-ins were illegal. 
First, shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical 
Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never 
lawfully registered and do not qualify for 
any valid exemption under federal or state 
law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, 
would have been and is unlawful under Section 
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77e, and Section 10 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares 
of U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement 
or performance of any and all such open 
trades or contracts would constitute and 
serve to complete illegal trades and 
unenforceable contracts. This would violate 
securities law. 
Sometime after the Division's March 1 stop trading order, 
the Johnsons purchased a total of 397,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical securities from six Utah residents and one New York 
resident. The Johnsons stated that they purchased the U.S.A. 
Medical securities to satisfy outstanding contracts for the 
delivery of those securities to several broker-dealers and 
clearing corporations. Additionally, on March 20, the Johnsons 
purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical from another source. 
Mr. Johnson testified that he made this purchase as a possible 
means to satisfy a pending NASD arbitration proceeding between 
Johnson-Bowles and Otra regarding the latter's buy-in. Mr. 
Johnson later used the 54,000 shares to satisfy an outstanding 
accounting debt. Consequently, the Utah State Division of 
Securities determined that the Johnsons were in violation of the 
stop trading order and other provisions of the law and initiated 
an agency action against the Johnsons. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 27, 1989, the Division initiated an agency action 
against both Mr. Johnson and Johnson-Bowles, naming each in a 
separate petition containing three counts. Count I alleged 
willful violation or willful noncompliance with agency rules. 
Count II alleged that Johnson and Johnson-Bowles had engaged in 
dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
Count III alleged that Johnson and Johnson-Bowles had, in 
violation of Division rules, recommended to a customer "the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any security without reasonable 
grounds to believe that such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial 
situation and needs, and any other relevant information known by 
the broker-dealer." The Division subsequently amended its 
petitions, removing Count I and re-alleging Counts II and III of 
the original petitions. 
On May 24, 1991, the Division brought a motion to convert 
the proceedings from informal to formal. Over the Johnsons' 
objection, the said motion was granted on July 14. 
On July 3, 1989, the Johnsons brought a motion pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the 
Division's proceedings against them, arguing that the Division 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to discipline them. The 
Johnsons asserted that they had purchased the stock in order to 
comply with NASD rules, which carry the full force and effect of 
federal law, and therefore necessarily take precedence over state 
law. After a hearing, the motion was denied by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989) 
and applicable Department of Commerce rules, the Johnsons filed 
for agency review of the denial of their 12(b)(1) motion by the 
ALJ, which request was denied by the Division director. 
On September 27, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion to 
dismiss the Division's amended petition for failure to state a 
claim. The Johnsons' motion was granted as to Count II of the 
amended petitions, but denied as to Count I, leaving the 
"dishonest and unethical practices" cause of action intact. 
On November 28, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the Division's amended petitions on several 
grounds. The Division filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Both motions were denied by the ALJ. The Johnsons filed a 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their motion for 
summary judgment, which request was denied. 
On August 10, 1990, following a hearing on the Division's 
amended petitions, the Securities Advisory Board issued an order 
suspending the Johnsons' registration for one year and placing 
them on an additional two years probation. The Division director 
reviewed and approved the board's order, which action was 
affirmed by the director of the Department of Commerce. 
III. ISSUES 
The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) Was the 
Division's March 1, 1989 stop trading order valid at the time the 
Johnsons purchased the U.S.A. Medical securities? (2± Did an 
unconstitutional conflict exist between the Division's 
enforcement of its March 1 stop trading order and the Johnsons' 
obligations to complete such transactions under NASD rules? 
(3) Did the March 1 stop trading order impermissibly interfere 
with interstate commerce? (4) Was there sufficient evidence to 
support the Division's August 10, 1990 order? (5) Did the 
Division properly apply the law to the facts of this case in its 
August 10 order? (6) Was the sanction imposed by the Division 
unreasonable in light of the facts and the Division's past 
practices? (7) Were procedural errors made with regard to the 
Johnsons' numerous motions? 
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Findings of Fact 
We review an agency's findings of fact under a "substantial 
evidence" *~est, and will not disturb such findings unless they 
are not M pported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988)). Substantial evidence is 
something less than the weight of the evidence, but more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence, .id. at 68, and is "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion." Id. (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 
110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). The burden lies with 
the Johnsons as the complaining party to "marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989), our review of 
issues other than findings of fact turned on whether an issue was 
characterized as a conclusion of law or a mixed question of law 
and fact. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). However, in Morton, 
the Utah Supreme Court readdressed the standard of review issue 
and concluded that: 
it is not the characterization of an issue as 
a mixed question of fact and law or the 
characterization of the issue as a question 
of general law that is dispositive of the 
determination of the appropriate level of 
judicial review. Rather, what has developed 
as the dispositive factor is whether the 
agency, by virtue of its experience and 
expertise, is in a better position than the 
courts to give effect to the regulatory 
objective to be achieved. 
Id. at 586. The court stated that this type of analysis would 
not significantly impact upon review of agency interpretation and 
application of their own statutes because "[i]n many cases where 
we would summarily grant agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant agency deference on 
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion 
contained in the governing statute." Id. at 588. Therefore, in 
order for us to determine the appropriate standard of review for 
the various issues raised by the Johnsons, we must first 
determine if the statutes involved grant the type of discretion 
to the Division that the Morton court described. 
Deference to an agency's statutory construction should be 
given "when there is a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the 
statute or implied from the statutory language." Id. at 589. In 
such cases, "we will not disturb the [agency's] application of 
its factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit 
Staffing v. Board of Review. 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989); 
see also Tasters Ltd. , Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 172 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. 1991). On the other hand, 
"absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is 
used in reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statutory 
term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588; see also Mor-Flo Ind. v. Board 
of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App. 1991). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Validity of the Division's Stop Trading Order 
The Johnsons claim that the Division's March 1, 1989 stop 
trading order was not valid at the time they purchased the U.S.A. 
Medical securities. They assert that since the order was not 
renewed within ten days, it lapsed at that time. The Division 
responds that the stop trading order remained in effect and was 
made permanent at the discretion of the executive director on 
March 27, 1989. 
In order to determine the proper standard of review to apply 
to the validity of the Division's stop trading order, we must 
first examine the statute in question to determine the amount of 
discretion that the legislature granted to the Division in making 
its stop trading orders permanent. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P~2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 
1991). Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-12 (1989) grants the executive 
director blanket authority to issue a stop order in several 
enumerated circumstances. In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
12(2)(c)(i) (1989) states: "If no hearing is requested and none 
is ordered by the division or executive director, the order shall 
remain in effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive 
director.11 id. By its plain language, the statute grants broad 
discretionary powers to the executive director to either call for 
a hearing, modify or leave in effect the stop trading order that 
has been entered. Thus, we will not disturb the agency's 
decision unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 
439, 442 (Utah App. 1989); see also Morton, 814 P.2d at 587; 
Tasters Ltd.. Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 172 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. 1991). 
According to the record, the Johnsons did not request a 
hearing on the March 1, 1989 order within the fifteen day period 
required by the statute, nor at any time thereafter. Further, 
the record indicates that there was no change in the status of 
U.S.A. Medical securities that would have allowed such securities 
to be traded legally. Thus, the executive director had the 
option of either continuing the order in effect, modifying or 
vacating it. The executive director chose in his discretion to 
continue the order in force. Such a decision was well within the 
agency's statutory authority and discretion, and thus, we 
conclude that it did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness. 
B. Preemption 
In the alternative, the Johnsons argue that the Division's 
stop trading order was never valid because it unconstitutionally 
conflicted with federal law, as embodied in the rules of the 
NASD. The Johnsons contend that their obligations as NASD 
members preempt any state law that would interfere with such 
obligations, and that since the NASD is governed by SEC rules, 
the rules of the NASD carry the full force and effect of federal 
law and necessarily preempt the operation of any state laws that 
may interfere with the operation of NASD rules. The Division 
responds that the Johnsons have not shown that there was any 
conflict between the Division's order and NASD rules, and even if 
such a conflict existed, the Johnsons have failed to show that 
such conflict would have to be resolved in favor of the NASD. 
We need not address the Johnsons' argument that the NASD's 
rules carry the full force and effect of federal law because it 
is clear that Congress did not intend the creation and continued 
supervision of the SEC to preempt the states' abilities to 
regulate fraudulent securities schemes. "Consideration under the 
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress 
did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2129 (1981) (citing Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that: 
where Congress has not entirely displaced 
state regulation in a specific area, state 
law is preempted to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a 
conflict arises when . . . state law "stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
full purpose and objectives of Congress." 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 
1472 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State 
Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 
S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983)), cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 
1183 (1991). A state statute will therefore be held to be void 
to the extent to which it conflicts with a federal statute if, 
for example, "compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 
747, 101 S. Ct. at 2129 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-18 
(1963)). Further, the state law will also be found to be void 
where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz. 321 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 
(1941)). 
That a federal statute should preempt state law in a 
specific area may be evidenced in several ways. For example, 
"[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplant it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947) (citing Pennsylvania 
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37 (1919)); see also Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 
148, 156-60, 62 S. Ct. 491, 496-98 (1942). Further evidence of 
preemption may be found if an Act of Congress "touch[es] a field 
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on 
the same subject." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S. Ct. at 1152 
(citing Hines, 321 U.S. at 66, 61 S. Ct. at 404 (1941)). Also, 
evidence of preemption may be found by examining the "object 
sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of the 
obligations imposed by [the law]." Id. (citing Southern R. Co. 
v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 35 S. Ct. 304, 305 (1915)). 
Finally, the state policy may simply "produce a result 
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute." Id. 
(citing Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 549, 65 S. Ct. 1373, 1378 
(1945)). 
As to whether state law is preempted in the case at bar, 
Section 78bb(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states in 
pertinent part: 
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or 
any agency or officer performing like 
functions) of any State over any security of 
any person insofar as it does not conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter or the 
rules and regulations thereunder. 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. 1991). The Securities Act of 1933 
contains similar language: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or 
any agency or office performing like 
functions) or any State or Territory of the 
United States, or the District of Columbia, 
over any security of any person. 
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1981). Moreover, f,[s]tate securities laws 
operate in conjunction with federal laws; federal laws do not 
supersede state laws." E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d 
978, 980 (Fla. 1989). Thus, section 78bb(a) can only be 
interpreted as an explicit indication by Congress that it 
expressly did not intend to control securities regulation to the 
exclusion of state law. To the contrary, Congress expressly 
granted power to the states to regulate securities. As further 
evidence that Utah's enabling statute, and the Division's order, 
did not in any way compromise the integrity of any federal laws, 
on March 6, 1989, the SEC also issued an order suspending any 
trading of U.S.A. Medical securities. Since both the Division 
and the SEC were acting in concert toward the same goal of 
preventing the fraudulent trading of securities, Utah's 
regulatory scheme in no way conflicted with federal law. 
In summary, it is clear that Congress did not intend the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to displace state law in the same 
area. It is also clear that Congress expressly gave the states 
the authority to regulate securities, especially securities that 
are being traded in a fraudulent manner. North Star Int'l v. 
Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Therefore, it is untenable to argue that the SEC would require 
the trading of a particular stock that a state has determined to 
have been traded in a fraudulent manner. Thus, compliance with 
both the federal and state law could not be a physical 
impossibility. The State law is designed to further the same 
objectives that Congress envisioned in creating the SEC. It 
cannot be said that Utah's regulation of a fraudulent-, security 
does not at the same time fulfill the purposes and objectives of 
federal law. It is therefore apparent that the Division's March 
1 order did not conflict with federal law, but instead helped to 
further the very objectives of Congress in promulgating the 
federal law. Accordingly, if the SEC does not preempt the 
operation of Utah's securities laws, a voluntary, self-regulatory 
organization such as the NASD that is governed by the SEC 
similarly cannot preempt Utah's securities laws. Therefore, we 
conclude that the Johnsons' assertion that the operation of the 
securities laws of the state of Utah are preempted is without 
merit.4 
C. Commerce Clause 
The Johnsons also contend that the Division's stop trading 
order was invalid because it impermissibly affected interstate 
commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have the 
power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states . . . .ff U.S. Const, art. I, § 8. The Johnsons 
argue that the Division attempted to extend its stop trading 
order to NASD members outside of Utah, that the out-of-state NASD 
members affected by the Division's order do not conduct any 
4. Additionally, the Johnsons raise several procedural attacks 
on the Division and the ALJ that are premised on the argument 
that NASD rules preempt state law. These include: (1) the ALJ's 
denial of the Johnsons' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) the denial of the Johnsons' 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their 12(b)(1) 
motion, (3) the ALJ's denial of the Johnsons' Rule 56 motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (4) the Johnsons' 
request for agency review of the ALJ's denial of their Rule 56 
motion. Having determined that NASD rules do not preempt state 
business in the state of Utah, and that, as such, the Division 
has attempted to give its order unlawful extra-territorial 
effect. We disagree. 
It is clear that Utah may apply its securities laws to 
operations that are conducted within this state, even if those 
laws affect, or are aimed at non-residents. Lintz v. Carey Manor 
Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 551 (D.C.Va. 1985) (citing Enntex Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Texas. 560 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)). 
With regard to a state statute's effect on interstate commerce, 
the proper inquiry is whether "the statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects 
on interstate commerce are incidental unless the burden imposed 
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits." Enntex Oil, 560 S.W.2d at 497 (citing Pike v. 
Bruce Church. 397 U.S. 137, 142-43, 90 S. Ct. 844, 845-48 (1970); 
and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 
S. Ct. 813, 815-16 (I960)); see also North Star Int'l v. Arizona 
Corp. Comm'n. 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). Further, "[a] 
state is damaged if its citizens are permitted to engage in 
fraudulent practices even though those injured are outside its 
borders." Enntex Oil. 560 S.W.2d at 497 (citing Rio Grande Oil 
Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 921-22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). 
Finally, it is not uncommon for state securities laws to cross 
state boundaries and have some ancillary effect on other states, 
and consequently raise potential issues related to the Commerce 
ClauseJ5 Such laws are designed to serve two distinct public 
purposes: 
First, the laws protect resident purchasers 
of securities, without regard to the origin 
of the security. Second, the laws protect 
legitimate resident issuers by exposing 
illegitimate resident issuers to liability 
without regard to the markets of the issuer. 
"The states' efforts to advance these 
interests will always overlap when securities 
transactions cross state lines. The states7 
interests can be protected without preventing 
other states from protecting their own 
interests." 
Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.f 699 F. Supp. 543, 545 
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (quoting McClard, The Applicability of Local 
5. Such state securities laws are referred to as Blue Sky laws, 
and have consistently been upheld by both federal and state 
courts. See, e.g., Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. 
Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Media Prods., 
Inc., 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. App. 198*U -
Securities Acts to Multi-State Securities Transactions, 20 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 139, 141 (1985)). 
Any interference with interstate commerce by the Division's 
March 1, 1989, order is merely incidental to the local benefit of 
preventing the trading of fraudulent stocks, or the trading of 
otherwise legal stocks in a fraudulent manner. Accordingly, any 
contention that the stop trading order, as it applies to the 
Johnsons, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution is without merit. 
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The Johnsons contend that all the Division's findings of 
fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, and therefore 
clearly erroneous. As noted above, we will not disturb such 
findings unless they are not "supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 
1989) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988)). 
Moreover, the Johnsons have the burden of marshaling all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and showing that, despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. See id. If the appellant fails to marshal 
the evidence, we assume that the record supports the findings and 
proceed to a review of the accuracy of the agency's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the case. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). With the 
exception of the Division's finding of fact number fourteen, 
which is addressed below, the Johnsons have neither marshaled the 
evidence in support of the agency's findings nor demonstrated 
that such findings are clearly erroneous. Such is plainly 
insufficient to meet the marshaling requirements of appellate 
courts in this state.6 
As to the Division's finding of fact number fourteen, we 
conclude that it is supported by substantial evidence and 
therefore is not clearly erroneous. Paragraph number fourteen of 
the Division's findings of fact states: 
6. Moreover, even had Johnsons properly marshaled the evidence, 
our cursory review of the record suggests that the Division's 
findings are overwhelming supported by the evidence. In fact, 
the majority of the Division's findings are merely a summation of 
a stipulation entered into by the parties. Those few findings 
that are not directly supported by the stipulation would appear 
to be amply supported by testimony from the hearing on July 16, 
On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson purchased 54,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities from 
Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, 
Respondent testified that he purchased those 
securities for an entity known as January 
Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy 
a pending NASD arbitration proceeding between 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and 
Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 
1989 buy-in of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities by Otra Clearing, :ic. On March 
29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson -
through the January Corporation - sold 54,000 
shares to a firm known as Sorenson, Chiddo & 
May. 
After marshaling the evidence in support of this finding, 
the Johnsons argue that the following testimony is sufficient to 
refute the facts set forth in paragraph fourteen, and that 
therefore such finding is clearly erroneous: (1) Mr. Johnson 
testified at the hearing that the 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical 
were purchased during March 1989, to be used, if necessary, in a 
NASD arbitration dispute between themselves and Otra; and (2) Mr. 
Johnson further testified that he later used the 54,000 shares as 
a security interest for an outstanding accounting debt, and that 
such a !transfer for security purposes only in no way harmed the 
public. However, the Johnsons' argument misses the mark. The 
March 1, 1989 order mandated that all transactional exemptions 
for U.S.A. Medical stock be denied, stating: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in § 61-1-14(3) of 
the Act, that the availability of any and all 
transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-
14(2) of the Act, be and hereby are, 
summarily denied. 
Since the stock was unregistered and was not eligible for any 
exemptions to registration, it could not lawfully be the subject 
of any transaction. Moreover, the letter that the Johnsons sent 
to the NASD on March 21, 1989, notifying the NASD about Otra's 
attempted buy-in, evidenced that the Johnsons were aware of such 
fact: 
On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. (M.S.T.), 
Otra Clearing called, buying in 150,000 
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corp. The buy-in 
price was $.70 based on guaranteed delivery 
of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson, seller) and the 
buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares (R.A. 
Johnson, seller). 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s 
position that these buy-ins were illegal. 
First, shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical 
Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never 
lawfully registered and do not qualify for 
any valid exemption under federal or state 
law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, 
would have been and is unlawful under Section 
5 of the Securities Act of 193 3, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77e, and Section 10 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares 
of U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement 
or performance of any and all such open 
trades or contracts would constitute and 
serve to complete illegal trades and 
unenforceable contracts. This would violate 
securities law. 
It is uncontroverted that the Johnsons purchased the 54,000 
shares subsequent to the Division's March 1 order, and while the 
order was in force. What the Johnsons subsequently chose to do 
with the stock is inconsequential and does not in any way 
diminish the fact that they purchased the stock in violation of 
the order. In light of the whole record before us, we conclude 
that finding of fact number fourteen is adequately supported by 
the evidence, and therefore not clearly erroneous. 
E. The Division's Application of the Law to the Facts 
Having found that the Division's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence, we next examine the accuracy 
of the Division's application of the law to the facts of this 
case, Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199 (citing Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlainson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); and Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)), which the Johnsons also 
dispute. 
As required by Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), we first examine the 
statute in question to determine the appropriate standard of 
review. Id. at 588-89. The Division relies upon two statutes as 
authority for its suspension of the Johnsons' registration. 
First, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989) states that H[i]t is 
unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this 
state unless it is registered under this chapter or the security 
or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." Id. 
-^,,y „ ^ ^ n+-*h rnHp Ann. € 61-1-6(1) (1989), the executive 
director of the Division "may issue an order denying, suspending, 
or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser 
registration if he finds that the order is in the public 
interest" and that "[the defendant has] engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the securities business." Jd. (emphasis 
added). We view the words "if he finds that" as granting to the 
Division significant latitude and deference. The Division is in 
a much better position than the legislature or this court to 
supervise the ongoing operation of the securities industry and 
determine what is in the public interest and which practices are 
dishonest and unethical. We hold that such statutory language 
"bespeak[s] a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation 
to the responsible agency," in this case, the Division. Morton, 
814 P.2d at 588 (footnote omitted); see also Utah Dep't of Admin. 
Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601, 615-16 (Utah 1983) 
(agency's determination as to whether something is iruthe public 
interest is reviewed for reasonableness); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Department of Employment Sec. 657 P.2d 1312, 1316-17 (Utah 1982) 
(agency granted discretion to determine what is "contrary to 
equity and good conscience"); Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. 1991) (the 
words "as determined by the [agency]" indicate a grant of 
discretion). Therefore, we conclude that the statutes in 
question grant to the division the type of deference envisioned 
in Morton, and accordingly we will not disturb the Division's 
decision unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 
439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Division's March 1, 1989 order stated in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in § 61-1-14(3) of 
the Act, that the availability of any and all 
transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-
14(2) of the Act, be and hereby are, 
summarily denied. 
In its findings supporting the order, the Division found that 
U.S.A. Medical was not registered with the State of Utah, and 
that it failed to qualify for any transactional exemptions. Upon 
issuance of the Division's order, there was an absolute 
preclusion of any trading of U.S.A. Medical securities. 
Nonetheless, it is uncontroverted that the Johnsons continued to 
purchase U.S.A. Medical securities subsequent to the March 1, 
1989 order. The Division held that such action by the Johnsons 
clearly "constitutes a Adishonest or unethical practice' within 
the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) " We find that such a 
determination by the Division was reasonable and therefore will 
not disturb the Division's determination as such. See generally 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 465-66 (Utah 
App. 1991) (the application of broadly phrased ethical standards 
is properly left to the discretion of an agency). 
F. Sanctions Imposed on the Johnsons by the Division 
In addition, the Johnsons contend that suspending their 
license for one year and placing them on an additional two years 
probation was "arbitrary and ridiculous in comparison to the 
alleged violation.1* In response, the Division argues that such 
sanctions were reasonable, and that it did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing such sanctions. 
Again, we examine the statute granting the Division the 
authority to impose sanctions under a Morton analysis in order to 
determine the appropriate standard of review. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-6(1) (1989) states in relevant part: 
Upon approval by the executive director 
and a majority of the Securities Advisory 
Board, the executive director may issue an 
order denying, suspending, or revoking any 
agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser 
registration if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that the applicant or 
registrant or, in case of a broker-dealer or 
investment adviser, any partner, officer, or 
director, or any person occupying a similar 
status or performing similar functions, or 
any person directly or indirectly controlling 
the broker-dealer or investment adviser: 
(b) willfully violated or willfully 
failed to comply with any provision 
of this chapter or a predecessor 
act or any rule or order under this 
chapter or a predecessor act; 
(g) engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the 
securities business[.] 
Id. (emphasis added). As noted above, this statute clearly gives 
the Division broad discretionary powers to either deny, suspend 
or revoke an agent's or broker-dealer's registration. Thus, the 
reasonableness of the sanctions imposed on the Johnsons by the 
Division is similarly a matter of agency discretion, and this 
court will not disturb the agency's decision unless it is clearly 
unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989). 
The Division's sanctions were well within the agency's 
discretion and are appropriate in light of the willful nature of 
the Johnsons' violations. It would be difficult to imagine a 
more willful violation of an order than that presented in this 
case. The Johnsons sought relief in federal district court, and 
when such relief was not forthcoming, they went to the Division 
of Securities to seek such relief. Having been granted the 
relief they sought from the Division, in the form of the stop 
trading order, they immediately turned around and began violating 
the very order for which in large part they were responsible. As 
the Securities Advisory Board and the Division director stated in 
the Division's August 10, 1990 order: 
entry of a disciplinary sanction in this 
proceeding is in the public interest and 
clearly warranted due to the [Johnsons'] non-
compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which 
was duly entered to regulate the trading of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. The 
record reflects that [the Johnsons'] 
dishonest and unethical conduct was driven by 
a desire to realize monetary gain and/or 
avoid financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] 
willingness to engage in trading the 
securities shifted over time, depending on 
whatever would promote [their] economic 
interests. Adherence to orders duly entered 
by the Division which govern the practices of 
broker-dealers and agents engaged in the 
securities business should not be a matter 
dictated by the potential for monetary gain. 
By reason of the serious nature of [the 
Johnsons'] misconduct, an appropriately 
severe sanction should be entered. 
Further, at the Johnson's request that we take judicial 
notice of past disciplinary practices of the Division, we have 
reviewed these practices with regard to the suspension and 
revocation of registrations, and conclude that the suspension of 
the Johnsons' registration is well within the established 
practices of the Division. Thus, the sanctions imposed on the 
Johnsons by the Division are reasonable in light of the willful 
nature of the violations, and in conformance to past policies and 
practices of the Division. 
G. Conversion of the Proceedings from Informal to Formal 
The Johnsons contend that the Division improperly converted 
the proceedings from informal to formal, thereby preiudicina 
their case. Our review of the Johnsons' argument reveals that 
the Johnsons have failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that ,f[t]he argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Id. 
See also English v. Standard Optical, 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah 
App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App. 
1991); Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah App.) 
(Jackson, J., concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 
(Utah App. 1987). 
In sole support of this argument, the Johnsons cite Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1989), which provides: 
Any time before a final order is issued 
in any adjudicative proceeding, the presiding 
officer may convert a formal adjudicative 
proceeding to an informal adjudicative 
proceeding, or an informal adjudicative 
proceeding to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is 
in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding 
does not unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
However, this statute does not validate the Johnsons' argument, 
but rather it supports the action taken by the ALJ. Section 63-
46b-4(3) grants discretion to the presiding officer to convert 
the proceedings from informal to formal if he or she believes the 
conversion to be in the public interest and that such conversion 
would not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.7 The 
Johnsons do not cite any authority or any portion of the record 
that would indicate that the Division abused its discretion in 
taking action under this section to convert the proceedings from 
informal to formal. Therefore, the Johnsons' appeal of this 
issue is disregarded for failure to comply with the court's 
briefing rules. 
We have reviewed the remaining issues raised by the Johnsons 
with regard to their various motions before the Division and find 
7. Given the additional procedural safeguards that attend a 
formal proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 to -10 (1989), it 
would be an unusual case indeed where conversion to a formal 
proceeding would prejudice a party sought to be sanctioned by an 
them to be without merit, Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 
676 (Utah 1989). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Johnsons' claims on appeal are without merit. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Division's final agency order 
suspending the Johnsons' registration for one year and placing 
the Johnsons on two years probation subsequent to their 
suspension. 
Qtefo/r* ^^C^^STT^%^ 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
^ ~'
A 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gr egory^K. Orme, Judge 
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THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE 
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BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OP COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF : ORDER ON REVIEW 
THE REGISTRATION OF: : 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. : CASE NO. SD-89-4 6BD 
IN THE MATTER OF : 
THE REGISTRATION : CASE NO. SD-89-47AG 
OF: MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON : 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Orders for Which this Review is Sought 
a. Final Order 
By order of the Securities Advisory Board dated August 10, 
1990, and approved by the Director of the Securities Division (the 
"Division") on August 13, 1990, the registration of Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. ("Johnson Bowles") and the 
registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson") were 
suspended for one year. (This order is hereinafter referred to as 
the "Final Order".) Both Respondents also were ordered placed on 
probation for two years following the suspension, with certain 
conditions. 
In summary, Respondents were sanctioned for violating the 
terms of a Division order, dated March 1, 1989, and made permanent 
on March 29, 1989 (the "March 1 Order"). This March 1 Order 
suspended all exemptions available under Section 14(2) of the Utah 
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Uniform Securities Act relative to trading in the stock of a 
company known as U.S.A. Medical Corporation, 
b. Other Orders 
The following interim orders were entered during the pendency 
of this matter: 
i. Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert; 
ii. Order Denying Respondents1 Rule 12(b)(1) 
Motion (lack of jurisdiction); 
iii. Order Denying Respondents1 12(b)(6) Motion 
(failure to state a claim); 
iv. Order Granting the Division's Motion to 
Dismiss Respondents1 Counterclaim; and 
v. Order Denying Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgement. 
2. Request for Agency Review 
Respondents filed a "Request for Agency Review of Entire 
Record and Supporting Brief" (hereinafter, the "Request for 
Review") on August 23, 1990. This Request for Review requests 
agency review (or, in this case, review by a superior agency) of 
the Final Order and the interim orders described above. 
Counsel for Respondents submitted a letter dated September 10, 
1990, to the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, who 
is issuing this Order on Review. This letter has been treated as 
a memo supplementing the Request for Review. The Division did not 
file a written response to the letter. 
In support of its request that each of the above-named orders 
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be reversed and that the proceedings be dismissed and vacated, 
Respondents have referenced the various motions, memoranda, and 
affidavits which support each particular order. The Request for 
Review requests in general fashion that the reviewing officer 
review all of these pleadings, as well as the audio tapes of oral 
argument and the hearing transcript, to determine grounds for 
reversal. The reviewing officer also is requested to address all 
issues presented in all of the documents. 
Counsel for Respondents was invited by letter dated October 9, 
1990, to supplement the Request for Review with a statement more 
particularly stating the grounds for review. Counsel requested 
and received permission to file such a statement within thirty 
days; he thereafter declined the invitation and filed no more 
memoranda. The attachments to the Request for Review and the 
documents incorporated by reference were reviewed in connection 
with this Order on Review for purposes of clarification and 
explanation but were not extensively mined to supply arguments or 
issues or grounds which Respondents declined to specify in the 
Request for Review. 
3. Statutes or Rules Permitting or Requiring Review 
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Section 61-1-2 3 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") . Rule I51-46b-12 of 
the Department also allows for filing a request for agency review. 
By letter dated August 29, 1990, counsel was advised that no oral 
argument would be heard. The Division did not file any written 
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response to Respondent's Request for Review. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
As previously noted, Respondents1 Request for Review did not 
clearly enumerate each separate issue on appeal, but appeared to be 
an attempt re-argue all motions previously made. Where particular 
grounds for review were alleged in the Request for Review, they are 
set forth below. The relief requested is assumed to be a reversal 
of each contested order. 
1. The Final Order: 
a. Whether the Order is supported by the evidence, the 
record, and the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of 
Law; 
b. Whether the Conclusions of Law follow from the 
Findings of Fact; 
c. Whether there should be no findings of fact nor 
conclusions of law, simply a verdict and sanction; 
2. Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert: 
a. Whether the Division waived any right or ability to 
convert the proceeding from an informal proceeding to a 
formal one; 
b. Whether the order granting the Division's motion to 
convert to formal proceedings is erroneous; 
3. Order Denying Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion: 
Whether the 12(b)(1) order was supported by the Findings 
of Fact and the Conclusions of Law; 
- 4 -
4. Order Denying Respondents1 12(b)(6) Motion; 
Whether denial of the 12(b)(6) motion was supported by 
the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law; 
5. Order Granting the Division's Motion to Dismiss 
Respondents f Counterclaim: 
Whether the order dismissing Respondents1 Counterclaim 
was supported by the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions 
of Law; 
6. Order Denying Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgement: 
Whether the order denying Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgement was supported by the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law. 
The Final Order 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Division presented evidence in the hearing through 
the testimony of Kathleen McGinley, Director of Licensing for the 
Division. For Respondents, Respondent Marlen Johnson testified; as 
did Don Sorenson, a Certified Public Accountant who performed some 
accounting services for Respondent; and David King, who offered 
testimony as an expert regarding "dishonest or unethical practices" 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Also entered into evidence 
were certain stipulations of fact; an order issued by the Federal 
District Court for the District of Utah which went to some of the 
issues herein; correspondence regarding the USA Medical stock; and 
other documents reflecting the transactions complained of herein. 
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2. All of the Findings of Fact in the Final Order were 
supported by sufficient and credible testimony and evidence 
presented at the hearing• 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. It appears that there is no basis to modify or overturn 
the Conclusions of Law in the Final Order, for the following 
reasons: the findings are supported by substantial and credible 
evidence; no evidence supporting a contrary finding was presented 
by Respondents1 counsel; the Board and the Director did not 
misinterpret applicable law or rules, and the conclusions do not 
reflect an abuse of discretion by the Board and the Director. 
Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert to Formal Proceedings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
4. Division rules designate all proceedings as informal. 
Although Respondents argue that the Division waived any right it 
had to convert the proceedings from informal to formal, nothing in 
the record indicates that the Division waived this right. In their 
original objection to the Division's motion to convert, Respondents 
argue that simply by the act of filing the petition, the Division 
waived its right to convert. However, this act by itself does not 
indicate that the Division wished to waive conversion, especially 
since there is no way for an agency to convert proceedings before 
they have even commenced. Both Division and Department rules are 
silent as to the ability to convert proceedings from formal to 
informal; the Utah Administrative Procedures Act does allow 
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conversion where it is in the public interest and does not unfairly 
prejudice a party's rights. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
5. The order allowing the proceedings to be converted from 
formal to informal did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge's ruling that conversion was 
in the public interest was not improper because the significant and 
complicated issues in this case could be more fully and competently 
disposed of with the expertise of the Board, pursuant to the 
greater discovery and other rights granted under formal 
proceedings, and because conversion would allow for this matter to 
be disposed of with one full and fair hearing at the administrative 
level. One of the most important issues in this case was whether 
Respondents1 behavior constituted unethical and dishonest conduct. 
These issues could better and more properly be explored within the 
context of a formal proceeding. 
7. Conversion did not unfairly prejudice Respondents1 
rights. Respondents are not harmed merely because they receive 
only one full hearing, at the administrative level, rather than two 
hearings — one in the administrative forum, one in the judicial. 
8. Respondents argue that the order granting conversion was 
erroneous but assigned no grounds for error. Based on a review of 
the record, and for the reasons noted above, I find that conversion 
was not erroneous. 
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Order Denying Respondents1 Rule 12(b)(1) Motion: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
9. Respondents' Request for Review assigns no grounds for 
error or issues on appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's denial 
of Respondent's motion to dismiss based on the Division's lack of 
jurisdiction, 
10. Respondents were licensed by the Division at all times 
relevant to these proceedings. As are most other licensees 
licensed by the Division, Respondents are subject to additional 
regulation by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
self-regulatory organizations such as the NASD which are under SEC 
oversight. 
11. Respondents were charged in the Amended Petition with 
violating Utah law and Division rules. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12. Concurrent regulation in these circumstances is not 
improper or illegal and any applicable federal law or rules did not 
supersede Utah law and rules. 
13. The Administrative Law Judge could reasonably conclude, 
based on the facts before him at the time, that the Division had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents based on their license 
and their alleged violation of Utah law and rules, and therefore 
did not improperly decline to dismiss the Petition. 
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Order Denying Respondents' Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
14. Respondents1 Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state 
a claim was denied. Respondents' Request for Review alleges no 
particular grounds for error or issues on appeal. 
15. The Amended Petition indicated that Respondents purchased 
securities of USA Medical Corporation during a time when all 
transactional exemptions from registration for that stock were 
suspended; that Respondents purchased the securities within Utah, 
from Utah residents; that Respondents knew of the order suspending 
exemptions; and that Respondents knew that the USA stock in fact 
had been unlawfully issued, had never been registered and had no 
exemption from registration and was traded illegally; and that 
Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell 
their stock to Respondents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. The Amended Petition and other documents in the record at 
the time Respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on failure 
to state a claim indicated that there were disputed issues of 
material fact. Specifically, Respondent denied soliciting any of 
the sales, and disputed the amount of profits from the sales; also, 
questions of fact remained to be resolved regarding whether the 
transactions by Respondents' customers were "unsuitable". Finally, 
based on the pleadings, it did not appear as a matter of law that 
the Division could not recover under the theories alleged (aiding 
and abetting and unsuitability). 
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Order Granting Division's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
17. Respondents1 Counterclaim alleges various wrongdoings by 
the Division and concludes with a request for an award of costs, 
attorney's fees and expenses, alleging in support of the request 
that the Division's petition is in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
Ann.; and that an award is proper under the federal Equal Access to 
Justice Act (no citation given). 
18. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Division's 
motion to dismiss the counterclaim, holding that Section 63-46b-
7(1) does not authorize filing of a counterclaim in these 
proceedings, hence that there was no subject matter jurisdiction 
over Respondents1 counterclaim. Thus, the Administrative Law Judge 
did not address whether Section 78-27-56 or Rule 11 applied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. Section 63-46b-7(l) does not clearly bar Respondents1 
counterclaim. It refers to the "claims or defenses" of parties and 
read expansively, could be meant to refer to counterclaims. 
Moveover, Section 63-46b-6 requires that a response be filed, which 
must include a statement of the relief sought. Again, read 
expansively, "response" and "relief" could be extended to cover a 
request for costs and attorney's fees. However, it is noted that 
nowhere does the Utah Administrative Procedures Act incorporate 
Rule 11 or the Rules of Civil Procedure, except those relating to 
discovery. 
-10-
20. Furthermore, Section 63-46b-6 states that the presiding 
officer or the agency by rule "may" permit pleadings in addition to 
the notice and response. Nowhere does the record reflect that the 
presiding officer permitted this counterclaim. Neither Department 
nor Division rules permit the counterclaim. Department Rules do 
not "expressly" adopt Rule 11; Respondents1 assertion in its 
counterclaim that it did is patently incorrect. Department Rule 
151-46b-7 only partially quotes a passage from Rule 11 (that 
signing pleadings constitutes certification that good grounds 
exist) and does not quote the portion regarding award of fees, 
costs or expenses. Therefore, Respondents1 counterclaim was not 
permitted Department rules. 
21. The proper forum for raising a Rule 11 claim, if at all, 
would be upon motion, not through a counterclaim. Regardless, 
Respondents did not prevail below and therefore a Rule 11 claim is 
moot. Finally, the Division's actions — the signing of any 
pleadings by its employees or by the Assistant Attorney General — 
did not violate Rule 11 because each allegation was substantiated 
through documentary evidence or testimony of witnesses, or by 
stipulation. 
Order Denying Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgement: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
22. The Administrative Law Judge denied Respondents1 Motion 
for Summary Judgement, finding that sufficient factual issues 
remained for resolution. 
-11-
23. The various motions filed — both before and after 
disposition of the Motion for Summary Judgement —~ as well as 
testimony at the hearing bear this out. Several important factual 
issues were in dispute. Specifically, the parties did not agree on 
whether Respondents knew of the precise terms of the Division's 
March 1 order when they purchased the USA Medical Securities; or, 
if they did, on whether the order extended to Respondents and the 
transactions complained of in the Petition; and on whether 
Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell 
their stock to Respondents. In addition, although some of the 
unresolved issues perhaps may be better characterized as legal 
issues rather than factual disputes, refusal to grant summary 
judgement was not improper where the Administrative Law Judge 
wished to allow the Board to hear the evidence and lend their 
expertise in determining whether Respondents1 actions did 
constitute violations of the Division's law and rules. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
24. A review of the record indicates that there were 
sufficient disputed issues that denial of the motion for summary 
judgement was not erroneous. 
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ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT the Final Order dated August 13, 1990, be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
Dated this 1*1 day of 0Cf€per , 1990 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the c ^ 9 ^ day of Qcfob&C , 
1990, I caused to be mailed (except as otherwise noted) a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Marlen Johnson 
Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc. 
430 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Earl S. Maeser, Director 
Utah Securities Division 
P.O Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(HAND DELIVERED) 
Craig S. McCullough 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building 
8th Floor 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
John Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark Griffin, Assistant A.G, 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(BUILDING MAIL) 
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THE AUGUST 10, 1990, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE 
SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD SIGNED BY THE 
DIRECTOR OF DIVISION 
EXHIBIT "4 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Registration of 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
CRD No. 7678 
In the Matter of the 
Registration of 
Marlen Vernon Johnson 
CRD No. 259888 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Appearances: 
Mark J. Griffin and Kathleen C. McGinley for the Division of 
Securities 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
July 16, 1990 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce, and the Securities Advisory Board. 
Four (4) members of the Board were present for the hearing, to wit: 
Keith Cannon, Kent Burgon, Margaret Wickens and Truman Bowler. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Board, being fully advised on the premises, now submits 
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to 
John C. Baldwin, Director of the Division of Securities, for his 
review: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen 
Vernon Johnson are, and all times relevant to these proceedings 
have been, registered with the Division of Securities as a broker-
dealer and agent, respectively. Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
is the President of Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
2. As of January 22, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles 
Company, Inc. was short 53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation, a Wyoming corporation. On January 23, 1989, 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation effected a 10 for 1 forward split, which 
increased Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s short position 
to 535,000 shares. Following the just-described forward split, the 
price of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock rapidly increased to 
approximately $1 per share. 
3. During February 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
had furnished information to the Division as to the problems 
associated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation and its securities. On 
February 6, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. received 
notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the latters1 buy-in of 150,000 
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities at $.10 per share 
and that Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. had until February 
15, 1989 to make delivery of those securities. As of February 14, 
1989, the price of those securities had risen to approximately $10 
per share. 
4. By letter, dated February 15, 1989, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson informed Otra Clearing, Inc. that Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. would not honor the buy-in notice 
because it (Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.) considered 
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U.S.A. Medical Corporation common stock to be unregistered 
securities and it declined to "engage or participate in an unlawful 
distribution of unregistered securities". 
5. On February 16, 1989 Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. filed a 10b-5 securities fraud action in Federal District 
Court seeking a preliminary injunction and declaration that 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.' s outstanding contracts and 
obligations to certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations, 
to whom Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. owed U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities, were void for illegality. In the just-
described action, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. alleged 
improprieties and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities. 
6. On February 17, 1989, the Court in the just-referenced 
litigation granted Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. fs motion 
for a temporary restraining order as to Midwest Clearing 
Corporation, thus preventing Midwest Clearing Corporation from 
effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. A hearing on the pending motion for 
a preliminary injunction was conducted on February 27-28, 1989. 
The Court denied that motion, but found as follows: 
"...the stock of U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is 
continuing to be traded illegally. 
The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent 
scheme and device to manipulate and artificially 
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inflate the price of that stock in violation of the 
securities laws.ff 
7. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a summary order 
suspending all Section 14(2) exemptions under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act relative to U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. 
Also on March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
received notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the lattersf buy-in of 
150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. 
8. On March 6, 1989, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation for ten (10) days. By letter, dated March 21, 1989, 
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson advised the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) , Inc. of the March 1, 1989 notice from 
Otra Clearing and stated as follows: 
"On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. ' (MST) , Otra 
Clearing called, buying-in 150,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical Corp. The buy-in price was $.70 based on 
guaranteed delivery of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson, 
seller) and the buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares 
(R.A. Johnson, seller). See attached confirmation 
of Execution of Buy-ins: 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s position 
that these buy-ins were illegal. First, shares of 
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. were unlawfully 
issued, were never lawfully registered and do not 
qualify for any valid exemption under federal or 
state law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, would have 
been and is unlawful under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e, and Section 
10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares of 
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
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and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement or 
performance of any and all such open trades or 
contracts would constitute and serve to complete 
illegal trades and unenforceable contracts. This 
would violate securities laws." 
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson sent the just-stated letter to 
prompt the initiation of an NASD arbitration proceeding with 
respect to the dispute concerning the buy-in of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. 
9. On March 29, 1989, the Divisionfs March 1, 1989 Summary 
Order was made permanent by default. Respondents received copies 
of the Division's March 1, 1989 and March 29, 1989 Orders on or 
about the date of their respective issuance. 
10. As of March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. owed several hundred thousand shares of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities to several broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations. Sometime after the just-stated date, Respondents 
purchased a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York 
resident. The Utah residents and the amount of shares so purchased 
were: Paul Jones (180,900), Nick Julian (69,500), Leo Pavich 
(67,500), Jim Coleman (30,000), Philip Tanzani (20,000) and Richard 
Sax (18,000) . The New York resident was Sheldon Flateman (12,000) . 
Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities as the 
means to satisfy outstanding contracts for the delivery of those 
securities to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
11. Prior to Respondents1 purchase of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities from the above-named seven individuals, 
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Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson informed Mr, Julian, Mr, Pavich, 
Mr. Coleman, Mr. Tanzani and Mr. Sax of the February 28, 1989 
ruling which had been entered by the Court in the previously-
referenced security fraud action and the March 1, 1989 and March 
29, 1989 Orders entered by the Division. Mr. Flateman and Mr. 
Jones, who were both registered NASD representatives, were also 
aware of the Federal Court ruling and the Division's Orders. Prior 
to March 1, 1989, Mr. Jones, a licensed securities agent with 
Wasatch Stock Trading, was involved with the trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities. 
12. During April 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson was 
informed by a Karl Smith that a John Dawson had U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities which Mr. Smith believed Mr. Dawson was 
desirous of selling. Based on that information, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was 
interested in selling those securities. No sale resulted and the 
conversation between Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson and Mr. 
Dawson did not constitute a violation of the Division's March 1989 
Order. Further, there is no sufficient evidence to find that 
Respondents or their agents solicited any of the above-named seven 
(7) individuals to sell their U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. 
13. Given the price which Respondents sold U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities prior to entry of the March 1, 1989 Order 
and the subsequent price which Respondents paid the above-named 
seven (7) individuals to purchase said securities after March 1, 
- 6 -
1989, Respondents realized a profit totalling $6,538 in that regard 
to thus deliver those securities to satisfy existing contracts with 
various broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
14. On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities 
from Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, Respondent testified 
that he purchased those securities for an entity known as the 
January Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy a pending NASD 
arbitration proceeding between Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. and Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 1989 buy-in of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. On 
March 29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson - through the 
January Corporation - sold the 54,000 shares to a firm known as 
Sorenson, Chiddo & May. 
15. Sometime within the last two (2) months, Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. filed a Form BDW with the Division to 
request that its1 broker-dealer registration be withdrawn. Said 
request was denied, given the pending disciplinary proceeding as to 
that registration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend they did not engage in any dishonest or 
unethical conduct and that no disciplinary sanction should enter 
with regard to their registration as a securities broker-dealer and 
agent, respectively. Specifically, Respondents assert that: (1) 
the Division's March 1, 1989 Order prevented only the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities; (2) Respondents purchased 
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those securities to satisfy existing contracts to thus deliver the 
securities to various broker-dealers and clearing corporations; and 
(3) Section 61-1-6(1)(g), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), quoted 
below, may not be applied to interfere with Respondents1 attempts 
to honor their contractual obligations to such third parties. 
Respondents urge that the Division has taken no action against 
other individuals who may have participated in the purchase or sale 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. Respondents also contend that the imposition of any 
sanction in this proceeding would be inconsistent with their duty 
to have complied with NASD requirements which prompted their 
purchase of the securities in order to avoid entry of a possible 
sanction with regard to their NASD affiliation. 
Section 61-1-6(1) provides as follows: 
"Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director...may issue an 
order... suspending, or revoking any 
registration,... if the director finds that it is in 
the public interest and if he finds...with respect 
to the. .. registrant or, in the case of a broker-
dealer..., any partner, officer, or director or any 
person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or 
indirectly controlling the broker-dealer..., that 
such person: 
(g) engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the 
securities business..." 
To be further noted is Section 61-1-7, which provides: 
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or 
sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or 
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." 
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order 
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entered by the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S^A. 
Medical Corporation securities within this state. Since those 
securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration and 
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the 
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly entered 
to protect the public interest. It is specious to argue, as 
Respondents assert, that the order only prohibited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given the unlawful issuance 
of those securities and that the subsequent trading of those 
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative practices, 
the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly 
interpreted and in a manner consistent with the purpose for the 
issuance of that order. 
Concededly, Respondents had an existing contractual obligation 
to deliver U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities to various broker-
dealers and clearing corporations prior to the entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. It is obvious that Respondents elected to trade in 
the securities at issue in an effort to mitigate their "short11 
position, avoid potentially severe economic consequences and escape 
the entry of a possible sanction on their NASD membership. Under 
the circumstances, no other alternative existed to thus foster 
Respondents1 economic interests and the motivation for their 
conduct is clearly understandable. 
Nevertheless, Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those 
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 1989 Order. 
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Such conduct clearly constitutes a "dishonest or unethical 
practice11 within the meaning of Section 61-1-6 (1) (g) and provides 
a sufficient basis upon which to enter a disciplinary sanction as 
to Respondents1 registration. 
Regardless of the factors which prompted Respondents purchase 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities, that conduct frustrated 
the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those 
securities and thus partially emasculated the effect of the March 
1, 1989 Order. While the record does not identify when Respondents 
purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after March 1, 
1989, any delay between entry of the March 1, 1989 Order and 
Respondents1 subsequent purchase of the securities appears to be 
more reflective of the common knowledge that the price of those 
securities would decrease after entry of the March 1, 1989 Order 
rather than any intended compliance by Respondents with that order. 
Respondents' contention that the Division has engaged in 
selective enforcement of the March 1, 1989 Order lacks serious 
merit. The Board notes that a disciplinary proceeding has been 
initiated as to Mr. Jones. It is unknown whether any disciplinary 
proceeding may be subsequently initiated as to Otra Clearing, Inc., 
P.B. Jameson, R.A. Johnson or any of their agents with regard to 
the buy-in notice issued to Respondents by Otra Clearing, Inc. In 
any event, the fact remains that Respondents engaged in misconduct 
which subjects them to entry of a disciplinary sanction regardless 
of whether other proceedings are initiated by the Division as to 
other entities or individuals. 
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Given the circumstances of this case, it may well have been 
impossible for Respondents to have either satisfied their existing 
contractual obligations to various broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations and avoid the subsequent entry of a disciplinary 
sanction in the proceeding or to have scrupulously avoided trading 
in U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and escape possible action 
on their NASD membership. However, the existence of that dilemma 
does not support Respondents' assertions that their duty to comply 
with the March 1, 1989 Order was inferior and subordinate to their 
satisfaction of any NASD requirements and that no disciplinary 
sanction can enter in this forum because they could have been 
potentially subject to adverse NASD action if they did not satisfy 
their contractual obligations to third parties. 
Concededly, there is no evidence that Respondents1 violation 
of the March 1, 1989 Order resulted in any harm to the investing 
public. Nevertheless, entry of a disciplinary sanction in this 
proceeding is in the public interest and clearly warranted due to 
Respondents1 non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which was 
duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. The record reflects that Respondents1 dishonest and 
unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain 
and/or avoid financial loss and that Respondents1 willingness to 
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon 
whatever would promote Respondents1 economic interests. Adherence 
to orders duly entered by the Division which govern the practices 
of broker-dealers and agents engaged in the securities business 
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should not be a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain. 
By reason of the serious nature of Respondents1 misconduct, an 
appropriately severe sanction should be entered. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. as a broker-dealer in the State of 
Utah and the registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson as an 
agent in this state shall be suspended for one (1) year. 
It is further ordered that said suspensions shall be deemed 
retroactively effective from the date that Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc. filed its1 Form BDW with the Division of 
Securities. 
It is further ordered that, upon expiration of the period of 
suspension set forth above, Respondents' registration shall be 
placed on probation for two (2) years. Should Respondents fail to 
comply with the statutes and rules which govern their registration 
during that time, further proceedings shall be conducted and a 
determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that 
set forth herein is warranted. 
Dated this iota day of August, 1990. 
Tubman Bowler 
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BY THE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
are hereby approved. Said Order shall become effective thirty (30) 
days from the date set forth below. 
Dated this day of August, 1990. 
iOA-
^ hn C. Baldwin 
Director 
Administrative Review of this Order may be obtained by filing 
a Request for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any request for a review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Sections 61-1-23, 63-46b-12(l) and the 
departmental rules which govern agency review. 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-16. 
- 13 -
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES 
OF HEARING (WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS) 
EXHIBIT "5 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. JUJ'J 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF i HE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR 
PURPOSES OF HEARING 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
MARLEN VERNON " 
"
 :
 888 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Th * 'ii anu respuiiutsnib nd through tiieii iespective and mutual 
counsel, hereby stipulate to the following facts for purposes of expediting the prospective 
hearing in the above-matter before the Securities Advisory Board. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
1. Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc., and Marlen V *•••' \-e 
registered with the Utah Division of Securities as a securitie, L. ..%c. jt„,e . .. : 
respectively. 
2. As of January 22, 1989, respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" exactly 
53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation 
("U.S.A. Medical" or "Company"). 
3. Effective January 23, 1989, U.S.A. Medical effected a 10 for 1 forward split 
which automatically increased Johnson-Bowies' "short" position tenfold. For example, 
instead of being "short" only 53,500 shares, Johnson-Bowles suddenly was "short" 535,000 
shares. 
4. Following the January 23, forward split, the price of U.S.A. Medical stock 
rapidly increased to approximately $1 per share. 
5. On February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles brought a 10b-5 securities fraud 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Utah seeking a preliminary 
injunction and declaration that Johnson-Bowies' outstanding contracts and obligations to 
certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations to whom Johnson-Bowles owed U.S.A. 
Medical stock were void for illegality. In such action, Johnson-Bowles, alleged improprieties 
and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A. Medical's securities. 
6. The U.S. District Court granted Johnson-Bowies' Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order on February 17, 1989 as against Midwest Clearing, thereby preventing 
Midwest Clearing from effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Johnson-Bowles. 
7. Following a hearing for Preliminary Injunction held on February 27 and 28, 
1989, the Court denied Johnson-Bowles' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. However, U.S. 
District Judge J. Thomas Greene did rule that the securities of U.S.A. Medical were and had 
been the subject of market manipulation and securities fraud. 
8. During February, 1989, Marlen Johnson furnished information to the Division 
relative to the problems associated with U.S.A. Medical and its securities. 
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9. On March 1, 1989. the Division issued a Summary Order suspending all 
§14(2) exemptions from registration under the Utah Uniform Securities Act relative to U.S.A. 
Medical's securities. On March 29. 1989. the Division's March 1, 1989 Order was made 
permanent by default. True and correct copies of the petitioner's March, 1989. Orders are 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibits "AM and "B" respectively. 
10. On March 6. 1989, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for ten (10) days. A true and correct 
copy of such Order is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "C". 
11. The respondents received copies of the Division's March 1 and 29. 1989 
Orders (Exhibits "A" and "B" hereto) on or about the date of their respective issuance. 
12. As of March 1. 1989. Johnson-Bowles' owed several hundred thousand 
shares of U.S.A. Medical stock to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. During 
March. 1989, respondents purchased a total of 397.900 shares of U.S.A. Medical securities 
from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York resident. 
13. Of the seven (7) individuals from whom respondents purchased U.S.A. 
Medical stock after March 1. 1989. five (5) have submitted affidavits that they were not 
"solicited" by respondents or any of their agents and such individuals have further attested 
that they were aware of not only Judge Greene's February 28, 1989 ruling, but that they 
were also aware of the Division's March 1989 orders. True and correct copies of such 
affidavits, including their respective exhibits, are attached hereto as Exhibits "D", "E". "F", 
"G", and "H". 
14. The remaining two (2) individuals from whom respondents purchased 
U.S.A. Medical stock after March 1. 1989, are New York resident Sheldon Flateman and Utah 
resident Paul Jones. Such individuals were also aware of Judge Greene's ruling and the 
Division's March 1989 Orders. Further, both individuals are registered representatives with 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") and prior to the Division's 
March 1, 1989, order, Paul Jones, a licensed securities agent with Wasatch Stock Trading, 
was involved in the trading of the securities of U.S.A. Medical. Because Flateman is a New 
York resident, and, in an effort to expedite these proceedings, whether respondents 
"solicited" him or not will not be an issue in these proceedings. 
15. During April, 1989, respondent Marlen V. Johnson was informed by one 
Karl Smith that a Mr. John Dawson had stock of U.S.A. Medical that Smith thought Dawson 
was desirous of selling. Based on Mr. Johnson's conversation with Mr. Smith, Mr. Johnson 
contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was interested in selling his U.S.A. Medical stock. 
Such conversation never resulted in either a sale of U.S.A. Medical stock or a violation of 
the Division's March 1989 orders. 
16. The purchases undertaken by the respondents in U.S.A. Medical stock 
during the pendency of the Division's order from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York 
resident are as follows in the amounts indicated: 
SELLER AMOUNT OF SHARES 
Paul Jones 180,900 
Richard Sax 18,000 
Philip Tanzini 20,000 
Jim Coleman 30,000 
Nick Julian 69,500 
Leo Pavich 67,500 
Sheldon Flateman, 12,000 
a New York resident 
TOTAL 397,900 
DATED this 0 th day of July, 1990. 
^Attorney for Respondents 
/ 
In re: Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson 
Case No. SD-89-45BD 
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF HEARING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of July, 1990, (s)he 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF 
HEARING by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin, Director and Kathleen C. 
McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division, Utah Department of 
Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; 
Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Ekiund, Esq., Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 
South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. McCullough, Esq., 
Callister, Duncan, & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, Kennecott Bldg., 10 
East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; and Mark J. Griffin, Esq., Assistant 
Attorney General, 115 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
J:STIP.3-4 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
^ ^ •a 
^ 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Leo Pavich on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical Is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
0!>U_LlbS 
1 -
In fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve involve the 
payment of a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this _/£ day of November, 1989. 
Leo Pavitch 
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. Case 
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before, 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing at Salt Lake City. UT 
j&ffl 
J:AFDVT.J.G 
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20 June 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE: 67,500 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp., . 145c per share, $9,787.50 
JJEO /%0l&h 
I, SHHBHBBHBMr, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen Johnson. 
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning 
U.S.A. Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being aware of 
the State of Utah's pending actions against Marlen Johnson and 
Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc. 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Richard Sax on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
- 1 -
in fact sold such stock on my own Initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a -customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this £t> day of November. 1989. 
p^iW^ \&j\^ 
Richard Sax 
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
Notary Public 
jsiding at Salt Lake City. UT 
My Cornmlssjon Expires: 
l-JML 
J:AF0VT.e 
May 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Richard Sax, offered to sell my U.S.A. Medical stock to Marlen 
Johnson. At no time, did Marlen Johnson solicit me to sell him 
my stock. 
Very truly yours, (24^ p-
Richard Sax 
c^ 
Witness 
S/A3/S4 
Date 
Subscribed and sworn before me t h i s **3 day of /v/A^/ 1989. 
"
 X
 NOTARY V * % 
fit- V.S.fi. /^Co,C-f\ir l,o fl-P. 
Oo °^ 
/ tVfc A ^ ^ ot= Jin*- j~ Tno"*i C^U^J^ oB^T 
/%*>,*/(. W<<S ACA/rJsT ^ ^ J J ^ W T 
5) rJ^tOL^y,
 7 . ^ 
SJo2?28l 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
&£* 
* / 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Nick Julian on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer- of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason. I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this//jday of November, 1989. 
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In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this (^day of November. 1989. 
Notary Public I 
9sid|ing at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
J:AF0VT.9 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JUSTEENE BLANKENSHIP 
7655 So. 2700 East 
Sa't Lake City, UT 84121 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JUNE 4, 1993 
STATE OF UTAH 
'
l j U ) A i H l 
- 3 -
May 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Nick Julian, called Marlen Johnson to ask him if he would be 
interested in buying my USA Medical stock. I told him I wanted 
to sell 69,500 shares at .10c per share or $6,950.00. I also told 
him that I was aware of the rulings of the State of Utah and Judge 
Greene's findings. 
Sincerely, } 
Witnessed b\? 
5/2 3 / g l 
Dated 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
on this J?3 day of />%y 1989. 
KQTAHY 
pysuc 
% , ^ 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
<«. 
to" , ' • * 
t3\ 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Phillip Tanzini on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical Is true and correct and It bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
- 1 -
in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr, Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason. I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this ^  day of November. 1989. 
- 9 _ 
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
tesiding at Salt Lake City, UT 
.'/ . * 
JrAFCVT. i r 
7 June 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE: 20,000 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp. .30c per share 
I, Phillip Tanzini, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen 
Johnson. I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling 
concerning USA Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being 
aware of the State of Utah's action dated March 1, 1989. 
Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and 
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical 
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers. 
Sincerely yours, , 
Phillip Tanzini ^ 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
4 £ ^ 2 5 2 g ^ 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE C O U N T Y ) 
Jim Coleman on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson when I sold 
him stock of U.S.A. Medical, is attached hereto and incorporated by reference and it is true 
and correct. 
2. That I was not -encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That I 
in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of to the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason. I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted and to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf 
of anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am 
also not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this Mo day of November. 1989. 
In re: In the matter of Johnson -Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. C-
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN 
SUBSCRIBED nml SWnhH lulmloie 
My Commission Expires: 
Raiding at Salt Lake C IT 
•\/(tj*t\ 
J:AF0V 
May 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE: 30,000 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp/$3,000.00 
I, James Coleman, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp shares to Marlen Johnson. 
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning 
U.S.A. Medical dated February 29, 1989 as well as being aware of the 
State of Utah's action dated March 1, 1989. 
Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and 
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical 
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers. 
Sincerely, 
James Coleman 
DIVISION'S MARCH 1, 1989, SUMMARY ORDER 
EXHIBIT "6" 
John C..-Baldwin, Director 
Patricia' -Louie# Director 
Registration 
Securities • 'Divis ,i 01 i 
Utah Department of Business Reg i il a t::l DI i 
160 East 300 South 
Post Office Box 4 5802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE SECURITIES DIVI8ION 
OP THE DEPARTMENT I'll1 lilllll I  INI Bill lUSGULATION 
I THE STATE OP UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION 
FILE NUKBEI&BT 1619 
SUMMARY ORDER DENYING 
AVAILABILITY OF • 'EXEMPTIONS 
FROM REGISTRATION 
CASE NUMBEK (;J1J iijt'iiii u i - i if 
Pursuant S e c u r i t i e s Act 
( T i t l e 61 , Chapter
 f -Utah. Code -Annotated, • a s ' amended # J. y 8 \ ( i i »" 
Act" "Ii, the^tJtah S e c u r i t i e s D i v i s i o n ("the Div i s ion 1 1 ) has found t h a t 
1&is .SunBuu^y-: Order JJ» In I In- inililin, I itcMPfil III appears t o t h e 
D i v i s i o n "'that i 
HffPiyqg QF WVCT 
1 1 S • ii11 mi mi mi mi 111 11 i i j i i j ( i l 11 ( i 1 ii" i iii 1 inn in U*i i ii 111 in mi in i|iiF i ir in1 f h P s f A t e 
of Wyoming f i January 12
 r 19 7<* • o r a b o u t D e c e m b e r . !' [ *7 , 
t ' i merged w i n i II< ft MprHcfli C o r p o r a t i o n , i ! uli 
' c o r p o r a t i o i ii".» LI. I ><> i J ml M , " i ,u i , i « " u p « t i i f e u i 
•Wyoming under t h e name USA Medical Corporat ion C'USA1"! . 
oo( )r#:>Mn 
2. The anti-fraud provisions contained in § 61-1-1 of tne Act 
prohibits (1) employment of any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud, (2) the making of any untrue statement of a material fact, 
or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading and (3) engaging in any act, practice 
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person. 
3. Section 61-1-7 of the Act states that it is unlawful for 
any person to offer or sell any security in Utah unless it is 
registered or exempt from registration under § 61-1-14 of the Act. 
4. Offers and sales of the securities of USA have been made 
in the state of Utah during the period June 1, 1988 through this 
date. 
A. Failure to Register Securities 
5. A search of the Division9s records indicates that a 
registration statement pursuant to § 61-1-8, fi 61-1-9 or S 61-1-10 
of the Act has never been filed by USA with the Division. 
B. Failure to Qualify for Exemptions from Registration 
6. Section 61-1-14(2) of the Act contains several 
transactional exemptions from registration, including the 
exemptions commonly referred to as the "manual listing" exemption 
contained in 5 61-1-14(2)(b) and the "secondary trading" exemption 
contained in fi 61-1-14(2)(m) of the Act. 
nnnr/vn 
— — abou4- ^ e Divis ion 
*~r2 *ca4 4 - i f i rmat ion or t h e a v a i l a b i ; i t . cne manuax 
l i s t i n g exempi * ' ~ct 1 - "< 
1 7 7 - 1 4 - 2 1 . J * - D i v i s i o n . r u ; ^ v . * e u 
i I n d u s t r i e **.i . t ic : * .* . • f e minimal information 
r e q u i r e d ' - -14-2b of ~:e 
D i v i s i o n . S p e c i f i c a . i . s t i n g d: . 
1 lUier tK** • -^ vp.ar p reced ing - ' ^ a r -he 
ba l ance shee t .,; ».h° mn^i * - j e t t e r 
da ted ^pbr r . .w ;^ he D iv i s ion n o t i f i e d A
 t.a . f 
was ii 111 H i J 11 I i i i i i i ' i<lilii1 i iiuil in format ion was requ i red , 
h Sec t ion 61-1-14 (2) (m) m Mi" »i< |IUIVIU<».'I ,i U.MM i c t i o n a l 
exemption for "fajny nonissuer t r a n s a c t i o n e f f e c t e d by oi through 
•a r e g i s t e r e d i i OUM m nn.i NIM I » " In I r o k e r - d e a l e r mainta ins in h i s 
r e c o r d s , and makes reasonably a v a i l a b l e npon reques i n .i , i i son 
I?'K «»roKf, i nq " i n t e r e s t In ,:i proposed t r a n s a c t i o n in the s e c u r i t y 
wi th t h e b roker -dea lu i in lumen nm i rc-.i I* ' lr" t h e d i v i s i o n under 
i t s r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s . " 
9 . Pulr* 17?-14-2m of tno D i v i s i o n s e t s f o r th the xc lus ive 
method of oiainunq ILv \ i iu„i,ii. t i r ' n KM mp1 ."nntaint * 
4(2) (m) of t h e Act p a r t i c u l a r , the i u l e r e q u ^ e . i 
» "due d i l i g e n c e package" be f i l e d ' w i t h 
t <i L- IVIS, «
 n f l e e t 
t h a t USA has PVP»
 i€S d i l i g e n c e ' 1 f i l i n q wiih UIH Divis ion 
nursuau v i s i o n . 
C. Fraudulent Scheme to Defraud 
10. In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company. Inc. v. USA 
Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court, 
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having 
heard testimony on the matter, that: 
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Division hereby 
issues the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
11. Failure of USA Medical Corporation to register its 
securities, or claim an appropriate exemption from registration as 
provided in § 61-1-14 of the Act, is a violation of § 61-1-7 of the 
Act; 
12. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act; 
13. Untrue .statements of material facts and omission to state 
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the 
securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2) 
of the Act; and 
non«<:M*'* 
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<>r, engaged in fho offer and sale of the securities 
nf lin;>A heiurai corporation hnvt• omjaMo'i! 11 i In, i iff Ices and/or 
JI r ourse ul business wlnliih IIIMI uperated as a iraud ui <JH' o n 
J, Mil *ii. i ' f M M - A c t . 
Based upon the foregoing Findings u ' i 1 n hi i i 
La W / it is in the public interest tin i Rsue the following 
SUMMARY ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with the provisions "".H'„, 
forth Ji] § 61.-1.-14(3) nf the Act, that the availability of any and 
all transactional exempt inn-, i mil.i M M il  '" ill1 il l -ill (V"! ,if the Act, 
be and hereby-are, summarily denied. 
1" 11 r siirtii I i I-in in HI o f t h e A c t , n o t i c e is h e r e b y g i v e n 
that within fifteen (15) days attc cei.pl ul ii i « MI. U I em leqwst,, 
this matter wil_ > H. down I or hearing, 
DONE AND ORDERED tins 1st day of March, 1989. 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIRECTOR 
At 
00'» 
DIVISION'S MARCH 27, 1989, "PERMANENT 
ORDER BY DEFAULT" 
EXHIBIT "7 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION 
Respondent• 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DEFAULT ORDER 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-031 
By the Presiding Officer: 
The instant proceeding was initiated via a Petition for Order 
Denying Availability of Transactional Exemptions from Registration 
dated March 1, 1989. A Notice of Agency Action was sent, certified 
mail, return receipt requested to Respondent and Respondent's 
authorized representative on March 2, 1989. The Notice of Agency 
Action and Petition was also sent, postage prepaid, regular mail, 
to the parties listed on Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part 
hereof. A hearing has not been requested by Respondent or any 
other interested party within twenty (20) days of the date of the 
Notice of Agency Action as required pursuant to the provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
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Section 63-4 6b-ll of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
provides that failure of a party to participate in an adjudicative 
proceeding may result in an order of default against such party. 
The Presiding Officer, being fully advised in the premises, 
now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state 
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979. On or about December 8, 1987, 
S.M.I., Inc. merged with USA Medical Corporation, a Utah 
corporation. The surviving company is domiciled in the state of 
Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation (flUSAM) . Offers and 
sales of the securities of USA have been made in the state of Utah. 
2. In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. v. USA 
Medical Corporation, et ah Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court, 
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having 
heard testimony on the matter, that: 
2. [T]he stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
3. The stock of USA Medical has been and continues 
to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and device 
to manipulate and artifically inflate the price of that 
stock in violation of the securities laws. 
Such findings of fact are adopted herein. A copy of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion for 
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Preliminary Injunction and Granting Motion to Stay Action and 
Compel Arbitration is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part 
hereof. 
3. The securities of USA, or its predecessor S.M.I., Inc., 
have never been registered in Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
§ 61-1-8, § 61-1-9 or § 61-1-10 of the Act. 
4. The exemption from registration contained in § 61-1-
14(2)(b) of the Act is unavailable for nonissuer transactions of 
the securities of USA inasmuch as the listing, in Moody' s OTC 
Industrial manual for USA did not contain the information required 
by § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the Division. 
Specifically, the listing did not contain a profit and loss 
statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the 
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations. 
5. USA did not file an application for any other 
transactional exemption from registration contained in 61-1-14(2) 
of the Act with the Division. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made in violation of § 61-1-7 of the Act; 
7. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act; 
8. Untrue statements of material facts and omissions to state 
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the 
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securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2) 
of the Act; and 
9. Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities 
of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or 
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in 
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act. 
DEFAULT ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the availability of the 
transactional exemptions from, registration contained in § 61-1-
14(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act be, and hereby are, denied 
for the securities of USA Medical Corporation, any affiliate or 
successor to USA Medical Corporation, or any entity subsequently 
organized by or on behalf of USA Medical Corporation. 
AGENCY REVIEW 
A defaulted party may seek to set aside the Default Order by 
filing a request for agency review within ten (10) days after the 
issuance of the order in accordance with the procedure set forth 
in Rule 151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act rules. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
An 0 faAkm. 
'-JOHN C. BALDWIN 
PRESIDING OFFICER 
0U;>^iu7 
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BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default 
Order are hereby accepted, confirmed and approved by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce. 
DATED this 27 th day of March , 1989. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
DAVID L. BDHLER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
The foregoing Default Order is hereby accepted, confirmed and 
approved by the Utah Securities Advisory Board. 
DATED this day of J/WWlA , 1989. 
^IAAKM <3L. 
^ c 
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DIVISION'S AMENDED PETITIONS DATED 
JULY 19, 1989 
EXHIBIT "8 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Mark J. Griffin 4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
KAYCEE MCGINLEY 2187 
Securities Division 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD NUMBER 7578 
A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-46BD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF 
MARLEN JOHNSON 
CRD NUMBER 259888 
A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-47AG 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah ("the Division"), by and through its Director, John 
C. Baldwin, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains and alleges 
as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The cause of action was investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that Marlen Johnson and Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. 
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("Johnson Bowles") have engaged in acts and practices which 
constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Title 61, 
Chapter 1, et sea., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) ("the 
Act"). 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction is vested in the Executive Director and the 
Securities Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce pursuant 
to § 61-1-6(1) of the Act. 
2. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Executive 
Director, upon approval of a majority of the Securities Advisory 
Board, may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any agent or broker-
dealer registration if he finds that such order is in the public 
interest and the agent or broker-dealer: 
(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical 
practices in the securities business. 
3. Johnson Bowles is a securities broker dealer duly 
registered by the state of Utah under CRD registration 7578. 
4. Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson"), CRD registration 
259888, is a registered securities agent by the state of Utah and 
principal of Johnson Bowles and acted as such at all times relevant 
to this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. On or about January 1988, Johnson, acting as an agent and 
principal for Johnson Bowles began effecting and attempting to 
effect transactions in the securities of USA Medical Corporation, 
a Wyoming corporation ("USA Medical"), whose securities were 
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offered and sold in the state of Utah. 
6. On or about February 16, 1989, Johnson Bowles, by and 
through its agent Johnson, filed suit in federal district court to 
obtain an injunction to prevent trading of in the securities of USA 
Medical. 
7. On March 1, 1989, in the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. v. USA Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. 
District Court, Central Division) the Court found: 
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further, that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
8. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order, 
(Case Number SD-89-030) denying the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of 
USA Medical pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in 
§ 61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary Order was hand 
delivered to Johnson Bowles on March 1, 1989. The Order is and has 
been in effect continuously since its issuance on March 1, 1989. 
The Summary Order is attached hereto and made a part of these 
proceedings (Exhibit A). 
9. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an administrative 
action to deny the availability of all transactional exemptions 
from registration pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act for the 
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securities of USA Medical (Case Number SD-89-031). A copy of the 
Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to Johnson Bowles 
on March 2, 1989. 
10. Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce accepted, 
confirmed and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order on March 27, 1989. The Default Order denied the 
availability of the transactional exemptions from registration 
contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of USA 
Medical, any affiliate or successor to USA Medical or any entity 
subsequently organized by or on behalf of USA Medical. A copy of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order was 
mailed to Johnson Bowles on March 27, 1989. 
11. On March 31, 1989, the Division caused a letter to be 
mailed to Johnson Bowles restating the findings of the federal 
district court and the Division's Summary Order and Default Order. 
12. On or about April 3, 1989 through April 18, 1989, 
Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and principal for 
Johnson Bowles, attempted to effect or effected transactions in the 
securities of USA Medical as follows: 
a. On or about April 3, 1989 and April 13, 1989, Johnson 
contacted Mr. John Dawson, a shareholder of USA Medical, to 
purchase shares of USA Medical owned by Mr. Dawson. Johnson 
informed Mr. Dawson that such arrangement would be a 
handwritten agreement between Mr. Dawson and a New York firm. 
Johnson offered Mr. Dawson $.10 per share and instructed Mr. 
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Dawson to deliver his stock certificate to Johnson Bowles 
whereupon a check for the shares of USA Medical would be given 
to him. 
b. On or about April 6, 1989, Johnson purchased 12,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,200.00 from Sheldon 
and Lois Flateman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
c. On or about April 14, 1989, Johnson purchased 18,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,800.00 from Richard 
Sax in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
d. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 80,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $8,000.00 from Paul Jones 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
e. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 69,500 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $6,950.00 from Nick 
Julian in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
f. On information and belief, the Division believes 
Johnson has purchased approximately 226,500 additional shares 
of USA Medical since March 1, 1989. 
COUNT I 
13. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 12 as specifically 
set out herein. 
14. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division 
may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration of a 
broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public interest 
and the broker-dealer: 
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(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business. 
15. The above described sales of USA Medical shares were 
sales effected without registration or exemption in violation of 
Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
16. The actions of Johnson, in soliciting and/or purchasing 
the USA Medical shares during the pendency of the Division's order, 
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 
of the Act. 
17. The above actions of Johnson, acting on behalf of 
Johnson-Bowles, in soliciting, encouraging or aiding the violation 
of the Division's Order constitute violations of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
COUNT II 
23. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 22 as specifically 
set out herein. 
24. Section 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Act provides that the 
Division may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration 
of a broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public 
interest and that the broker-dealer "has engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the securities business." 
25. Rule R177-6-lg(a)(3) of the Division, promulgated under 
the authority of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act, establishes that the 
7 
following acts and practices by broker-dealers constitute grounds 
for suspension or revocation of registration: 
"(3) Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale 
or exchange of any security without reasonable grounds 
to believe that such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, 
financial situation and needs, and any other relevant 
information known by the broker-dealer." 
26. Johnson and Johnson-Bowles, as described above, 
recommended, solicited or effected for customers the sales of 
securities of USA Medical which sales would necessarily involve a 
violation of Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
27. The above actions by Johnson Bowles constitute dishonest 
and unethical practices within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) 
of the Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg in that transactions which 
involve a violation of the Act are not suitable. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. A finding that Johnson Bowles Company, Inc., engaged in 
the acts and practices alleged above; 
2. A finding that Marlen Johnson engaged in the acts and 
practices alleged above; 
3. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Johnson 
Bowles Company, Inc. be adjudged and decreed to be found in 
violation of § 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and 
Rule R177-6-lg of the Division; 
4. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Marlen 
Johnson be adjudged and decreed to be found in violation of § 61-
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1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and Rule R177-6-lg of 
the Division; 
5. That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
6. That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
Dated this day of July, 1989. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Griffin 
;ant Attorney General 
THE JOHNSONS' AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
EXHIBIT "9 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents herewith respond to the amended petitions in the above matters, 
affirmatively allege, and counterclaim against the Division as follows. 
ANSWER 
1. Respondents deny U1 of the amended petitions in that the Division does not 
have any jurisdiction over these proceedings. 
2. Respondents admit ^2 as a blanket statement of the law taken out of 
context but allege that §61-1-6(1 )(g). Utah Code Ann., and the rules promulgated 
thereunder based on NASD rules and NASAA Guidelines, are inapplicable to these 
proceedings and the conduct of Respondents. 
3. Respondents admit 113 of the amended petitions. Respondents deny 114 to 
the extent that Respondent Marlen V. Johnson was acting at all times relevant to this action 
as an individual and not as either a securities principal or agent. 
4. Respondents deny 115 in that Respondent Johnson-Bowles was effecting 
transactions in the securities of U.S.A. Medical in January, 1989, not 1988. 
5. Respondents deny 116 of the amended petitions to the extent that such was 
the sole purpose of Respondents' filing of a federal lawsuit ultimately assigned to Judge J. 
Thomas Greene. On the contrary, the primary reason Respondent Johnson-Bowles filed the 
federal action was to have a U.S. District Court declare Respondents' outstanding Exchange 
Act contracts void for illegality — something the Court ultimately declined to do on 
February 28, 1989. 
6. Respondents admit 117 of the amended petitions but allege that such is not 
the full extent of Judge Greene's ruling in Case No. C-89-157-G and 117 is thus misleading 
to the extent that it is taken out of context. What Judge Greene essentially ruled relative to 
these proceedings was that Respondents' outstanding Exchange Act contracts were neither 
"void" nor "voidable" and therefore. Respondents would be required by law to purchase 
enough U.S.A. Medical stock, as they ultimately did, to complete such interstate contracts 
previously entered into in the course of their Exchange Act business. 
7. Respondents admit ^8 of the amended petitions to the extent that the 
Division's Order of March 1, 1989, revoked the availability of exemptions in Utah only for the 
offer and sale of U.S.A. Medical stock. The Order, however, either legally, or by its own 
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terms, is irrelevant to and otherwise has no effect whatsoever on purchases of U.S.A. 
Medical stock by anyone as a matter of law. Respondents do not recall whether the Order 
was "hand-delivered" to them or not on March 1, and whether it was or not, such Order, by 
its own unambiguous terms, does not and did not put Respondents on either actual or 
constructive notice that their subsequent purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock to fulfill 
Exchange Act obligations would, or could, result in the instant proceedings. As to whether 
the March 1, Order has been in effect continuously since its issuance, this is debatable and 
therefore denied. 
8. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in H9 of the 
amended petitions and therefore, they deny the same. They also have no recollection of 
whether a Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to them by the Division on either 
March 2, 1989, or at all. 
9. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in H's 10 and 11 
and therefore, on that ground, deny the same. 
10. Relative to H12a, Respondent Johnson admits that he called John Dawson 
but such only occurred after he was informed by one Karl Smith that Dawson was anxious to 
sell his "worthless" U.S.A. Medical stock to anyone who wanted to buy it. The remainder of 
H12a is inaccurate and irrelevant to these proceedings as a matter of law and therefore, the 
same is denied. 
11. Respondents deny Ts 12b-12f of the amended petitions insofar as they 
are inconsistent with various Representation Letters furnished Respondents by each of their 
sellers, true and correct copies of which were similarly furnished the Division and the 
Administrative Law Judge at the hearing on Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. 
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Such Representation Letters and their respective contents are incorporated herein by 
reference. In particular, however, Respondents deny the applicability and relevance of all of 
H12 to these proceedings. 
12. Paragraphs 13 and 23 of the amended petitions do not call for a response. 
13. Respondents admit H14 of the amended petitions to the extent such an 
order would be "in the public interest" but deny that any part or portion of these 
proceedings are either "in the public interest" or in the interests of public policy. 
Respondents thus deny this allegation and allege that these entire proceedings are against 
both "the public interest" and public policy. 
14. Respondents deny H15 of the amended petitions in that it is an inaccurate 
and misleading statement of the law relative to the facts of this case. Whether the "sales" 
to Respondents were unlawful or not in and of themselves is irrelevant to whether or not 
Respondents, as purchasers, have any legal liability or otherwise did anything wrong or 
remotely improper in their capacities as broker-dealers and agents. 
15. Respondents deny H's 16 and 17 of the amended petitions. 
16. There are no H's 18-22, inclusive, in the amended petitions calling for an 
answer or response. 
17. Respondents admit Ts 24 and 25 of the amended petitions as blanket 
statements of the law taken out of context, but deny their applicability in any respect to the 
instant proceedings. 
18. Respondents deny H's 26 and 27 of the amended petitions. 
WHEREFORE, Respondents pray for an "adversary adjudication" as 
contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act and an order of no cause in their favor on 
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both Counts I and II of the amended petitions. Respondents further pray for an award of all 
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in accordance with Rule 11, §78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann., as amended, and as otherwise fully contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. The Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these proceedings and 
as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The amended petitions fail to state any claim on which relief may be granted 
and as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred for 
each and every reason conceivably contemplated in and by any and all pleadings heretofore 
filed by Respondents in these proceedings, the contents of which are each and all 
incorporated herein by reference. 
4. The amended petitions are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
5. The amended petitions are barred by their own unlawfullness and illegality. 
6. The amended petitions are barred by the illegal conduct, bad faith, and 
overall malicious and improper motives of employees of the Division. 
7. The amended petitions are barred in that they have unlawfully damaged 
Respondents in their business and reputations. Such amended petitions have further 
deprived Respondents of liberty and property by individuals acting under color and power of 
state law based upon powers granted to them as a result of their employment by the state. 
8. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred by 
virtue of a No-Action Letter of the Division relative to U.S.A. Medical addressed to Utah 
securities agent Susan Slattery and Utah broker-dealer P.B. Jameson dated August 9, 1989, 
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a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as 
Exhibit "A". Such Letter completely undermines the Division's March 1989, Orders in that it 
creates an "unsolicited order" or trading exemption in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for a 
Utah broker-dealer and agent. Such Letter is further inconsistent as a matter of law with 
the instant amended petitions in that such Letter authorizes the very same conduct that is 
proscribed and attributed to Respondents in the amended petitions. Such Letter — a policy 
statement of the Division directed solely to certain privileged individuals — is thus further 
evidence that the amended petitions violate various constitutional rights guaranteed 
Respondents and as otherwise set forth in their Memorandum in Support of their Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on file herein. 
In addition, the foregoing No-Action Letter, Ezxhibit "A" hereto, ironically puts 
the Division in the untenable and precarious position of aiding and abetting the so-called 
"U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators" identified in the Judge Greene litigation. This is because 
Susan Slattery has been named as a co-defendant in the class action securities fraud, 
racketeering, and insider trading case identified as Arena Land & Investment Co., Inc., et al. 
v. Petty, Strand, Global Oil, Slattery, et al., U.S. District Court Case No. 89-C-144-S, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B". 
In such case, Susan Slattery is an alleged co-conspirator in the U.S.A. Medical stock fraud 
and market manipulation. See H48, page 23 and ^280, page 85 of Exhibit "B" hereto. 
Reference is also made to Respondents' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion dated September 27, 1989. pages 16 and 17 thereof, which makes reference 
to P.B. Jameson and its alleged participation in the U.S.A. Medical fraud, even after March 
1. Thanks to the Division's secret No-Action Letter (which Respondents only discovered on 
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September 29, by accident), Slattery, P.B. Jameson, convicted felon Michael William Strand, 
and any and all other U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators have been given a state license to 
engage in "dishonest and unethical practices" by distributing its "unsuitable" stock 
out-of-state in obvious furtherance of the U.S.A. Medical fraudulent scheme. The 
foregoing is significant in that it demonstrates not only that the Division does not know 
what "in the public interest" means but that it is otherwise discriminating against 
Respondents in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and otherwise. 
9. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in that 
Respondents have now completed their Exchange Act contracts and there is no showing 
that the conduct complained of will or may occur in the future or, that it is otherwise 
capable of being repeated by Respondents. Therefore, the entire case is moot. This 
defense is consistent with the weight of authority which holds that the SEC cannot obtain 
an injunction or issue a cease and desist order without an adequate showing of not only 
irreparable harm but a substantial showing that the conduct complained of is highly likely to 
occur in the future. Since revocation is on the nature of an injunction, the same principles 
apply in these proceedings. 
10. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in 
that Respondents did not need the protection of the securities laws in purchasing U.S.A. 
Medical stock from certain individuals who arguably lacked exemptions. SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)(holding that securities laws are inapplicable to a person who 
does not need the protection afforded by them). 
11. The amended petitions are violative of or otherwise invoke Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Section §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and the Equal Access to 
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Justice Act ("EAJA"), 5 U.S.C. §504. "Costs and Fees of Parties". Fed. Sec. L. Rep.. Vol. 5. 
1160,104. as amended, effective August 5. 1985, Sec. 1, Public Law 99-80. 99 Stat. 183. 
Based on the violation or applicability of the authority referred to in this paragraph, 
Respondents are entitled to reimbursement of all costs, expenses, and attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with these unlawful proceedings. 
12. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted because the Division has no power or authority to summarily suspend all 
exemptions from registration under §61-1-14(2), Utah Code Ann., particularly when not 
even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has such power or authority to suspend 
al] exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933. In the alternative, it is an abuse of agency 
discretion under the circumstances for the Division to have suspended all §14(2) 
exemptions, even if the Division had such power or authority, which it does not. Further, the 
Division's findings of fact relative to their March. 1989 Orders do not support the wholesale 
and ruthless suspension of all §14(2) exemptions from registration under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
13. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim because 
Respondents' sellers had "exemptions" regardless of the Division's March. 1989, Orders. 
This is because such sellers were "bona fide purchasers" who acquired their U.S.A. Medical 
stock in good faith, without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and otherwise, they paid value. The Division thus cannot 
prohibit the sale of such stock to Respondents and this exemplifies the Division's regulatory 
overreaching with respect to its March 1989 Orders. The burden is also on the Division in 
these proceedings to prove that Respondents' sellers were not "bona fide purchasers" of 
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the U.S.A. Medical stock in issue or that Respondents themselves were not "bona fide 
purchasers". 
COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Respondents incorporate each and every allegation hereinabove as if each 
were set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
2. The original and amended petitions have been brought and filed in violation 
of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
3. These proceedings have been brought for an improper purpose and are 
based on personal, malicious, vindictive, and retaliatory motives on the part of Division 
employees and personnel. 
4. Respondents have been deprived of liberty and property as a result of the 
instant proceedings. 
5. Respondents have been substantially damaged in their business and 
reputations by the initiation of the instant proceedings. 
6. Respondents have incurred substantial unwarranted and unnecessary 
attorney's fees, expenses, and costs in being required to defend the instant proceedings. 
7. As a direct and proximate result of these proceedings. Respondents have 
been substantially damaged as aforesaid. 
8. Neither the Division nor any of its personnel, including the Utah Attorney 
General, has statutory immunity or any lawful exemption from the operation of either Rule 
11, §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., or the spirit of the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
9. The equity and other powers and authorities of this court enable it to make 
the type of award to Respondents, if warranted, as specifically contemplated in the Equal 
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Access to Justice Act. regardless of whether said Act directly applies to these particular 
proceedings. The spirit of such Act therefore does and should apply to these proceedings 
regardless. 
10. The amended petitions have not been brought with a reasonable 
investigation of the facts or the law. nor have they been brought after a reasonable inquiry 
into whether the allegations contained therein are well grounded in fact or whether they are 
otherwise warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification or 
reversal of existing law. 
11. These proceedings have been brought by the Division and its personnel in 
bad faith. 
WHEREFORE. Respondents pray for an award of all costs, expenses, and 
attorney's fees incurred by them in any respect in connection with the existing proceedings. 
DATED this /^f day of November. 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the^//day of November, 1989, (s)he 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
with attendant Exhibits by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin, Director and 
Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division, Utah 
Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer J. Stephen Eklund, Esq., 
Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0802; Mark J. Griffin, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. 115 South State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City. Utah 84114; and to Craig F. McCullough, Esq., Callister, Duncan. & Nebeker, 
Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. Kennecott BjdSK, 10£ajst South Temple Street. Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84133. 
J : A N S W E R . 1 - 3 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-6(1)(g) effective 1989 
EXHIBIT "10" 
61-1-6 SECURITIES DIVISION-REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
61-1-6. Denial, suspension, or revocation of registration — 
Grounds — Procedure — Examination, 
(1) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, suspend-
ing, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser registration 
if he finds that the order is in the public interest and that the applicant or 
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any part-
ner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the broker-
dealer or investment adviser: 
(a) filed an application for registration that was incomplete in any 
material respect or contained any statement that was, in light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect 
to any material fact; 
(b) willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of 
this chapter or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this chapter or 
a predecessor act; 
(c) was convicted, within the past ten years, of any misdemeanor in-
volving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony; 
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent 
jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in-
volving any aspect of the securities business; 
(e) is the subject of an order of the executive director or any predecessor 
denying, suspending, or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent, 
or investment adviser; 
(f) (i) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by 
the securities administrator of any other state or by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission denying or revoking registration as a 
broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or the substantial equiv-
alent of those terms as defined in this chapter, or is the subject of an 
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or ex-
pelling him from a national securities exchange or national securities 
association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or 
is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud order. 
(ii) The division may not institute a revocation or suspension pro-
ceeding under this Subsection (f) more than one year from the date of 
the order relied on, and the executive director may not enter an order 
under this Subsection (f) on the basis of an order under another state 
act unless that order was based on facts that would currently consti-
tute a ground for an order under this section; 
(g) engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities busi-
ness; 
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(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets 
or in the sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature. How-
ever, the executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer or investment adviser under this Subsection (h) without a finding 
of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser; or 
(i) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience, 
and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in 
Subsection (3). 
(2) (a) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Secu-
rities Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, 
suspending, or revoking any registmtion, if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that the applicant or registrant: 
(i) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a broker-
dealer or his employees if he is an investment adviser; or 
(ii) has failed to pay the proper filing fee. 
(b) The division may enter a denial order under this subsection, but 
shall vacate the order when the deficiency has been corrected. 
(c) The division may not institute a suspension or revocation proceed-
ing on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when registration 
became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30 
days. 
(3) The following provisions govern the application of Subsection 
61-l-6(l)(i): 
(a) The executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other than 
the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual or an agent of the broker-
dealer. 
(b) The executive director may not enter an order against an invest-
ment adviser on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other 
than the investment adviser himself if he is an individual or any other 
person who represents the investment adviser in doing any of the acts 
which make him an investment adviser. 
(c) The executive director may not enter an order solely on the basis of 
lack of experience if the applicant or registrant is qualified by training or 
knowledge. 
(d) The executive director shall consider that an agent who will work 
under the supervision of a registered broker-dealer need not have the 
same qualifications as a broker-dealer. 
(e) The executive director shall consider that an investment adviser is 
not necessarily qualified solely on the basis of experience as a broker-
dealer or agent. When he finds that an applicant for initial or renewal 
registration as a broker-dealer is not qualified as an investment adviser, 
he may by order condition the applicant's registration as a broker-dealer 
upon his not transacting business in this state as an investment adviser. 
(0 The division shall by rule provide for examinations, which may be 
written or oral or both, to be taken by all applicants. 
(4) The division may take emergency action with respect to registration 
applications according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63. 
(5) If the division finds that any registrant or applicant for registration is 
no longer in existence, has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, or 
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investment adviser, is subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or to 
the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after 
reasonable search, the division may by order cancel the registration or appli-
cation according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63. 
(6) (a) Withdrawal from registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or invest-
ment adviser becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to 
withdraw or within such shorter period of time as the division may deter-
mine, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is pending when the 
application is filed or a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to impose 
conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the 
application is filed. 
(b) If a proceeding is pending or instituted, the division shall designate 
by order when the withdrawal becomes effective. 
(c) (i) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, and withdrawal auto-
matically becomes effective, the division may initiate a revocation or 
suspension proceeding under Subsection 61-l-6(l)(b) within one year 
after withdrawal became effective. 
(ii) If the division decides to issue a revocation or suspension order, 
the executive director shall enter the order as of the last date on 
which registration was effective. 
(7) The division, board, and executive director shall comply with the proce-
dures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, before issuing any order 
under any part of this section. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-6, enac ted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 9; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 233. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Sub-
section (4) to such an extent as to make a de-
tailed analysis impracticable; in Subsection (5) 
added "according to the procedures and re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63"; in Sub-
section (6) added the internal subsection desig-
nations and in Subsection (b) substituted "the 
division shall designate by order when the 
Scope of inquiry. 
Commission had authority to inquire into 
applicant's or registrant's conduct with respect 
to unworthiness to carry on business that he or 
it was registered to carry on, irrespective of 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities 
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion §§ 223 to 226. 
A.L.R. — Churning: stockbroker's liability 
for allegedly "churning" or engaging cus-
tomer's account in excessive activitv, 32 
A.L.R.3d 635. 
Law practice: what activities of stock or se-
withdrawal becomes effective" for "withdrawal 
becomes effective at such time and upon such 
conditions as the division by order deter-
mines"; rewrote Subsection (7) to such an ex-
tent as to make a detailed analysis impractica-
ble; and made minor changes in style and 
phraseology throughout the section. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. — The 
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, re-
ferred to in Subsection (l)(f), appears as 15 
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
fact that securities to which inquiry was specif-
ically directed did not need to be registered. 
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah 
234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942) (decided under former 
law). 
curity broker constitute unauthorized practice 
of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305. 
Mistake: effect, as between stockbroker and 
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or 
other security other than that intended by cus-
tomer, 48 A.L.R.3d 513. 
Key Numbers. — Licenses <&=> 18 l/2(38), 38; 
Securities Regulation ®=> 270, 274, 277. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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DIVISION RULE R177-6-lg effective 1989 
EXHIBIT "11" 
817 4-88 Blue Sky Regulations 50,507 
be prepared and filed in accordance with the 
(allowing requirements: 
%) The financial statements shall he 
cermfied by an independent certified public 
accountant or an independent public^ 
accountant. £' 
(B) *Mie audit shall l>e made in accordance 
with gfcerally accepted auditing standards; 
the examination shall include a review>of 
the account ing s y s t e m , the internal 
accounting controls and procedures for/the 
safeguarding of securi t ies and funds 
including appropriate tests thereof since the 
prior examiKat ion.
 #v 
(C) The augit shall l)e accompanied by an 
unqualified oninion of the accountant as to 
the finaiK'ianrcondition. In addition, the 
accountant shall submit as a supplementary 
opinion any olmments. based /upon the 
audit, as to any Aiaterial inadequacies found 
to exist in tlift: accounting system, the 
internal account fig controls and procedures 
for safeguarding sfeurities and shall indicate 
any corrective actual taken or proposed. 
(3) The financiarestatements required by 
this section shall n$ filed within 90 days 
following the end of the broker-dealer's 
fiscal year. \ .*• 
(b) Investment 'Adviser Required 
Financial Reports. (1%. Every investment 
adviser who has custo|M or possession of 
client's funds or securities or requires 
payment of advisory fe% six months or 
more in advance and lA ^xcess of $500 per 
client shall file with t*he 'Division audited 
financial statements as of^the ei\d of the 
investment adviser's fiscal yfcar. 
**. t 
(2) Each financial s t a t e m e n t filed 
pursuant to this section shall be prepared 
and filed in accordance with the following 
requirements: " *. 
(A) The audi£ shall be certified by an 
independent certified public accountant or 
independent puolic accountant. \ 
(B) The aufflt shall l>e made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards; 
the examination shall include a Review of 
the account ing sys tem, the internal 
accounting controls and procedureslfor the 
safeguarding of securit ies and^funds 
including appropriate tests thereof sifcce the 
prior examination. \ J' • ^ 
(QfThe audit shall be accompanied | y an 
unqualified opinion of the accountant as to 
th# report of financial c o n d i t i o n ^ In 
adnilion, the accountant shall submit a$ a 
scp3plementary opinion any comments baited 
u4)on audit, as to any material inadequacies 
«>und to exist in the accounting system, the 
v^mtemal accounting controls and procejtfts 
J^^afeguarding securities andJjg0&, and 
/fhalliTHicate any correct iv^a^^unta ken or 
^ ' p r o p o s c d ^ S , ^ ^ ^ ^ 
f (3) The finanaafriLatements required by 
this section sj)a1 f o e fnetNttn^ the Division 
within 9Q*<Tavs following tn^^nd of the 
investment adviser's fiscal year. ^ ^ ^ 
.Adopted elf. 2-15-86.) 
1*1 57,403] 
R 1 7 7 - 6 - l g . R u l e s o f c o n d u c t f o r 
b r o k e r - d e a l e r s , i n v e s t m e n t a d v i s e r s 
a n d a g e n t s . 
Preliminary Notes: 1. Rl77-6-lg is intended to 
define certain acts and practices which the Utah 
Securities Division (the "Division") deems 
violative of Section 6{lXg) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (the "Act"). The list contained 
herein should not be considered to be all-inclusive 
of acts and practices which violate that section, 
but rather is intended to act as a guide to broker-
dealers and agents as to the types of conduct which 
are prohibited. 
2. Broker-dealers and agents are reminded that 
conduct which violated Section 1 of the Act may 
also l>e considered to violate Section 6(1 Kg) under 
certain circumstances. 
3. This Rule is patterned after well-established 
standards in the industry which have been 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the NASD. NASAA, the national 
exchanges and various courts. It represents one of 
the purposes of the securities laws: to create viable 
securities markets in which those persons involved 
are held to a high standard of fairness with respect 
to their dealings with the public. 
(a) Broker-Dealers. The following acts and 
practices, when performed by a broker-
dealer or a person over whom the broker-
dealer has supervisory authority , are 
considered contrary to Section 6(1 Kg) of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or 
revocation of registration. 
(1) Engaging in a pattern of unreasonable 
and unjustifiable delays in the delivery of 
securities purchased by any of its customers 
and/or in the payment, upon request, of free 
credit ba lances ref lect ing comple ted 
t ransactions of any of its customers. 
(2) Inducing trading in a customer's 
account which is excessive in size or 
frequency in view of the financial resources 
and character of the account. 
(3) Recommending to a customer the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any security 
without reasonable grounds to believe that 
such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon rea-
Blue Sky Law Reports 
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sonable inquiry concerning the customer's 
investment objectives, financial situation 
and n e e d s , and any o t h e r re levant 
information known by the broker-dealer. 
(4) Executing a transaction on behalf of a 
customer without prior authorization to do 
so. 
(5) Exercising any discretionary power in 
effecting a transaction for a customer's 
account without first obtaining written 
discretionary authority from the customer, 
unless the discretionary power relates solely 
to the time and/or price for the execution of 
orders. 
(6) Executing any transaction in a margin 
account without securing from the customer 
a proper ly executed wr i t ten margin 
agreement promptly after the initial 
transaction in the account. 
(7) Failing to segregate customers' free 
securities or securities held in safekeeping. 
(8) Hypothecating a customer's securities 
without having a lien thereon unless the 
broker-dealer secures from the customer a 
properly executed written consent promptly 
after the initial transaction, except as 
permitted by the rules and regulations of 
the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
(9) Entering into a transaction with or for 
a customer at a price not reasonably related 
to the current market price of the security 
or receiving an unreasonable commission or 
profit.! 
(10) Failing to furnish to a customer 
purchasing securities in an offering, no later 
than the date of confirmation of the 
transaction, either a final prospectus or a 
preliminary prospectus and an additional 
document , which together include all 
i n f o r m a t i o n set f o r t h in t h e final 
prospectus. 
(11) Charging fees for services without 
prior notification to a customer as to the 
nature and amount of the fees. 
( 1 2 ) C h a r g i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e and 
iinequitable fees for services performed, 
including miscellaneous services such as 
collection of monies due for principal, 
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer 
of securities, appraisals, safekeeping, or 
custody of securities and other services 
related to its securities business. 
(13) Offering to buy from or sell to any 
person any security at a stated price unless 
such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase 
or sell, as the < :«se may l>e, at such price and 
under such conditions as are stated at the 
time of such offer to buy or sell. 
(14) Representing that a security is being 
offered to a customer "at the market" or a 
price relevant to the market price unless 
such broker-dealer knows or has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a market for such 
security exists other than that made, 
created or controlled by such broker-dealer, 
or by any person for whom he is acting or 
with whom he is associated in such dis-
tribution, or any person controlled by, 
controlling or under common control with 
such broker-dealer. 
(15) Effecting any transaction in, or 
inducing the purchase or sale of, any 
security by means of any manipulative, 
deceptive or fraudulent device, practice, 
plan, program, design or contrivance, which 
may include but not be limited to: 
(A) Effecting any transaction in a security 
which involves no change in the beneficial 
ownership thereof; 
(B) Entering an order or orders for the 
purchase or sale of any security with the 
knowledge that an order or orders of 
substantially the same size, at substantially 
the same time and substantially the same 
price, for the sale of any such security, has 
been or will be entered by or for the same or 
different parties for the purpose of creating 
a false or misleading appearance of active 
trading in the security or a false or 
misleading appearance with respect to the 
market for the security; provided, however, 
nothing in this subsection (B) shall prohibit 
a broker-dealer from entering bona fide 
agency cross transactions for its customers; 
or 
(C) Effecting, alone or with one or more 
other persons, a series of transactions in any 
security creating actual or apparent active 
trading in such security or raising or 
depressing the price of such security, for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of 
such security by others. 
(16) Guaranteeing a customer against loss 
in any securities account of such customer 
carried by the broker-dealer or in any 
securities transaction effected by the broker-
dealer with or for such customer. 
(17) Publishing or circulating, or causing 
to be published or circulated, any notice, 
circular, advertisement, newspaper article, 
investment service, or communication of 
any kind which: (A) purports to report any 
transaction as a purchase or sale of any 
security unless such broker-dealer believes 
that such transaction was a bona fide 
purchase or sale of such security; or (B) 
purports to quote the bid price or asked 
price for any security, urdess such broker-
1157,403 c 1988, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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d e a l e r b e l i e v e s t h a t s u c h q u o t a t i o n 
represents a bona fide bid for, or offer of, 
such security. 
(18) Using any a d v e r t i s i n g or sa les 
presentation in such a fashion as to be 
deceptive or misleading. An example of such 
prac t ice would be d i s t r i bu t ion of any 
nonfactual data, material or presentation 
b a s e d on c o n j e c t u r e , u n f o u n d e d o r 
unrea l i s t ic claims or asser t ions in any 
b r o c h u r e , flyer, or d isp lay by words , 
pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to 
supplement , det ract from, supersede or 
de fea t t h e p u r p o s e or effect of a n y 
prospectus or disclosure. 
(19) Failing to disclose to a customer tha t 
t h e b r o k e r - d e a l e r is c o n t r o l l e d by , 
c o n t r o l l i n g , a f f i l i a t ed w i t h or u n d e r 
common control with the issuer of any 
security before entering into any contract 
with or for a customer for the purchase or 
sale of such security, and if such disclosure is 
n o t m a d e in w r i t i n g , i t s h a l l b e 
supplemented by the giving or sending of 
w r i t t e n d i s c l o s u r e a t o r b e f o r e t h e 
completion of the transaction. 
(20) Failing to make a bona fide public 
offering of all of the securities allotted to a 
broker-dealer for d i s t r ibu t ion , w h e t h e r 
acquired as an underwriter, a selling group 
member, or from a member participating in 
the distribution as an underwri ter or selling 
group member. 
(21) Fa i l u r e or refusal to furnish a 
c u s t o m e r , u p o n r e a s o n a b l e r e q u e s t , 
information to which he is entit led, or to 
respond to a formal writ ten request or 
complaint. 
(22) Permi t t ing a person to open an 
account for ano the r person or t ransact 
business in such account unless there is on 
file written authorization for such action 
from the person in whose name the account 
is carried. 
(23) Pe rmi t t i ng a person to open or 
transact business in a fictitious account. 
(24) Pe rmi t t ing an agent to open or 
transact business in an account o ther than 
his own, unless disclosed in writing (to 
include the reason therefor) to the broker-
dealer or issuer he represents. 
(b) Agents. T h e fol lowing ac t s and 
practices, when performed by agents of 
broker-dealers or agents of issuers, are 
considered contrary to Section 6(1 Kg) of the 
Utah Uniform Securit ies Act and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or 
revocation of registration. 
(1) Engaging in the practice of lending or 
borrowing money or securi t ies from a 
customer, or acting as a custodian for 
money, securi t ies or an executed stock 
power of a customer. 
(2) Effecting securities transactions not 
recorded on the regular books or records of 
t h e b r o k e r - d e a l e r w h i c h t h e a g e n t 
represents, in the case of agents of broker-
d e a l e r s , u n l e s s t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e 
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer 
prior to execution of the transaction. 
(3) Establishing or maintaining an account 
containing fictitious information in order to 
execute transactions which would otherwise 
be prohibited. 
(4) Sharing directly or indirectly in profits 
or losses in the account of any customer 
without the prior written authorization of 
the customer and the broker-dealer which 
the agent represents. 
(5) Dividing or otherwise splitting the 
a g e n t ' s c o m m i s s i o n s , p rof i t s or o t h e r 
compensation from the purchase or sale of 
s e c u r i t i e s w i t h a n y p e r s o n not a lso 
registered as an agent for the same broker-
dealer, or for a broker-dealer under direct or 
indirect common control. 
(6) Engaging in conduct specified in 
subsection (aX2), (aK3). (a)(4). (a)(5), (a)(6), 
(aX9), (aX10), (aK15), (aK16). (aK17), or (aX18). 
(1157,404) 
FTO. 7 7 - 9 - 1 . R e g i s t r a t i o n b \^r 
c o o r d i n a t i o n , (a) Who May File. A^iy 
securnV for which a registration statement 
or a unif icat ion under Regulation £? has 
been f i l e \ u n d e r the Securities Act $f 1933 
in c o n n e c t \ n with the same offering may be 
regis tered ^ ^ coordinat ion pursuant to 
Section 9 o f ^ h e Utah Uniform Securities 
Act (the "Ac t " )V ^ 
(b) Documents^LBe FilefRApplicant shall 
file one copy each^tf the&following and the 
appropriate fee pursuwy^fo Rl77-18-4: 
(1) Uniform consen#t^gervice of process; 
(2) One copy o ^ n e disftpsure statement, 
i n c l u d i n g e x h i b i t s , tog^JLher wi th all 
amendments a^niled with the%ecurities and 
Exchange Commission under n |e Securities 
Actof 193jjjf' I k 
(3) Agr application on Form U l k w h i e h 
conta^ris t h e u n d e r t a k i n g requirekLby 
Section 9(1 Xd) of the Act. ^ L * 
c) Additional Documents. The applicar 
lalI provide to the Division any additional^ 
Blue Sky Law Reports 
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SECTION 1401-1404 OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF THE SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION 
("NASAA") GUIDELINES (CCH) 
EXHIBIT "12 
901 
DISHONEST OR UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Adopted on April 23. 1983 
[11H01] 
[HIGH STANDARDS AND JUST PRINCIPLES.] Each broker-dealer and 
agent shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade in the conduct of their business. Acts and practices, including but 
not limited to the following, are considered contrary to such standards and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration or such other 
action authorized by statute. 
[H 1402] 
1. BROKER-DEALERS 
a. Engaging in a pattern of unreasonable and unjustifiable delays in the 
delivery of securities purchased by any of its customers and/or in the 
payment upon request of free credit balances reflecting completed 
transactions of any of its customers; 
b. Inducing trading in a customer's account which is excessive in size or 
frequency in view of the financial resources and character of the account; 
c. Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security 
without reasonable grounds to believe that such transaction or 
recommendation is suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and 
needs, and any other relevant information known by the broker-dealer; 
d. Executing a transaction on behalf of a customer without authorization to do 
so; 
e. Exercising any discretionary power in effecting a transaction for a 
customer's account without first obtaining written discretionary authority 
from the customer, unless the discretionary power relates solely to the time 
and/or price for the execution of orders; 
f. Executing any transaction in a margin account without securing from the 
customer a properly executed written margin agreement promptly after the 
initial transaction in the account; 
g. Failing to segregate customers' free securities or securities held in 
safekeeping; 
h. Hypothecating a customer's securities without having a lien thereon unless 
the broker-dealer secures from the customer a properly executed written 
consent promptly after the initial transaction, except as permitted by Rules 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
i. Entering into a transaction with or for a customer at a price not reasonably 
related to the current market price of the security or receiving an 
unreasonable commission or profit; 
j . Failing to furnish to a customer purchasing securities in an offering, no later 
than the date of confirmation of the transaction, either a final prospectus or 
a preliminary prospectus and an additional document, which together 
include all information set forth in the final prospectus; 
k. Charging unreasonable and inequitable fees for services performed, including 
miscellaneous services such as collection of monies due for principal, 
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer of securities, appraisals, 
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safekeeping, or custody of securities and other services related to its 
securities business; 
1. Offering to buy from or sell to any person any security at a stated price 
unless such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase or sell, as the case may be, 
at such price and under such conditions as are stated at the time of such 
offer to buy or sell; 
m. Representing that a security is being offered to a customer uat the market" 
or a price relevant to the market price unless such broker-dealer knows or 
has reasonable grounds to believe that a market for such security exists other 
than that made, created or controlled by such broker-dealer, or by any 
person for whom he is acting or with whom he is associated in such 
distribution, or any person controlled by, controlling or under common 
control with such broker-dealer; 
n. Effecting any transaction in, or inducing the purchase or sale of, any 
security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent device, 
practice, plan, program, design or contrivance, which may include but not be 
limited to: 
(1) Effecting any transaction in a security which involves no change in the 
beneficial ownership thereof; 
(2) Entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale of any security with 
the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at 
substantially the same time and substantially the same price, for the 
sale of any such security, has been or will be entered by or for the same 
or different parties for the purpose of creating a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in the security or a false or misleading 
appearance with respect to the market for the security; provided, 
however, nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a broker-dealer from 
entering bona fide agency cross trans-actions for its customers; 
(3) Effecting, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of 
transactions in any security creating actual or apparent active trading 
in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for 
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others; 
o. Guaranteeing a customer against loss in any securities account of such 
customer carried by the broker-dealer or in any securities transaction 
effected by the broker-dealer with or for such customer; 
p. Publishing or circulating, or causing to be published or circulated, any 
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment service, or 
communication of any kind which purports to report any transaction as a 
purchase or sale of any security unless such broker-dealer believes that such 
transaction was a bona fide purchase or sale of such security; or which 
purports to quote the bid price or asked price for any security, unless such 
broker-dealer believes that such quotation represents a bona fide bid for, or 
offer of, such security; 
q. Using any advertising or sales presentation in such a fashion as to be 
deceptive or misleading. An example of such practice would be a distribution 
of any nonfactual data, material or presentation based on conjecture, 
unfounded or unrealistic claims or assertions in any brochure, flyer, or 
display by words, pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to supplement, 
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detract from, supersede or defeat the purpose or effect of any prospectus or 
disclosure; or 
r. Failing to disclose that the broker-dealer is controlled by, controlling, 
affiliated with or under common control with the issuer of any security 
before entering into any contract with or for a customer for the purchase or 
sale of such security, the existence of such control to such customer, and if 
such disclosure is not made in writing, it shall be supplemented by the giving 
or sending of written disclosure at or before the completion of the 
transaction; 
s. Failing to make a bona fide public offering of all of the securities allotted to 
a broker-dealer for distribution, whether acquired as an underwriter, a 
selling group member, or from a member participating in the distribution as 
an underwriter or selling group member; or 
t. Failure or refusal to furnish a customer, upon reasonable request, 
information to which he is entitled, or to respond to a formal written request 
or complaint. 
[11 H03] 
2. AGENTS 
a. Engaging in the practice of lending or borrowing money or securities from a 
customer, or acting as a custodian for money, securities or an executed stock 
power of a customer; 
b. Effecting securities transactions not recorded on the regular books or records 
of the broker-dealer which the agent represents, unless the transactions are 
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer prior to execution of the 
transaction; 
c. Establishing or maintaining an account containing fictitious information in 
order to execute transactions which would otherwise be prohibited; 
d. Sharing directly or indirectly in profits or losses in the account of any 
customer without the written authorization of the customer and the broker-
dealer which the agent represents; 
e. Dividing or otherwise splitting the agent's commissions, profits or other 
compensation from the purchase or sale of securities with any person not also 
registered as an agent for the same broker-dealer, or for a broker-dealer 
under direct or indirect common control; or 
f. Engaging in conduct specified in Subsection l.b, c, d, e, f, i, j , n, o, p, or q. 
[11 H04] 
[CONDUCT NOT INCLUSIVE.] The conduct set forth above is not inclusive. 
Engaging in other conduct such as forgery, embezzlement, non-disclosure, incomplete 
disclosure or misstatement of material facts, or manipulative or deceptive practices 
shall also be grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration. 
[The next page is 1001.] 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-14(2) and (3) effective 1989 
EXHIBIT "13" 
61-1-14 SECURITIES DIVISION-REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
Jtah 184', 218 P. 133fWP 
"Sale" did not include a gift of stock because 
of use of words "for value." Therefore an agree-
ment with a statistician to promote the disposi-
tion of such stock was not in violation of the 
Blue Sky Law. Fact that it was understood at 
time of gift that there would be ag 
donees'were hotnaDle to pajuyjBpHsessrnent. 
Andrews v. Chase, 89 X$Hf$T49 P.2d 938 
(1935), affd on r e h ^ l P i n 89 Utah 73, 57 
P.2d 702 (1936L 
COLLATERAL REFE 
Utah Law Review. — Securities Law ar 
the Franchise Agreement, 1980 Utah 
311. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 69 Am. Jur^jgP&Turities 
Regulation — State §§ l6,j&MmS9, 31, 69 to 
85, 102. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J .^$pjjf Securities Regula-
tion §§ 201 to 
A.L.R. —J$0$$s "isolated" or "successive" 
or the lUjpflinder state securities acts, 1 
A.UMf^ . 
_who is "dealer" uncj 
Sfal 
suers not made in course of successive trans-
actions, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425. 
Investment contract: what constitutes an 
"investment contract" within the meaning of 
state Blue Sky Laws, 47 A.L.R.3d 1375. 
"Common enterprise" element of Howey test 
to determine existence of investment contract 
regulable as "security" within meaning of fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et 
seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 90 A.L.R. Fed. 825. 
ecunffiesne^jTanon 
61-1-14. Exemptions. 
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed 
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any 
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the forego-
ing, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing; 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian prov-
ince, any political subdivision of any such province, any agency or corpo-
rate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any other 
foreign government with which the United States currently maintains 
diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obligation by 
the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United 
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust company supervised 
under the laws of any state; 
(d) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any federal savings and loan association, or any build-
ing and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state 
and authorized to do business in this state; 
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any federal credit union or 
any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association orga-
nized and supervised under the laws of this state; 
(0 any security issued or guaranteed by any railroad, other common 
carrier, public utility, or holding company which is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission; a registered holding com-
pany under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsid-
iary of such a company within the meaning of that act; regulated in 
respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental authority of the 
United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian province; 
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(g) any security listed on the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange, 
the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium 
approved by the division, provided that the division may at any time 
suspend or revoke this exemption for any particular stock exchange, me-
dium, security, or securities under Subsection 61-1-14(3); any other secu-
rity of the same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank to 
any security so listed and approved by the division; any security called for 
by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved; or any warrant 
or right to purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing; 
(h) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for 
private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, chari-
table, fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber 
of commerce or trade or professional association; and any security issued 
by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 and any security 
issued by a corporation to which the provisions of such chapter are made 
applicable by compliance with the requirements of Section 3-1-21; 
(i) any commercial paper which arises out of a current transaction or 
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, 
and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months of the 
date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal, guarantee, or 
guarantee of renewal of the paper which is likewise limited; 
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees' 
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan; 
(k) any security as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 
61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer 
or not; 
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security if: (i) it is 
listed in a recognized securities manual such as Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's securities manuals where the listing contains the names of the 
issuer's officers and directors, a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date 
within 18 months, and a profit and loss statement for either the fiscal 
year preceding that date or the most recent year of operations; or (ii) the 
security has a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provision and 
there has been no default during the current fiscal year or within the 
three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of the issuer and any 
predecessors if less than three years, in the payment of principal, interest, 
or dividends on the security. The division may by rule or order approve 
certain manuals as recognized within the meaning of this subsection; 
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf 
the offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured 
by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or 
agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness 
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit; 
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(0 any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, re-
ceiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide pledgee without any pur-
pose of evading this chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, 
insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial 
institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the pur-
chaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity; 
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if: (i) 
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indi-
rectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber; (ii) the number of sub-
scribers acquiring any legal or beneficial interest therein does not exceed 
ten; and (iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection 
with the offer or sale; 
(j) (i) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an issuer of its securities 
to its existing securities holders, if no commission or other remunera-
tion, other than a standby commission is paid or given directly or 
indirectly for soliciting any security holders in this state, if the trans-
action constitutes: (A) the conversion of convertible securities; (B) the 
exercise of nontransferrable rights or warrants; (C) the exercise of 
transferable rights or warrants if the rights or warrants are exercis-
able not more than 90 days after their issuance; or (D) the purchase 
of securities under a preemptive right; 
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection (2)(j)(i) is not available for 
an offer or sale of securities to existing securities holders who have 
acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation 
of Section 61-1-7; 
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for which registration state-
ments have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act of 
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no public proceeding 
or examination looking toward such an order is pending; 
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if the person distributing 
the dividend is the issuer of the securities distributed; 
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer where the broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and 
the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and makes reasonably avail-
able upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed 
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information prescribed 
by the division under its rules; 
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering; 
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or "time period units" as 
those terms are defined in the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, 
whether or not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are located in another 
state, the condominium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land and 
Timeshare Sales Practices Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code are complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consol-
idation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, 
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if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is the issuance of 
securities of a person or persons, and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is incident to a vote of 
the securities holders of each person involved or by written consent or 
resolution of some or all of the securities holders of each person in-
volved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given under a provision in: 
(A) the applicable corporate statute or other controlling statute; (B) 
the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed of 
trust, or partnership agreement; or (C) the controlling agreement 
among securities holders; 
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file 
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one person involved in the 
transaction is an insurance company which is exempt from filing 
under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regu-
latory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or (C) all persons 
involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section 
12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the 
division such proxy or informational material as the division requires 
by rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division 
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the trans-
action or series of transactions at least ten business days prior to any 
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on any necessary 
consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption 
within ten business days after filing of the proxy or informational 
materials; 
(q) any transaction as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(3) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any 
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with 
respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) 
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any 
entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally. 
No such order may be entered without appropriate prior notice to all inter-
ested parties, opportunity for hearing, and written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, except that the division may by order summarily deny or revoke 
any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding 
under this subsection. Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall 
promptly notify all interested parties that it has been entered and of the 
reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of the receipt of a written 
request the matter will be set down for hearing. If no hearing is requested and 
none is ordered by the executive director or division, the order will remain in 
effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is 
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority 
of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after notice of and 
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opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or va-
cate the order or extend it until final determination. The executive director 
may not extend any summary order for more than ten business days. No order 
under this subsection may operate retroactively. No person may be considered 
to have violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale ef-
fected after the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the order. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-14, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, § 5; 1983, 
ch. 284, § 17; 1987, ch. 92, § 106. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment corrected the statutory reference in Sub-
section (2)(j)(ii), substituted "Utah Uniform 
Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act" for 
"Utah Uniform Land Sale Practices Act" in 
Subsection (2)(o), and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
Federal law. — The federal acts cited in 
this section are codified as: 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. For provisions regarding 
registration of holding companies, see 15 
U.S.C. § 79e. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-1 et seq. For definition of investment 
ANALYSIS 
Debentures of cemetery association. 
Isolated transaction. 
Stock dividends or distribution out of earnings. 
Debentures of cemetery association. 
Debentures of an incorporated cemetery as-
sociation were not exempt from registration 
where the articles of incorporation did not con-
tain language reasonably interpretable to cate-
gorize the corporation as one whose purpose 
was exclusively for educational, benevolent, 
fraternal, charitable, or reformatory pursuits. 
State ex rel. Securities Comm'n v. Lake Hills, 
14 Utah 2d 14, 376 P.2d 540 (1962). 
Isolated transaction. 
The exchange by the incorporators of a min-
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Elu-
sive Limited Offering Exemption of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
825. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur . 2d Securities 
Regulation — State §^ 69 to 85. 
C.J .S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion §§ 201 to 221. 
company, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3. Section 20 of 
that act, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(iii), 
appears as 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20. 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et 
seq. 
Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(iii), 
appears as 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g)(l). Section 
12(g)(2)(G) of that act appears as 15 U.S.C. 
§ 787(g)(2)(G). Sections 14(a) and (c) of that act 
appear as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a) and (c). 
Cross-References. — Condominium Own-
ership Act, § 57-8-1 et seq. 
Utah Consumer Credit Code, § 70C-1-101 et 
seq. 
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, 
§ 57-11-1 et seq. 
ing company of shares of stock for mining 
claims, where the transaction involved the si-
multaneous issuance of shares to the plaintiff 
and a third person, did not involve a transac-
tion requiring registration because it was ex-
empt as an isolated transaction. Johnson v. 
Crail, 11 Utah 2d 392, 360 P.2d 485 (1961). 
Stock dividends or distribution out of 
earnings. 
To claim exemption, it had to be shown that 
corporation was distributing shares to its 
shareholders as a stock dividend out of earn-
ings or surplus, or that it was increasing its 
capital stock. Harper v. Tri-State Motors, Inc., 
90 Utah 212, 58 P.2d 18 (1936), rehearing de-
nied, 90 Utah 226, 63 P.2d 1056 (1937) (de-
cided under former law). 
A.L.R. — Sales as "isolated" or "successive" 
or the like under state securities acts, 1 
A.L.R.3d 614. 
Dealer: who is "dealer" under state securi-
ties acts exempting sales by owners other than 
issuers not made in course of successive trans-
actions, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425. 
Who may exercise voting power of corporate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Appealable judgments, orders and decrees. 
Jurisdiction of court. 
Presumptions as to court order. 
Who may appeal. 
Construction and application. 
The proceeding was in the nature of an origi-
nal proceeding, and the only issues before the 
court were those raised by the pleadings. 
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah 
234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942); Withers v. Golding, 
100'utah 179, 111 P.2d 550 (1941). 
Upon proper and sufficient allegations of the 
complaint the district court was to determine, 
as on an appeal in equity, whether the findings 
of the commission were contrary to the clear ^  
preponderance of the evidence adduced befa 
it. Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102A"A 
234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942). 
The court should hear proof on iarfPTaised 
of the insufficiency of the evidenGgposustain 
commission's order canceling^ rjgpCTant's reg-
istration. Lauren W. Gibbs, JljjprTMonson, 102 
Utah 234, 129 P.2d 8 8 7 j i p £ ) . 
Appealable judg 
crees. 
An appeal wa 
orders and de-
ved from any final order 
of the commission; no other order was app 
able. In re Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Ut 
3 P.2d 267 (1931). 
Jurisdiction of court. 
The district court, being coujttW general ju-
risdiction, had inherent paflgWio grant stay 
orders. Lauren W. Gibb^HP: v. Monson, 102 
Utah 234, 129 P.2d^SB^942). 
Presumptions aaf l^court order. 
Order suspeniijjcommission's order would 
be presumeckjpd rather than invalid or void. 
Lauren \^jpHbbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah 
234, l j ^ l S d 887 (1942). 
Kay appeal. 
fTder former provision authorizing persons 
lirectly affected and aggrieved" to appeal an 
"order, it was unlikely that mere competitors of 
applicant, or members of the public desiring 
that no unworthy securities be placed before 
the public, would be qualified to take appeal. 
The words "directly affected and aggrieved" 
were to be given the same construction as was 
given to words "interested parties" in prior 
statute, and be held to refer to persons who 
were touched in their property or person by the 
order complained of. In re Deseret Mortuary 
Co., 78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities 
State § 94. 
r
.S. — 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 43; 79 C.J.S. 
pp. Securities Regulation § 227. 
Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» I8V2 (38), 22; 
Securities Regulation <s=» 275. 
61-1-24. Rules, forms, and orders of division. 
(1) (a) The division may make, amend, and rescind rules, forms, and orders 
when necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. 
(b) For the purpose of rules and forms, the division may classify securi-
ties, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction, and prescribe different 
requirements for different classes. 
(2) (a) The division may not make, amend, or rescind any rule, form, or 
order unless it finds that the action is in the public interest, for the 
protection of investors, and consistent with the purposes of this chapter. 
(b) In prescribing rules and forms, the division may cooperate with the 
securities administrators of the other states and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to achieve maximum uniformity in the form and 
content of registration statements, applications, and reports wherever 
practicable. 
(3) (a) The division may by rule or order prescribe: 
(i) the form and content of financial statements required under 
this chapter; 
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(ii) the circumstances under which consolidated financial state-
ments shall be filed; and 
(iii) whether or not any required financial statements shall be cer-
tified by independent public accountants. 
(b) All financial statements shall be prepared in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting practices. 
(4) All rules and forms of the division shall be published. 
(5) No provision of this chapter imposing any liability applies to any act 
done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, form, or order of the 
division, notwithstanding that the rule, form, or order may later be amended 
or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for 
any reason. 
(6) The division may by rule classify specific acts as unlawful within the 
meaning of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-2 if it finds that the acts could operate as 
a fraud or part of a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any person, and that 
the rule is not inconsistent with this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-24, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 34; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 237. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, added the in-
ternal subsection designations in Subsection 
(1); in Subsection (l)(a) deleted "including 
rules and forms governing registration state-
ments, applications, and reports, and defining 
any terms, whether or not used in this chapter, 
insofar as the definitions are not inconsistent 
with this chapter" following "chapter"; added 
the internal subsection designations in Subsec-
tions (2) and (3) and made various stylistic 
changes in those subsections; and deleted for-
mer Subsection (6) pertaining to public hear-
ings and redesignated former Subsection (7) as 
Subsection (6). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities Key Numbers. — Licenses «= 18V2(31), (38); 
Regulation — State §§ 87, 89. Securities Regulation *» 270, 274. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion §§ 222, 226. 
(1) A document is filed when it is received by tt|iP*Vision. 
(2) The division shall keep a register of all appJimBns for registration and 
registration statements which are or have evejyfcwpneffective under this chap-
ter and all denial, suspension, or revocatigpjilfrders which may have been 
entered under this chapter. The regist^rfnall be open for public inspection. 
(3) The information contained in jj^fued with any registration statement, 
application, or report may be mad^available to the public under such rules as 
the division prescribes. df$ 
(4) Upon request and afcjsfich reasonable charges as it prescribes, the divi-
sion shall furnish tQ-a^y person photostatic or other copies, certified under 
seal if requeste4|J$*any entry in the register or any document which is a 
matter of puhj^^ecord. In any proceeding or prosecution under this chapter, 
any copy ^fipirtified is prima facie evidence of the contents of the entry or 
docurrmpfe^rtified. 
(5£mBfc division in its discretion may honor requests from interested per-
for interpretative opinions. 
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lshrought under this cr 
same force and validity as if served on him personally. Service may be 
by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the division, but it^ 
effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, ac 
proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a C 0 P y j « P e pro-
cess by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at h i s ^ K known 
address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculatedjtfgive actual 
notice, and the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this syjaection is filed 
in the case on or before the return day of the process, if a « ? o r within such 
further time as the court allows. 
(8) When process is served under this section, the^jJPFl, or the executive 
director shall order such continuance as may be necj^ffty to afford the defen-
dant or respondent reasonable opportunity to 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L. busing 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36. Cor 
Cross-References. — Corporations doing 
^state to have resident agent, Utah 
Prt . XII, Sec. 9. 
NOTES TJS 5CISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Foreign contracts. 
In personam jurisdiction. 
Foreign contracts. 
Act did not apply to contracj 
tered into in another state. U; 
& Fin. Corp. v. National Bl< 
Am., 80 Utah 62, 12 P.; 
nied, 80 Utah 70, 17 
under former law). 
de and en-
States Bond 
Loan Ass'n of 
8, rehearing de-
38 (1932) (decided 
In personam ju 
Subsection (7Y 
iction. 
Bs not provide the exclusive 
method of acquiring jurisdiction over one in 
violation of the Securities Act, but simply gives 
a special means of doing so; it does not prevent 
the obtaining of personal jurisdiction by any 
other means provided by statute and, in partic-
ular, does not preclude the use of § 78-27-22, 
the "long-arm statute." Piantes v. Hayden-
Stone, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 P.2d 529 
(1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 995, 94 S. Ct. 
1599, 39 L. Ed. 2d 893, rehearing denied, 416 
U.S. 963, 94 S. Ct. 1983, 40 L. Ed. 2d 314 
(1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
lur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities 
&tion — State §§ 17, 92. 
LS. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
5n § 198. 
Key Numbers. — 
curities Regulation 
Licenses «=> 18V2 (36); Se-
*» 271. 
61-1-27, Construction of chapter. 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-27, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 37. 
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EXHIBIT "15" 
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 61-1-26 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-25, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 35. 
61-1-26, Application of sections — Transactions in Utah — 
Irrevocable consent to service. 
(1) Sections 61-1-1, 61-1-3(1), 61-1-7, 61-1-17 and 61-1-22 apply to persons 
who sell or offer to sell when an offer to sell is made in this state, or an offer to 
buy is made and accepted in this state. 
(2) Sections 61-1-1, 61-1-3(1), and 61-1-17 apply to persons who buy or offer 
to buy when an offer to buy is made in this state, or an offer to sell is made 
and accepted in this state. 
(3) For the purpose of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this 
state, when the offer is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the 
place to which it is directed, or at any post office in this state in the case of a 
mailed offer. 
(4) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when the publisher 
circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state any bona fide 
newspaper or other publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which 
is not published in this state, or which is published in this state but has had 
more than two-thirds of its circulation outside this state during the past 12 
months, or a radio or television program originating outside this state is 
received in this state. 
(5) Sections 61-1-2 and 61-1-3(3), as well as Section 61-1-17 so far as invest-
ment advisers are concerned, apply when any act instrumental in effecting 
prohibited conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is then 
present in this state. 
(6) Every application for registration under this chapter and every issuer 
which proposes to offer a security in this state through any person acting on 
an agency basis in the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such 
form as it by rule prescribes, an irrevocable consent appointing the division or 
the director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor, executor, 
or administrator which arises under this chapter or any rule or order hereun-
der after the consent has been filed, with the same force and validity as if 
served personally on the person filing the consent. A person who has filed 
such a consent in connection with a previous registration need not file an-
other. Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the 
division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in 
a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a 
copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his 
last address on file with the division, and the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance 
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the return day of the 
process, if any, or within such further time as the court allows. 
(7) When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in 
conduct prohibited or made actionable by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of process under Subsec-
tion (6) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in 
this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his appointment of 
the division or the director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful 
process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his 
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successor executor or administrator which grows out of that conduct and 
which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with the 
same force and validity as if served on him personally. Service may be made 
by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the division, but it is not 
effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, action, or 
proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a copy of the pro-
cess by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known 
address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice, and the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed 
in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such 
further time as the court allows. 
(8) When process is served under this section, the court, or the executive 
director shall order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defen-
dant or respondent reasonable opportunity to defend. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L. business in state to have resident agent, Utah 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36. Const. Art. XII, Sec. 9. 
Cross-References. — Corporations doing 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS method of acquiring jurisdiction over one in 
^
 x . violation of the Securities Act, but simply gives Foreign contracts. ,
 c , . . ' , ! A r~ ™™„o™
 1II1.:0j:/,i:Ari a special means of doing so; it does not prevent 
In personam jurisdiction. . r .
 n , . . , . . , 
the obtaining of personal jurisdiction by any 
Foreign contracts. other means provided by statute and, in partic-
Act did not apply to contracts made and en-
 u l a r > d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e t h e u s e o f § 78.27-22, 
tered into in another state. United States Bond
 t h e ^ r m s t a t u t e » p i a n t e s v H d e n . 
& Fin. Corp. v. National Bldg. & Loan Ass n of
 c . T on TT, , O J 1 1 A C1>4 n 0 i c o n 
Am., 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758, rehearing de- ^tone. Inc 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 R2d 529 
nied, 80 Utah 70, 17 P.2d 238 (1932) (decided \9Q7Q3)' T / / " o ! aat u A 3 Z* 
under former law) 1599> 3 9 L ' E d- 2 d 8 9 3 ' r e h e a r l n g denied, 416 
under former law).
 u g ^ ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ £ d 2 d 3 H 
In personam jurisdiction. (1974) 
Subsection (7) does not provide the exclusive 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities Key Numbers. — Licenses <s=> I8V2 (36); Se-
Regulation — State §§ 17, 92. cunties Regulation «= 271. 
C.J.S. — 79 CJ.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion § 198. 
61-1-27. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-27, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 37. 
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SECTIONS 12(j) AND (k), 15A, 19(g)(1) AND (h)(2), 
AND 27, OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 19 34 
EXHIBIT "16 
1420 n-7-90 Registration Requirements— § 12 15,107 
[As added by Act of August 20,1964, Sec. 3(d), 78 Stat. 568.] ^ W ^ 
[H 20,321 ] [Securities Issued by Banks] t M r ^ 
(i) In respect of any securities issued by banks and savings associatioj^jpcdeposits of 
which are insured in accordance with Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Urilwwers, functions, 
and duties vested in the Commission to administer and enforce secygflffz, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 
14(d), 14(f), and 16, (1) with respect to national banks and banks^ jjHBting under the Code of 
Law for the District of Columbia are vested in the Comptad|jP )^f the Currency, (2) with 
respect to all other member banks of the Federal Reserve^prem are vested in the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (3) with grfpR to all other insured banks are 
vested in the Federal Deposit Insurance CorporjiHr; and (4) with respect to savings 
associations the accounts of which are insured b\«^^ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
are vested in the Office of Thrift SupervisionJ3jPComptroller of the Currency, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System |^MFr edera 1 Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision shall h^gpHie power to make such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary for the execution/wtne functions vested in them as provided in this 
subsection. In carrying out their resppnsibilities under this subsection, the agencies named in 
the first sentence of this subsectior s^nall issue substantially similar regulations to regulations 
and rules issued by the Commission under sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), and 16, 
unless they find that implementation of substantially similar regulations with respect to 
insured banks and insured f^nstitutions are not necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for protection ofij^estors, and publish such findings, and the detailed reasons therefor, in 
the Federal Register Such regulations of the above-named agencies, or the reasons for failure 
to publish sud^Tubstantially similar regulations to those of the Commission, shall be 
published vtUm Federal Register within 120 days of the date of enactment of this subsection, 
and, the|«ter, within 60 days of any changes made by the Commission in its relevant 
reguj^pns and rules. 
fks added by Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 3(e), 78 Stat. 569, amended by Act of July 29, 
B, 82 Stat. 454; amended by Act of October 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1503; and Act of August 9, 
1989 (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989), Sec. 
744(vX2), Pub. Law 101-73,103 Stat. 183.] 
[H 20,322] [Suspension or Revocation of Registration of Security] 
(j) The Commission is authorized, by order, as it deems necessary or appropriate for the 
protection of investors to deny, to suspend the effective date of, to suspend for a period not 
exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a security, if the Commission finds, 
on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the issuer of such security has 
failed to comply with any provision of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. No 
member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the 
purchase or sale of, any security the registration of which has been and is suspended or 
revoked pursuant to the preceding sentence. 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 9, 89 Stat. 
118.] 
[H 20,323] [Suspension of Trading of Security] 
(k) TRADING SUSPENSIONS; EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.— 
(1) TRADING SUSPENSIONS.—If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of 
investors so require, the Commission is authorized by order— 
(A) summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than an exempted security) 
for a period not exceeding 10 business days, and 
(B) summarily to suspend all trading on any national securities exchange or 
otherwise, in securities other than exempted securities, for a period not exceeding 90 
calendar days. 
Federal Securities Law Reports S 6 C . 1 2 ^ 2 0 , 3 2 3 
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The action described in subparagraph (B) shall not take effect unless the Commission notifies 
the President of its decision and the President notifies the Commission that the President 
does not disapprove of such decision. 
[Added by the Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 9, 89 Stat. 
118; amended by Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Public Law 
101-432, 104 Stat. 963.] 
(2) EMERGENCY ORDERS.—(A) The Commission, in an emergency, may by order summa-
rily take such action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions 
with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or a self-
regulatory organization under this title, as the Commission determines is necessary in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors— 
(i) to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets (other than markets inA 
exempted securities), or 
(ii) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transaction! 
securities (other than exempted securities). 
(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) shall continue in effecygj^he 
period specified by the Commission, and may be extended, except that in no eventjajnfl the 
Commission's action continue in effect for more than 10 business days, including ja£ffnsions. 
In exercising its authority under this paragraph, the Commission shall not be^Jfiuired to 
comply with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or witryjjpprovisions 
of section 19(c) of this title. 
[As added by Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990, &iP2, Public Law 
101-432, 104 Stat. 963.] 
[H 2Q,323B] [Termination of Emergency Orders] /J 
(3) TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY ACTIONS BY PRESIDENT—The Pfdtfdent may direct that 
action taken by the Commission under paragraph (1)(B) or para$j$$n (2) of this subsection 
shall not continue in effect. 
[As added by Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reformy&4Fbf 1990, Sec. 2, Public Law 
101-432, 104 Stat. 963.] ^ 
[H 20,323C] [Compl iance] i^p 
(4) COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS.—No member of a^Cfional securities exchange, broker, or 
dealer shall make use of the mails or any means onjpjjifrumentality of interstate commerce to 
effect any transaction in, or to induce the purch£gf§5r sale of, any security in contravention of 
an order of the Commission under this subseckkfljpnless such order has been stayed, modified, 
or set aside as provided in paragraph (5) of Af s subsection or has ceased to be effective upon 
direction of the President as provided in pamgraph (3). 
[As added by Act of October 16, ;g0$T(Market Reform Act of 1990, Sec. 2, Public Law 
101-432,104 Stat. 963.] 
[H 20.323D] y f Review of Orders] 
(5) LIMITATIONS ON REVTE^W ORDERS.—An order of the Commission pursuant to this 
subsection shall be subject }4$tY\ew onty a s provided in section 25(a) of this title. Review 
shall be based on an examination of all the information before the Commission at the time 
such order was issued. Tflty reviewing court shall not enter a stay, writ of mandamus, or 
similar relief unless theiourt finds, after notice and hearing before a panel of the court, that 
the Commission's actjfra is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with lay 
[As added b # f c t of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990, Sec 2, Public Law 
101-432, 104 SrM '963/ 
[120,3236] /$* [Emergency] 
(6) JElEHNrnON OF EMERGENCY.—For purposes of this subsection, the term 'emergency' 
means^nnajor market disturbance characterized by or constituting— 
Jjf* (A) sudden and excessive fluctuations of securities prices generally, or a substantial 
^threat thereof, that threaten fair and orderly markets, or 
(B) a substantial disruption of the safe or efficient opera Lion of the national system 
for clearance and settlement of securities, or a substantial threat thereof. 
[As added by Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990, Sec 2, Public Law 
101-432, 104 Stat. 963.] 
[The next page is 15,127.] 
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[As added by Act of November 19, 1988 (Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988), Sec. 5(b)(1), Pub. Law 100-704. 102 Stat. 4077, effective for actions 
occurring after November 18, 1988.] 
[H 20,410] REGISTERED SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS 
[Title as amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 
12(1), 89 Stat. 127. effective December 1, 1975] 
Sec. 15A. (a) An association of brokers and dealers may be registered as a national 
securities association pursuant to subsection (b), or as an affiliated securities association 
pursuant to subsection (d), under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this 
section and in accordance with the provisions of section 19(a) of this title, by filing with the 
Commission an application for registration in such form as the Commission, by rule, may 
prescribe containing the rules of the association and such other information and documents as 
the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of June 4, 1975 
(Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[D 20,410A] [Requirements for Regulation] 
(b) An association of brokers and dealers shall not be registered as a national securities 
association unless the Commission determines that— 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of June 4, 1975 
(Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975] 
[H 2 0 , 4 1 0 B ] [Ability to Carry Out Purposes of Law] 
(1) By reason of the number and geographical distribution of its members and the scope 
of their transactions, such association will be able to carry out the purposes of this section. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a)(1), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4. 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[D 20,410c] [Organization of Association; Ability to Enforce Compliance] 
(2) Such association is so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the 
purposes of this title and to comply, and (subject to any rule or order of the Commission 
pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by its members and 
persons associated with its members, with the provisions of this title, the rules and regula-
tions thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the rules of the 
association. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a)(1), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975] 
[H 20,4100] [Membership in Association] 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the rules of the association 
provide that any registered broker or dealer may become a member of such association and 
any person may become associated with a member thereof. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a)(2), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4. 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975] 
[H 20,410E] [Administration of Association's Affairs] 
(4) The rules of the association assure a fair representation of its members in the 
selection of its directors and administration of its affairs and provide that one or more 
directors shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a member 
of the association, broker, or dealer. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a)(3), 78 Stat. 574-578; as amended by Act of June 4, 1975, Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 
127, effective December 1, 1975] 
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[H 20 /410F] [Equitable Allocation of Dues, Fees and Charges] 
(5) The rules of the association provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues 
fees and othtr charges among members and issuers and other persons using an\ tacihtv or 
svstem which the association operates or controls 
[As added b> Act of August 20 1964 Sec 7(a)(4) 78 Stat v 4 S78 as amended b\ Act 
of June 4 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments ol 197->) Sec 12(2) 89 Stat 127 effective 
December 1 1975 ] 
[11 20,410G] [Design of Association's Rules] 
(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts 
and practices to promote just and equitable principles of trade to foster cooperation and 
(oordination with persons engaged in regulating clearing settling processing information 
with respect to and facilitating transactions in securities to remove impediments to and 
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market svstem and in 
general to protect investors and the public interest and are not designed to permit unfair 
discrimination between customers issuers brokers or dealers to fiv minimum profits to 
impose anv schedule or fix rates of commissions allowances discounts or other fees to be 
1J20,410F §15A © 1989, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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charged by its members, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this title 
matters not related to the purposes of this title or the administration of the association. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), 
Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 127, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[H 20,4101-1] [Disciplining of Members and Persons Associated with 
Members] 
(7) The rules of the association provide that (subject to any rule or order of the 
Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) its members and persons 
associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any provision 
of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of 
activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being 
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), 
Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[120,4101] [Fair Procedure] 
(8) The rules of the association are in accordance with the provisions of subsection (h) of 
this section, and, in general, provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and 
persons associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking member-
ship therein, the barring of any person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and 
the prohibition or limitation by the association of any person with respect to access to services 
offered by the association or a member thereof. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(a), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), 
Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[ 1 20,410.1] [No Burden on Competition] 
(9) The rules of the association do not impose any burden on competition not necessary 
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this title. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 170; as amended by Act of August 20, 1964, 
Sec. 7(a), 78 Stat. 574-578; Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 
12(2), 89 Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[ 1 20,41 OK] [Aff i l iated Association] 
(10) The requirements of subsection (c), insofar as these may be applicable, are satisfied. 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of August 20, 
1964, Sec. 7(aX6); Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(2), 89 
Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[H 20,4101] [Distribution or Publication of Quotations] 
(11) The rules of the association include provisions governing the form and content of 
quotations relating to securities sold otherwise than on a national securities exchange which 
may be distributed or published by any member or person associated with a member, and the 
persons to whom such quotations may be supplied. Such rules relating to quotations shall be 
designed to produce fair and informative quotations, to prevent fictitious or misleading 
quotations, and to promote orderly procedures for collecting, distributing, and publishing 
quotations. 
{As added by Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 7(a)(7), 78 Stat. 577; and as amended by Act 
of June 4,1975, Sec. 12(2), 89 Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[H 20,410M] [Affiliated Securities Associations] 
(c) The Commission may permit or require the rules of an association applying for 
registration pursuant to subsection (b), to provide for the admission of an association 
registered as an affiliated securities association pursuant to subsection (d), to participation in 
said applicant association as an affiliate thereof, under terms permitting such powers and 
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responsibilities to such affiliate, and under such other appropriate terms and conditions, as 
may be provided by the rules of said applicant association, if such rules appear to the 
Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors and to carry out the purposes of this section. The duties and powers of the 
Commission with respect to any national securities association or any affiliated association 
shall in no way be limited by reason of any such affiliation. 
[H 2 0 , 4 1 0 M ] [Requirements for Registration of Affi l iated Securities 
Association] 
(d) An applicant association shall not be registered as an affiliated securities association 
unless it appears to the Commission that— 
(1) such association, notwithstanding that it does not satisfy the requirements set forth 
in paragraph (1) of subsection (b), will, forthwith upon the registration thereof, be admitted 
to affiliation with an association registered as a national securities association pursuant to 
said subsection (b), in the manner and under the terms and conditions provided by the rules 
of said national securities association in accordance with subsection (c); and 
(2) such association and its rules satisfy the requirements set forth in paragraphs (2) to 
(10) inclusive and paragraph (12), of subsection (b); except that in the case of any such 
association any restrictions upon membership therein of the type authorized by paragraph 
(3) of subsection (b) shall not be less stringent than in the case of the national securities 
association with which such association is to be affiliated. 
[As amended by Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 7(b), 78 Stat. 577.] 
[11 20,4100] [Dealing with Nonmember Professionals] 
(eXl) The rules of a registered securities association may provide that no member 
thereof shall deal with any nonmember professional (as defined in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection) except at the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on the same 
terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the general public. 
[As added by Act of June 25,1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as redesignated from subsection (i) 
to (e) and amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts of Amendments of 1975), Sec. 
12(3), 89 Stat. 128, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[U 20,41 OP] [Nonmember Professional] 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "nonmember professional" shall include 
(A) with respect to transactions in securities other than municipal securities, any registered 
broker or dealer who is not a member of any registered securities association, except such a 
broker or dealer who deals exclusively in commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and 
commercial bills, and (B) with respect to transactions in municipal securities, any municipal 
securities dealer (other than a bank or division or department of a bank) who is not a member 
of any registered securities association and any municipal securities broker who is not a 
member of any such association. 
[As added by Act of June 25,1938, 52 Stat. 1070; and as amended by Act of June 4, 1975 
(Securities Acts of Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(3), 89 Stat. 1,28, effective December 1, 
1975.] 
[U 20,410Q] (Allowances to Members; Municipal Securities] 
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be so construed or applied as to prevent (A) any 
member of a registered securities association from granting to any other member of any 
registered securities association any dealer's discount, allowance, commission, or special 
terms, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, or (B) any member of a registered 
securities association or any municipal securities dealer which is a bank or a division or 
department of a bank from granting to any member of any registered securities association or 
any such municipal securities dealer any dealer's discount, allowance, commission, or special 
terms in connection witn the purchase or sale of municipal securities: Provided, however, 
That the granting of any such discount, allowance, commission, or special terms in connection 
with the purchase or sale of municipal securities shall be subject to rules of the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board adopted pursuant to section 15B(bX2XK) of this title. 
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[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat 1070 and as amended b> Act of June 4 1975 
(Securities Acts of Amendments of 1975), Sec 12(2), 89 Stat 128, effective December 1, 
1975] 
[H 20,410QA] [Transaction in Exempted Security] 
(fXO Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, nothing in this section shall 
be construed to apply with respect to any transaction by a registered broker or dealer in any 
exempted security 
[As added by Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat 1070, as redesignated from (m) by Act of 
June 4, 1975, Sec 12(3), 89 Stat 129, effective December 1, 1975, and amended by Act of 
October 28, 1986 (Government Securities Act of 1986), effective July 25 1987 Sec 102(g) 
Pub Law 99-571, 100 Stat 3218] 
[H 2 0 , 4 1 0 0 B ] [Rulemaking by Associations] 
(2) A registered securities association may adopt and implement rules applicable to 
members of such association (A) to enforce compliance by registered brokers and dealers with 
applicable provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder (B) to provide 
that its members and persons associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined, 
in accordance with subsections (b)(7), (bX8), and (h) of this section, for violation of applicable 
provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder, (C) to provide for reasonable 
inspection and examination of the books and records of registered brokers and dealers, (D) to 
provide for the matters described in paragraphs (bX3), (bX4), and (b)(5) of this section (E) 
to implement the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, and (F) to prohibit fraudulent, 
misleading, deceptive, and false advertising 
[As added by Act of October 28, 1986 (Government Securities Act of 1986), effective 
July 25,1987, Sec 102(g), Pub Law 99-571,100 Stat 3218 ] 
[H 20,41 OQC] [Rules Involving Municipal Securities Transactions] 
(3) Nothing in subsection (bX6) or (bXH) of this section shall be construed to permit a 
registered securities association to make rules concerning any transaction by a registered 
broker or dealer in a municipal security 
[As added by Act of October 28, 1986 (Government Securities Act of 1986), effective 
July 25, 1987, Sec 102(g), Pub Law 99-571, 100 Stat 3218 ] 
[H 20,41 OR] [Denial of Membership] 
(gXl) A registered securities association shall deny membership to anv person who is not 
a registered broker or dealer 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec 12(4), 89 
Stat 129, effective December 1,1975 ] 
[H 20,410S] [Persons Subject to Statutory Disqualification] 
(2) A registered securities association may, and in cases in which the Commission, by 
order, directs as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors shall, deny membership to any registered broker or dealer, and bar from becoming 
associated with a member any person, who is subject to a statutory disqualification A 
registered securities association shall file notice with the Commission not less than thirty days 
prior to admitting any registered broker or dealer to membership or permitting any person to 
become associated with a member, if the association knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known, that such broker or dealer or person was subject to a statutory 
disqualification The notice shall be in such form and contain such information as the 
Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec 12(4), 89 
Stat 129, effective December 1,1975 ] 
[H 20,410T] [Who May Be Denied Membership or Association with Member] 
(3XA) A registered securities association may deny membership to, or condition the 
membership of, a registered broker or dealer if (I) such broker or dealer does not meet such 
standards of financial responsibility or operational capability or such broker or dealer or any 
natural person associated with such broker or dealer does not meet such standards of training, 
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experience and competence as are prescribed b\ the rules of the association or <u> such 
broker or dealer or person associated with such broker or dealer has engaged and there is a 
reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or practices inconsistent with just and 
equitable principles of trade A registered securities association mav examine and venfv the 
qualifications of an applicant to become a member and the natural persons associated with 
such an applicant in accordance with procedures established bv the rules of the association 
(B) A registered securities association mav bar a natural person from becoming 
associated with a member or condition the association of a natural person with a member 
if such nafural person (I) does not meet such standards of training experience and 
competence as are prescribed by the rules of the association or (n) has engaged and there 
is a reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or practices inconsistent with just 
and equitable principles of trade A registered securities association mav examine and 
verify the qualifications of an applicant to become a person associated with a member in 
accordance with procedures established by the rules of the association and require a 
natural person associated with a member, or anv class of such natural persons to be 
registered with the association in accordance with procedures so established 
(C) A registered securities association mav bar any person from becoming associated 
with a member if such person does not agree d) to supplv the association with such 
information with respect to its relationship and dealing* with the member as mav be 
specified in the rules of the association and (n) to permn examination of its books and 
records to venfv the accuracy of anv information so supplied 
(D) Nothing in subparagraph (A) (B), or (C) of this paragraph shall be construed to 
permit a registered securities association to denv membership to or condition the 
membership of or bar anv person from becoming associated with or condition the 
association of any person with a broker or dealer that engages exclusivelv in transactions 
in exempted securities 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975) Sec 12(4) 89 
Stat 129, effective December 1 1975, and amended bv Act of October 28 1986 (Government 
Securities Act of 1986) effective July 25 1987 Sec 102(g) Pub Law 99 571 100 Stat 
3218] 
[H 2 0 , 4 1 0 1 A ] [Qualification Standards for Membership by Government 
Securities Brokers and Dealers or Association With Member] 
(4)(A) A registered securities association mav den> membership o^ or condition the 
membership of, a government securities broker or government securities dealer if such 
government securities broker or government securities dealer (I) does not meet standards of 
financial responsibility under rules adopted pursuant to section 15C(b)(l)(A) of this title or 
(n) has engaged and there is a reasonable likelihood that it will again engage in anv conduct 
or practice which would subject such government securities broker or government securities 
dealer to sanctions under section 15C(c) of this title A registered securities association mav 
establish procedures including examination of the books and records of government securities 
brokers and government securities dealers to verify compliance with the provisions of this 
title and the rules thereunder 
(B) A registered securities association may bar any person from becoming associated 
with a member or condition the association of a person with a member (I) if such person 
has engaged in any conduct or practice and there is a reasonable likelihood that such 
person will again engage in any conduct or practice which would subject such person to 
sanctions under section 15C(c)of this title, or (n) if such person does not agree to supplv 
such association with such information with respect to its relationship and dealings with 
the member as may be specified m the rules of the association and to permit examination 
of its books and records to verify the accuracy thereof, 
[As added by Act of October 28, 1986 (Government Securities Act of 1986), effective 
July 25,1987, Sec 102(g), Pub Law 99 571, 100 Stat 3218] 
[H 20,4101)] [Type of Business Done] 
(5) A registered securities association may deny membership to a registered broker or 
dealer not engaged in a type of business in which the rules of the association require members 
to be engaged Provided however, That no registered securities association mav deny (cont d) 
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membership to a registered broker or dealer by reason of the amount of such type of business 
done by such broker or dealer or the other types of business in which he is engaged. 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(4), 89 
Stat. 130, effective December 1, 1975; and redesignated as paragraph (5) by Act of October 
28, 1986 (Government Securities Act of 1986), effective July 25, 1987, Sec. 102(g), Pub. Law 
99-571, 100 Stat. 3218.] 
[H 20,410V] [Disciplinary Proceedings] 
(hXl) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to determine whether a 
member or person associated with a member should be disciplined (other than a summary 
proceeding pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection) the association shall bring specific 
charges, notify such member or person of, and give him an opportunity to defend against, 
such charges, and keep a record. A determination by the association to impose a disciplinary 
sanction shall be supported by a statement setting forth— 
(A) any act or practice in which such member or person associated with a member 
has been found to have engaged, or which such member or person has been found to have 
omitted; 
(B) the specific provision of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules 
of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association which any 
such act or practice, or omission to act, is deemed to violate; and 
(C) the sanction imposed and the reason therefor. 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(4), 89 
Stat. 130, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[1120,410W] [Procedure] 
(2) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to determine whether a 
person shall be denied membership, barred from becoming associated with a member, or 
prohibited or limited with respect to access to services offered by the association or a member 
thereof (other than a summary proceeding pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection), the 
association shall notify such person of and give him an opportunity to be heard upon, the 
specific grounds for denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation under consideration and keep a 
record. A determination by the association to deny membership, bar a person from becoming 
associated with a member, or prohibit or limit a person with respect to access to services 
offered by the association or a member thereof shall be supported by a statement setting forth 
the specific grounds on which the denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation is based. 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 12(4), 89 
Stat. 130, effective December 1,1975.] 
[H 20,41 OX] [Summary Proceeding] 
(3) A registered securities association may summarily (A) suspend a member or person 
associated with a member who has been and is expelled or suspended from any self-regulatory 
organization or barred or suspended from being associated with a member of any self-
regulatory organization, (B) suspend a member who is in such financial or operating 
difficulty that the association determines and so notifies the Commission that the member 
cannot be permitted to continue to do business as a member with safety to investors, 
creditors, other members, or the association, or (C) limit or prohibit any person with respect 
to access to services offered by the association if subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph is 
applicable to such person or, in the case of a person who is not a member, if the association 
determines that such person does not meet the qualification requirements or other prerequi-
sites for such access and such person cannot be permitted to continue to have such access 
with safety to investors, creditors, members, or the association. Any person aggrieved by any 
such summary action shall be promptly afforded an opportunity for a hearing by the 
association in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection. The 
Commission, by order, may stay any such summary action on its own motion or upon 
application by any person aggrieved thereby, if the Commission determines summarily or 
after notice and opportunity for hearing (which hearing may consist solely of the submission 
of affidavits or presentation of oral arguments) that such stay is consistent with the public 
interest and the protection of investors. 
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regulatory agency may cancel, reduce, or require the remission of such sanction. M 
[As added by Act of July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 4531 and as amended by Act of June 4, ijjWP 
(Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 Stat. 151.] ^Kr 
[11 20,463] [Standards for Review of Denial of Membership, Etc.] gm^ 
(f) In any proceeding to review the denial of membership or partjyjPPTon in a self-
regulatory organization to any applicant, the barring of any person froHMBRming associated 
with a member of a self-regulatory organization, or the prohibitiojj|ffimitation by a self-
regulatory organization of any person with respect to access to^Bnces offered by the self-
regulatory organization or any member thereof if the appropjgjpregulatory agency for such 
applicant or person, after notice and opportunity for hedHg (which hearing may consist 
solely of consideration of the record before the self-rejM^rv organization and opportunity 
for the presentation of supporting reasons to dismjfljjPrproceeding or set aside the action of 
the self-regulatory organization) finds that thejjJjKTic grounds on which such denial, bar, or 
prohibition or limitation is based exist ijatfpRT that such denial, bar, or prohibition or 
limitation is in accordance with the ruigBSr the self-regulatory organization, and that such 
rules are, and were applied in aJjpBfer consistent with the purposes of this title, such 
appropriate regulatory agency^jBptjrder, shall dismiss the proceeding. If such appropriate 
regulatory agency does nqftJjttKe any such finding or if it finds that such denial, bar, or 
prohibition or limitatigjrtp^oses any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of tj^gjgfposes of this title, such appropriate regulatory agency, by order, shall 
set aside thegdJBrrof the self-regulatory organization and require it to admit such applicant 
to memhgflPJfor participation, permit such person to become associated with a member, or 
grangJfPm person access to services offered by the self-regulatory organization or member 
jgBr [As amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 
• F s t a t . 151. 
[11 20,464] [Compliance and Enforcement of Compliance] 
(g)(1) Every self-regulatory organization shall comply with the provisions of this title, 
the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules, and (subject to the provisions of 
section 17(d) of this title, paragraph (2) of this subsection, and the rules thereunder) absent 
reasonable justification or excuse enforce compliance— 
(A) in the case of a national securities exchange, with such provisions by its 
members and persons associated with its members; 
(B) in the case of a registered securities association, with such provisions and the 
provisions of the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board by its members and 
persons associated with its members; and 
(C) in the case of a registered clearing agency, with its own rules by its participants. 
[As amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 
Stat. 152, effective December 1, 1975.] 
i: 
The Commission, by rule, consistent with the publk^^KjSPHP^R>Fe^tion of 
investors, and the other purposes of this title, m a y r e t o ^ t f f r ^ ^ ^ 7 r ' " ^ - - y organization of 
any responsibility under this title to e n ^ ^ ^ | g y f f ^ ^ a t h any specified provision of this 
title or the rules or regulatWM^j^^^wPr^yany member of such organization or person 
associated with su^«J^p^r, ' - o1 r any class of such members or persons associated with a 
member.^ •jaB*™" -*" 
rrtended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 
152 , effective December 1, 1975.] 
(h)(1) The appropriate regulatory agency for a^^jggBaHppPBHWwWs^uthorized, 
by order, if in its opinion such a c t i o n j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P J W ^ R a ^ i r i the public interest, for the 
protection of in '^JI^^MLMSJ^J^^^ 'T lrmNTi of the purposes of this title, to suspend for 
a perip^^^ppBBBwr^Twelve months or revoke tne registration of such self-regulatory 
on, or to censure or impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and opera-
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ulatory organization, if such appropriate regulatory agency fu 
record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such self-regulatory^gjipRmon has 
violated or is unable to comply with any provisions of this t i t l e^ jggpJSror regulations 
thereunder, or its own rules or without reasonable justificatioj^fljBBreenas failed to enforce 
compliance— 
(A) in the case of a national securitiflgJ^PHFrTge, with any such provision by a 
member thereof or a person associatexygMproernber thereof; 
(B) in the case of a 111 i hJflJJjTTTTi 111 association, with any such provision or any 
provision of the rules j^dPSffunic ipa l Securities Rulemaking Board by a member 
thereof or a perstpjjjg^ffired with a member thereof; or 
e of a registered clearing agency, with any provision of its own rules by 
therein, 
['amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 
152, effective December 1, 1975.] 
[H 20,467] [Power of Appropriate Regulatory Agency Over Members and 
Participants] 
(2) The appropriate regulatory agency for a self-regulatory organization is authorised, 
by order, if in its opinion such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the 
protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title, to suspend for 
a period not exceeding twelve months or expel from such seli-regulatory organization any 
member thereof or participant therein, if such member or participant is subject to an order of 
the Commission pursuant to section 15(b)(4) of this title or if such appropriate regulatory 
agency finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such member or 
participant has willfully violated or has effected any transaction for any other person who, 
such member or participant had reason to believe, was violating with respect to such 
transaction— 
(A) in the case of a national securities exchange, any provision of the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
this title, or the rules or regulations under any of such statutes; 
(B) in the case of a registered securities association, any provision of the Securities 
Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
this title, or the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; or 
(C) in the case of a registered clearing agency, any provision of the rules of the 
clearing agency. 
[As amended by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 16, 89 
Stat. 153, effective December 1, 1975.] 
(3) The appropriate regulatory agency for a national securities exchange 
securities association is authorized, by order, if in its opinion such actjfflfliitoflecessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, o ^ f l M p f MII furtherance 
of the purposes of this title, to suspend for a period not exceedyggjgPremonths or to bar any 
person from being associated with a member of such na tyMJpPnmies exchange or registered 
securities association, if such person is subject [%&&&$r of the Commission pursuant to 
section 15(b)(6) or if such appropriate regu l<\tgrfjiPn% finds, on the record after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that such persogrfp^llfully violated or has effected any transac-
tion for any other person who, suc^jp^^efn'associated with a member had reason to believe, 
was violating with respect to sucfoframsaction— 
(A) in the case.tfjpJtational securities exchange, any provision of the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Xfjjjfpiflent Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
this title^gMJPfules or regulations under any of such statutes; or 
^ J i p & r t h e case of a registered securities association, any provision of the Securities 
^ j d | p l n 9 3 3 , the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
^jfflRTs title, the rules or regulations under any of the statutes, or the rules of the Municipal 
P " Securities Rulemaking Board. 
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sffiffiffieftt of report i^tw^S^PS^trSte^^^, 
shall be unlawful to make, or cause to be rna. 
security any represeE 
be so om^f^B^B^^^cff efT^et'" 
haTit is.' 
iS^f^r'seirer of a 
fact bv any such authority is to 
[H 20,551] JURISDICTION OF OFFENSES AND SUITS 
Sec. 27. The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any 
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the 
rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district 
wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to 
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations thereunder, or to 
enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district 
or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and 
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an 
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall 
be subject to review as provided in sections 1254, 1291, 1292, and 1294 of title 28, United 
States Code. No costs shall be assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding under 
this title brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such other courts. 
[As amended by Act of June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921; Act of June 25, 1948, Sec. 32(b), 62 
Stat. 991; Act of May 24, 1949, Sec. 127, 53 Stat. 107; amended by Act of December 4, 1987 
(Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization Act of 1987), Sec. 326, Pub. Law 
100-181, 101 Stat. 1249.] 
Sec. 27A. (a) EFFECT ON PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION.—The limitation peri<g|*P*any 
private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commencec^pw before 
June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws audlKIe in the 
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on Jy^BPi 1991. 
[As added by Act of December 19, 1991 (Federal Deposit Ijgjpnce Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991), Sec. 476, Pub. Law 102-242, 105 Stat. 22Jjp* 
[H 20,553] [Effect on Dismissed Causes of Actw»T 
(b) EFFECT ON DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION.—Any prjgpfcivil action implied under 
section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or beforejilK 19, 1991— 
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequenrapBune 19, 1991, and 
(2) which would have been timely filed undej^JlpGrnitation period provided by the laws 
applicable in the jurisdiction, including princiflMpfrf retroactivity, as such laws existed on 
June 19, 1991, JBF' 
shall be reinstated on motion by t h e ^ f l u f f not later than 60 days after the date of 
enactment of this section. *j||3F' 
[As added by Act of ^<tfriS& 19, 1991 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991), S a 0 R f Pub. Law 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.] 
[H 20,561] ^ B R F F E C T ON EXISTING LAW 
Sec. 28. (a) ThejwBRs and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and 
all other rights annpniedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted to 
maintain a SM/BW damages under the provisions of this title shall recover, through 
satisfaction^ppfcdgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual 
damagejgflpfccount of the act complained of. Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction 
°f t.h«Hinties commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State 
o w p y security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this title 
^•Pfie rules and regulations thereunder. No State law which prohibits or regulates the making 
H 20,551 Sec. 27 
, call, stradaleT 
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of the NYSK's conduct in cancelling a sale c.f MOMS during negotiations fur the salt*, and ilie 
Kquitv Funding bonds. The bondholder had mailing of confirmations of vale—Sftni^uc <<• 
directed his broker to effectuate such sale which NammacktSEC 1973), 1973 CCH per:? 79.-l.Vl. 
direction had been carried out. Since trading of . ,
 c „ • * . . . .-„ '""D • .„. , 
v- ^ J • L J L i i .47 Suspension of trading—Private sales— hquitv runding securities had been suspended „ , , , ,, „° . . . , ,. 
. ; . • , . . , / , Broker-dealer involvement.—Although Sr imn {•nor to the owning of the market on the dav said . - , ~.
 f l W . t . . . . , . . 
. *• \ . ~ . • . . l."M<:»o) oLine h.xchange Act prohibits a broker 
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17 CFR 241.7920. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission today made public a policy statement of 
its Division of Trading and Markets relating to the post-suspension consummation of 
securities transactions entered into by brokers and dealers before the Commission 
suspended trading in the security pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. 
The text of the statement, issued by Irving M. Pollack, Director of the Division, 
follows: 
"A number of questions have been presented recently as to whether, during the 
period when trading is suspended by order of the Commission pursuant to Section 
15(c)(5) or Section 19(aX4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer 
may complete (e.g., by payment or delivery) an agency or principal contract entered 
into prior to the suspension. 
"It is the position of the Division that where the broker or dealer is himself acting 
in good faith, where he is not connected with the activity announced by the Commis-
sion as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4), and 
where he has no reason to believe that his customer is so connected, no objection need 
be raised under such sections because the broker-dealer completes his contractual 
obligations in the particular transaction (e.g., by payment or delivery) while the 
suspension is still in effect. The Division believes that in each such case, however, he 
should inform his customer, prior to consummating the transaction, that trading in the 
security is suspended and of the reasons announced by the Commission for suspending 
trading. 
"A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate such a transaction, must of 
course consider not only the provisions of Sections 15(c)(5) and 19(a)(4) but also all 
other applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws." 
[Release No. 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 31 F. R. 10076.] 
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UNCIVIL RITES 
Conservatives argued for years that the problem with 
liberals was that they relied on an activist Supreme 
Court for victories they were unable to win in Congress. 
Last week President Bush fell into the same unfortunate 
habit. The civil rights bill and the attempt to lift the gag 
rule on abortion were introduced to overrule conserva-
tive Supreme Court decisions that ironically claimed to 
be deferring to the "original intention" of Congress. In 
both cases, Congress said the Court got its intention 
wrong. And in both cases, Mr. Bush refused to enforce 
the laws as written, even after Congress tried to make its 
intention clear. 
The question in the abortion debate was what Con-
gress intended when it passed the Family Planning Act 
of 1970. The purpose of the act (according to the 
preamble) is to "make readily available information on 
family planning." But in 1988 a pro-life Reagan aide 
wrote a regulation that said the act was intended to ban 
federally financed clinics from discussing abortion. 
Deferring to his "expertise," the Court upheld the regu-
lation last spring. Majorities in both houses of Congress 
immediately said they intended nothing of the sort, and 
tried to lift the gag rule, but Mr. Bush vetoed. The 
moral is that conservative federal agencies can ignore 
or rewrite their statutory mandates, unless two-thirds of 
both houses agree to stop them. 
The civil rights bill, similarly, was introduced to over-
rule a series of recent Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After attacking the 
measure as a "quota bill," Mr. Bush caved on the central 
point and agreed to shift the burden of proving dis-
crimination back from the employee to the employer. 
To remedy this, administration lawyers are now claim-
ing they acquiesced to a "killer provision" in the bill 
that, although clearly framed by Democrats to endorse 
affirmative action, will be read by them—and the 
Court—to strike down all means of affirmative action. 
(See "Last Laugh" by Fred Barnes, below.) To add insult 
to injury, on the eve of the signing, C. Boyden Gray, Mr. 
Bush's legal adviser, went one step further. He tried to 
achieve by executive fiat what he had failed to achieve 
in Congress, and instructed federal agencies to end 
affirmative action. (See "Race Unconscious," TRB, page 
4.) Although Mr. Bush disavowed the order, he signed a 
"signing statement" written by Mr. Gray. It tells agencies 
to follow an interpretation of the law that Congress had 
rejected, but that a handful of Republican senators 
placed in the Congressional Record as part of its "legisla-
tive history." 
Both moves are particularly cynical. The first is simply 
a bid to get Congress to enact a law that's clearly against 
its intention. The second is a more fundamental breach 
of the principles of judicial restraint. In the past, Mr. 
Bush's lawyers have repeatedly endorsed Justice 
Antonin Scalia's view that judges should ignore legisla-
tive history since it's easily manipulated by special inter-
ests and rarely reflects the views of a majority of Con-
gress. But despite his emphasis on the text of a bill, Jus-
tice Scalia is reluctant to enforce Congress's intentions 
unless there are no ambiguities—an unrealistic proposi-
tion. The upshot is that in conflicts with the new execu-
tive/judicial axis, Congress will lose one way or another. 
This is hardly good news for principled conservatives. 
Contempt for original intention in statutory interpreta-
tion is hard to reconcile with respect for original inten-
tion in constitutional interpretation. And it's ironic that 
the "strict constructionist" president and Supreme 
Court are conspiring to prevent the people's represen-
tatives in Congress from enacting their will into law, 
either by legislative mischief or by judicial and executive 
fiat. Excuse us, but wasn't that the problem with the 
Warren Court? 
T r, f l A A 1 / •• M-
I J ^ S H I S M OF THE WEEK: "I don't want to just sit 
here learning Congress. I mean, we're all in this 
togetherX—President Bush, November 20, to news, 
anchor BiiV>tuart of KCNC-TV, Denver i 
"I think the \ongress should be blamed." —several Mi-
nutes later, tomVarner Saunders of WMAQ-TV, Chicago • 
WHITE HOUSEWCH 
LAST LATOI / 
By Fred Barnes Jk 
C . Boyden Gray, the Whife Hov^e legal counsel and foe of racial quotas, j rb lamedtor bungling nego-tiations on the n d f Civil Rights Act. President Bush was forced Jo settle for a b i \ that, by nearly 
all accounts, containedmiore of what Derrtocrats and the 
civil rights lobby h|jfl sought, and less q£ what Bush 
wanted. Gray, in adFop-ed piece in The Washington Post, 
insisted that Busjjfriad gotten the better oft™ deal, but 
few believed hijj^ L Then Gray tried to get Bush\o invoke 
presidential ajRhority to eliminate the government's pro-
gram of raojal quotas, preferences, and set-asidek. That 
blew up ij^Gray's (and Bush's) face. The president con-
frontedjnvith an angry protest by black leaderStend 
Republican Senator Jack Danforth of Missouri, sblit 
pubpclv with Grav. When he signed the bill on Novemcfer 
2J; Bush declared his support for "the govern men t \ 
Jfffirmative action program." Gray dutifully fell on his^ 
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